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Abstract 
 
In a time defined as both an age of abundant atheism which triumphs in the wake of the death 
of God, and an age of post-secularism which returns to religion, the discrete forms of music 
and cinema remain germane sites for theorising the relation between belief and the nature of 
existence. Taking up the particular relation between the cinematic human figure and musical 
meaning, how might Marcel Cobussen’s musical-spiritual concept of “the threshold” 
problematise the difference between Christian and atheistic belief, so as to reimagine the 
boundaries of spiritual identity, faith, truth, ethics, choice and possibility?  
 
As an original contribution to knowledge, this thesis engages a series of liminal aesthetic 
modes—the ineffable, the uncanny, utopian desire and absurd feeling—to bring spiritual 
theories of music and film philosophy into a dynamic dialogue with one another, not only to 
develop a circuit of reciprocity between the two disciplines that affirms the significance of 
one to the other, but to work toward a more complex understanding of the spiritual 
significance of the cinematic human figure and musical meaning than discrete theories of 
cinema, music or film music have traditionally accommodated alone. Drawing from a range 
of continental thinkers such as Friedrich Nietzsche, Søren Kierkegaard, Vladimir 
Jankélévitch, Edgar Morin, Gilles Deleuze and Marcel Cobussen, this thesis argues that 
liminal modes of musical meaning and the cinematic human figure inhabit a dynamic, 
indeterminate space between a belief in eternity and a belief in time, becoming conduits and 
catalysts for a mode of possibility I call spiritual complexity. Spiritual complexity affirms the 
paradox, ambiguity and irony of liminal modes of existence in our post-religious and post-
secular time, where the ontological and ethical possibilities of human identity may be 
reimagined in the thresholds of archaic, Platonic, Christian and atheistic belief.
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Introduction: Music, Cinema and Spiritual Complexity 
 
At the end of the twentieth century, Dennis Schmidt takes up the problem of “an ethics for 
these times”, emphasising the plural significance of what it means to live and die in this 
particular time that is “ours”.1 Our times means “these times of the triumph of a technological 
world-order, these times after Auschwitz, these times in which “the Judeo-Christian 
tradition…of ethics…is of diminishing efficacy.” ”2 Following Nietzsche, Schmidt writes that 
an ethics for these times can no longer be determined by the absolute categories of good and 
evil, but would somehow speak to “our shared life in time after thinking has been released 
from the timeless assumptions of metaphysics, that is, after we no longer presume to think 
from the vantage point of an infinite and omnipresent mind that suffers no death.”3  
 
Two decades later, a profound irony haunts this “ethics “for our times”…the time of the death 
of God”,4 as this release chafes uneasily against the so-called return of religion. Our times 
also means not only an abundant atheism which triumphs in the wake of the death of God, but 
also, as Gregg Lambert notes, the intensely politicised presence of “post-secularism, or the 
“return of religion”,” with “signs of this return…everywhere, and not only in the Islamic 
world, but in the former West as well”.5 Between the two perspectives, we could say that our 
times encompasses both the continuing order of belief bound to a universalising, monotheistic 
faith in God and eternity, and an embodied mode of existence that, for Schmidt, is acutely 
“attuned to the finite experience of mortal life” and death,6 a mode which is bound to the 
natural cosmos and the temporal world.  
 
However paradoxically, I wonder if an ethics for our times must somehow reckon with this 
ideological impasse that continues to divide an order of creationist thought from its 
evolutionary other. While this impasse indicates a difference between religious and atheistic 
belief, it simultaneously invites a qualification regarding the subtle, yet significant, 
                                                 
1 Dennis J. Schmidt, “What We Owe the Dead: Of Mortality, Measure, and Morality,” Research in 
Phenomenology 27, no. 1 (1997): 190–91, Proquest Central. Quotation source: Werner Marx, Gibt es auf Erden 
ein Maß? (translated as Is there a Measure on Earth?), trans. T. Nenon and R. Lilly (Chicago: Chicago 
University Press, 1987), 2.  
2 Ibid., 191. Quotation source: Ibid. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Gregg Lambert, Return Statements: The Return to Religion in Contemporary Philosophy, Incitements 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2016), 38.  
6 Ibid., 192. 
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convergence and difference between atheism and secularism. Both atheism and secularism 
are often used interchangeably to refer to non-religious, non-sacred matters of the temporal 
world. More complexly, while atheism entails the rejection or absence of belief in the 
existence of an omnipotent God or gods, secularism may further entail an acceptance and 
respect for the difference, diversity and equality of religious beliefs. If our time may be 
thought as post-religious and post-secular, it is so in the very particular, political sense that 
the religious/non-religious divide is directly influenced by those non-secular attitudes present 
in both religious and non-religious belief systems.  
 
More precisely for this thesis, and against this political backdrop, we could say that the 
Christian/atheist divide continues to be directly shaped by those adversarial attitudes of 
intolerance, supremacy and hierarchy that are present in both Christianity and atheism, and 
which continue to compel the posthumanist project regarding the nature and purpose of 
human identity. As such, the image of human existence—as traditionally determined through 
the dualistic sites of the spiritual and the material—is fundamentally connected to this 
impasse, as it moves ambiguously between a belief in the truth of eternity, and a belief in the 
truth of time. This difference, as well as its crossing, continues to play out in the world of art 
and aesthetics, where the complex problems of mediation, representation and imagination 
roam freely. In tune with an ethics for our times, and alluding to a rather different mode of 
spiritual belief, the following ruminations prepare a profoundly different image of identity 
and existence for thought, one that engages music and cinema to move beyond the either/or 
predicament of the Christian/atheist divide, one that moves between time and eternity, and 
one that may yet be possible, perhaps even necessary, for our times now. 
 
 “Some day,” writes Sufi teacher Hazrat Inayat Khan at the turn of the twentieth century, 
“music will be the means of expressing universal religion. Time is wanted for this, but there 
will come a day when music and its philosophy will become the religion of humanity.”7 
Almost a century later, musicologist Wilfred Mellers contemplates the place of music in 
relation to the now “familiar theme” of “the Decline of the West”.8 “There is,” he writes, “a 
widespread belief that music—and the civilisation of which music is a part—has reached 
                                                 
7 Hazrat Inayat Khan, The Mysticism of Sound and Music: The Sufi Teaching of Hazrat Inayat Khan, rev. ed., 
Shambala Dragon Editions (Boston: Shambhala Publications, 1996), 8.  
8 Wilfred Mellers, Singing in the Wilderness: Music and Ecology in the Twentieth Century (Urbana: University 
of Illinois Press, 2001), vii.  
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some kind of crisis. …whether or not we still live in a Christian civilisation, we cannot 
escape the implications of our Christian heritage.”9 Around the same time, Russian filmmaker 
Andrei Tarkovsky responds to modernity’s departure from “a true faith in God”, speaking of 
cinema’s role in relation to “the chronic syndrome in modern man, who could be diagnosed 
as being spiritually impotent. …The aim of art is to prepare a person for death, to plough and 
harrow his soul, rendering it capable of turning to good.”10 And in his cinema books, Gilles 
Deleuze offers yet another, more complex dimension to this simultaneous lacuna and 
remainder that manifests its tension in the artworld. Toward a cinema of faith, he writes, 
“Whether we are Christians or atheists, in our universal schizophrenia, we need reasons to 
believe in this world. It is a whole transformation of belief.”11  
 
In these powerful ruminations, the discrete forms of both music and cinema are individually 
presented as mediums of spiritual edification, consolation, hope and salvation, the essence of 
their combined message reclaiming the curative role of art amidst the departure from and 
return to religion. Yet as if to complicate this movement, these reflections also collectively 
suggest that the concepts of spirituality and faith have drifted from their purely religious, 
orthodox moorings, at once unsettling and reaffirming the traditionally distinct sites of 
Christian and atheistic thought. Ambiguously, both music and cinema would seem to invoke 
the presence of a radically different kind of sign, a different kind of faith, one that somehow 
involves this departure and return, but also moves beyond its adversarial division. While 
Khan’s Sufi mysticism would seem to be the exception to the western focus of Tarkovsky, 
Mellers and Deleuze, his appeal for a universal musical religion prophecies their 
acknowledgement regarding the spiritual wound of a ‘world’—a ‘humanity’—that remains, 
inevitably and ironically, without the triumphant victory of either the universal harmony 
promised by religion, or the progressive equality and diversity promised by secularity: caught 
between the two, the very concept of human identity carries within it the uneasy traces of 
existential paradox. Recalling theories of existence such as Kierkegaardian despair, 
Nietzschean nihilism and Sartrean absurdity, twentieth-century humanity appears as a 
spiritual no-man’s-land, with the worlds of music and cinema deeply invested in the stakes of 
                                                 
9 Wilfred Mellers, Caliban Reborn: Renewal in Twentieth-Century Music, Da Capo Press Music Reprint Series 
(New York: Da Capo Press, 1979), 1 and 180.  
10 Andrei Tarkovsky, Sculpting in Time: Reflections on the Cinema, trans. Kitty Hunter-Blair (Austin: 
University of Texas Press, 1987), 42–43. Italics added: in all following quotations, italics are the original 
author’s own emphasis, unless otherwise stated. 
11 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 2: The Time-Image, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Robert Galeta (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2010), 172. 
4 
 
its anguish and ambivalence; an anguish regarding the nature and purpose of existence, what 
it might mean to still be, in some imprecise sense, spiritual or spiritually potent, and the 
extent to which this anguish—including its origins, mutations, annihilations, catharses and 
remedies—inhabits theories regarding the meaning (and meaningfulness) of music and 
cinema.   
 
Taken together, I wonder whether these testimonies give rise to the presence of a more 
complex spiritual sensibility, one which appears to be stranded in the ideological crossroads 
of western binary thought, yet which is nonetheless already moving in an indeterminate space 
shaped by aesthetics. Amidst these reflections, it is as though a new image of human identity 
is in the process of taking shape; a new mode of existence and a new mode of faith which 
appears to be radically at odds with the certainty implicit to the binary logic of both religious 
and atheistic thought; a mode which still believes itself to be spiritual in some sense but 
which, as musicologist Marcel Cobussen writes, is marked by a sense of 
“wandering…groping…erring”;12 a mode which also registers what Lambert perceives as “a 
new openness, a new horizon, a new hope for religion without “religion”,” whose signs 
“announce the moment when God finally succumbs to something like a peaceful (albeit not 
natural) death, at the very moment when the word “religion” loosens its death grip on life”;13 
an ambiguous mode whose liminal nature unsettles the hierarchy between traditional 
polarities of existence such as presence/absence, time/eternity, soul/body; a mode which 
necessarily invokes both music and cinema as conduits and catalysts for imagining and 
reimagining human identity in a time when, as posthumanist dialogues affirm, the concept of 
‘the human’ has itself become absurd.14 
 
This ambiguous mode of existence, crossing the border between music and cinema, presents 
an entirely unique space for theoretical consideration; a space, I argue, that does not so much 
“bridge” the ontological and ethical theories of music and cinema, but is, following 
Cobussen, a threshold for rethinking the nature, place and purpose of spirituality in a time—a 
world—where the death of God and religious faith coexist uneasily. The concept of the 
threshold, I suggest, offers a dynamic response to Deleuze’s credo for an affirmation of life 
                                                 
12 Marcel Cobussen, Thresholds: Rethinking Spirituality Through Music (Aldershot, England; Burlington, VT:  
Ashgate Publishing, 2008), 143.  
13 Lambert, Return Statements, 38. 
14 Rosi Braidotti, “Post-humanism: Life Beyond the Self,” in The Posthuman, EBL (Cambridge, UK; Malden, 
MA: Polity Press, 2013), 13–54.  
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through art, and the possibility of a whole transformation of belief. With this aim, this study 
takes up the provocative sense of belief that moves ambivalently through and between the 
boundaries of musical meaning, the cinematic human figure and the concept of spirituality, to 
draw out an image of human existence that would seem profoundly fit to respond to the 
question of an ethics for our times, a mode which I theorise, through a multi-layered 
methodology, as spiritual complexity. 
  
Methodology for Theorising Spiritual Complexity 
The bespoke methodology devised for this thesis is necessarily complex, and aims to perform 
the following inter-connected movements: to problematise the film music argument that 
establishes an anthropocentric, logocentric bond between musical meaning and the cinematic 
human figure, and to place this bond within the broader western historical, philosophical and 
religious context of dualism; to bring the two entities of this bond into an intensely cross-
disciplinary space to rethink the ontology and ethics of both—be they separate or together—
beyond hierarchical, binary-ordered thought systems while simultaneously acknowledging 
the continuing presence of such systems; to demonstrate that both musical meaning and the 
cinematic human figure are conduits and catalysts for theorising a mode of spirituality that 
moves between human and cosmos; to argue the theoretical significance of the paradox, 
ambiguity and irony intrinsic to such liminality; and to allow the full extent of this spiritual 
complexity to problematise the boundaries between archaic, Platonic, Christian and atheistic 
belief systems.  
 
Ultimately, through these movements, the thesis aims to draw out a complex mode of 
spirituality that thrives in the collective assemblage of existing liminal theories of soul, spirit 
and body: I argue that a manifold of thresholds between film and music philosophy provides 
provocative possibilities for reimagining spiritual identity beyond the traditionally essentialist 
concept of ‘the soul’ in this post-secular, post-religious time. To this end, the claims, 
arguments, questions and interventions in this thesis are developed through a multi-layered 
methodology, with each chapter attempting to critically and creatively engage with what it 
means to search for a spiritual sensibility in the folds of such discord, with a keen awareness 
of, and sensitivity to, the potentially adversarial response that such a threshold may attract. 
Yet I believe this is one of the principle possibilities of aesthetics; to provide a quieter space 
for rigorous self-reflection, to open out modes of thought that challenge the premises of 
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institutionalised belief, thus preparing a pathway for a genuine metamorphosis of thought for 
life itself, one which allows us to live into the ethical possibilities immanent to such spiritual 
complexity.  
  
Inspired by Edgar Morin’s own method of complex thought, which is intensely 
interdisciplinary, highly attuned to personal experience and critically invested in the 
anthropological significance of paradox, uncertainty, disorder and contradiction,15 the 
methodology prepared for this thesis takes a necessarily plural and personalised approach. 
The following interlocuting layers are active throughout the thesis, which together generate a 
dynamic circuit of reciprocity and transformation between musical meaning and the 
cinematic human figure, the movement of which makes a theory of spiritual complexity 
possible:  
 
1. Presence and absence, anthropomorphism and anthropocentrism, mythos and logos 
2. The concept of the threshold as developed by musicologist Marcel Cobussen 
3. The ontological-symbolic elements common to reality, mysticism, music and cinema 
4. Liminal modes of existence: the cinematic human figure and musical meaning  
5. human-cosmos unity: anthropomorphism, cosmomorphism, transformation 
6. aesthetic modes: utopian desire, absurd feeling, the ineffable, the uncanny 
7. Mythos-logos: an appropriate language for a method of complexity  
 
This layered methodology ultimately hopes to show that a theory of complexity, drawn from 
disparate theories of music and film, is able to contribute meaningfully to the incertitude and 
ambivalence that surrounds the notion of spiritual belief, through the following four stages of 
liminal existence: the imprecise soul, the undead spectre, the living spirit, and the body of 
immanence. In this sense, the thesis hopes to affirm the possibilities of both spiritual 
complexity and theoretical complexity. As this study is primarily an engagement with both, I 
preface the following exegesis of the methodology with several important caveats. Firstly, I 
do not provide extended audio-visual analyses of films or musical works, nor do I use the 
formal, technical terminologies and languages of music and film, which may certainly put 
                                                 
15 See Edgar Morin, On Complexity, trans. Robin Postel, Advances in Systems Theory, Complexity, and the 
Human Sciences (Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press Inc., 2008). For a thorough overview of Morin’s method, see 
Alfonso Montuori, “Complex Thought: An Overview of Edgar Morin’s Intellectual Journey,” MetaIntegral 
Foundation, Resource Paper (June 2013). 
7 
 
readers of either music or film at a significant disadvantage. Instead, I offer examples, where 
necessary, which illustrate or further clarify the particular ideas in play, or which concretise 
my own interventions. Secondly, this study does not address spirituality as a narrative theme, 
or as an aspect of the film’s dialogue. Nor does it not presume the spirituality of music to be 
limited to the categories of sacred church music and/or “high art” classical music. 
 
Thirdly, and as an extended caveat to this last qualification, this thesis does not 
comprehensively address the ways in which the key theorists variously negotiate the broader 
“catch-all” categories of music and cinema to privilege particular musical or cinematic 
genres, categories, types, movements or kinds. This is not to say that the question of genre is 
insignificant. On the contrary, as a term loaded with the politics of capitalism, and the 
judgements of taste and morality, genre may be thought as a dominant form of categorisation, 
and as such, already entangled within the politics of boundary-making, which is further 
entangled in the divisive either/or predicament of belief that I am ultimately attempting to 
reimagine. A rudimentary glance at the key theorists I engage acknowledges the significance 
of category within their own belief systems. For example, Plato prefers the Apollonian 
sobriety of the contemplative modes, while Nietzsche loves the Dionysian intoxication of 
Wagner. Jankélévitch’s Bergsonian philosophy of becoming more-often privileges high art 
music, while Cobussen’s phenomenology and deconstruction moves between genres and 
movements, including popular music, jazz and “New Spiritual Music”. Morin’s unique 
method of complexity returns to archaism with a particular interest in surrealism, while 
Cholodenko uses animation film and deconstruction to argue an animistic theory for all film. 
As one of the most influential French film critics, Bazin writes on the realism of filmmakers 
from both avant-garde European and classical Hollywood cinema, while also invoking the 
esoteric ambiguity of the medium through his canonical ontology essay. As one of the most 
influential French philosophers, Deleuze also draws from these stylistically-opposed 
reservoirs to develop a complex taxonomy of images, one which responds comprehensively 
to Bazin’s own ontological interests in movement, stasis, time and eternity. However brief, 
such a comparison offers a sense of the diversity at play, which shows both consistencies and 
incongruencies between and through the disparate schools of thought.  
 
My reason for this comparison is to emphasise that my own principle goal, in taking up this 
particular ensemble of theorists, is less concerned with thinking “spirituality” through the 
broad categories of music and cinema, or the finer categories of genre. As earlier suggested, 
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this thesis is more concerned with two particular components—musical meaning and the 
cinematic human figure—which are embedded within ontological and affective theories of 
music and cinema, and which speak to the anthropological attachment to the mystery and 
meaningfulness of existence. To develop this theory of spiritual complexity, I extract from 
the key theorists those elements which have a direct connection to the foundational issue of 
the human-cosmos bond as it relates to the space between time and eternity. While much 
more will soon be said of this, this unique relation may be principally introduced through the 
following distinctions. In music theory, I am most interested in the ways in which 
anthropomorphic and cosmomorphic musical meanings are theorised in relation to the modes 
of the ineffable, the uncanny, utopian desire and the absurd. In film theory, I am most 
interested in four liminal conceptions of the cinematic human figure—the imprecise soul, the 
undead spectre, the living spirit and the body of immanence—which also connect to these 
modes. Through those theories that harbour such components, the methodology advocates 
inclusion, plurality and extension, rather than exclusion, singularity and elitism. This means 
that although I do not address the problem of genre here, genre need not be excluded from 
ensuing studies that apply a theory of spiritual complexity: in searching for a less travelled 
road to theorise the relation between art and spirituality, the problem is no longer one of 
genre per se, nor is it a problem of the relation between the broader categories of “music” and 
“cinema”, but of this new relation between these particular aspects of musical meaning, the 
cinematic human figure and aesthetic modes, which is yet to receive any substantial attention 
in scholarship.  
 
Toward this original contribution then, I preserve the earliest conception of the “music-
cinema relation” which is established in early silent film and its contemporary criticism, 
which speaks to the relation between the “silent” cinematic figure and non-diegetic 
instrumental music, the latter which is understood colloquially as “the score” or “the 
soundtrack”. Thus, for the sake of a consistent working definition throughout the thesis, the 
term “music” may, in the first instance, be understood broadly as non-diegetic, affective, 
instrumental music; specifically, this means music without words or lyrics, which is 
emotionally affective, the feeling of which cannot be translated easily into words, and which 
is somehow inextricably linked to a belief in music’s anthropomorphic and/or cosmomorphic 
essence. This basic working definition allows a commonality between at least some of the 
many genres, styles and movements of music in film including, and going beyond, the 
Hollywood classical score. Such a definition includes, but is in no way limited to, the 
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following examples: the dynamic expressionism of Bernard Herrmann’s compositions (most 
famously in collaboration with Alfred Hitchcock), the ephemeral impressionism of Dario 
Marionelli’s string compositions in Jane Eyre (Cary Joji Fukunaga, 2011), the nomadic 
ambiguity of Neil Young’s guitar in Dead Man (Jim Jarmusch, 1995), the magical evocations 
of Saint-Saëns “The Aquarium” in the opening titles of Days of Heaven (Terrence Malick, 
1978), Antonio Sánchez’s primal jazz percussion in Birdman (Alejandro G. Iñárritu, 2014), 
Michael Nyman’s minimalist score for The Piano (Jane Campion, 1993), the diametrically-
opposed hybridity of Ornette Coleman’s free jazz and Howard Shore’s symphonic scoring in 
Naked Lunch (David Cronenberg, 1991), the allegretto from Beethoven’s Symphony No. 7 in 
The Fall (Tarsem Singh, 2006), and Teiji Ito’s hybridised style for the short experimental 
dance film The Very Eye of Night  (Maya Deren, 1958), which moves between traditional 
Japanese theatre music and the American avant-garde.  
 
With these preliminary caveats in place, the following sections introduce each of the 
methodological layers, and the ways in which spiritual complexity emerges through the 
concepts that influence and ground these layers. In these sections, I emphasise core problems 
that have arisen throughout the process of this research. I also provide pragmatic connections 
between music and film theory which are active within the thesis yet organised across the 
chapters in such a way as to allow the modes of existence a more prominent presence. The 
layers also offer a variety of contexts for the sections entitled “Choices in Literature” and 
“Summation of Chapters” which follow this exegesis. It is hoped that this detailed account 
demonstrates a sense of the preparation required in developing a method that may contribute 
purposefully and respectfully to the possibility of spiritual complexity.  
 
1. Presence and absence, anthropomorphism and anthropocentrism, mythos and 
logos 
In striving for a method that affirms complexity, three interrelated pairs of terms have come 
to shape the trajectory of this thesis: presence and absence, anthropomorphism and 
anthropocentrism, and mythos and logos. The first pair of terms, presence and absence, which 
continue to influence poststructural critiques on the history of western philosophy and 
theology, are intrinsically connected to other traditionally dualistic terms that articulate a 
connection between human and cosmos: essence and appearance, soul and body, thought and 
feeling, the concrete ‘real’ world and other spiritual worlds, time and eternity. In the early 
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research stages of this thesis, this pair of terms quickly emerged as the catalyst for not only 
grasping the shared ontological and ethical aspects of music and cinema, but for also 
perceiving this relation with a liminal sensibility (the significance of liminality will be the 
focus of the second section of this methodology, entitled “Cobussen’s concept of the 
threshold”). As the catalyst of the thesis itself, the bearing that presence and absence has 
upon the connection between faith and art is comprehensively critiqued in Chapter One, 
where I introduce the theoretical stakes of liminal spirituality in relation to the categories of 
the cinematic human figure and musical meaning (both of which will be detailed in the fourth 
section entitled “Liminal modes of existence: the cinematic human figure and musical 
meaning”). Because the terms presence and absence are given extended clarification and 
treatment in the first chapter, it would be more beneficial here, in this first section of the 
methodology, to concentrate on the two other pairs of terms that more fluidly permeate this 
study.   
 
Throughout the chapters, we will encounter instances where a universalising lexicon is used 
to describe certain states of existence, for example, Kierkegaard’s “despairing man”, 
Nietzsche’s “Hellenic man”, and the spiritual impotence of “modern man” already described 
by Tarkovsky. While this phallocentric tendency is problematic for a posthumanist 
sensibility, I preserve such phrases and categories as they appear in the original texts 
themselves, to emphasise the problem of universality that underscores even those more 
complex theories of existence where the relation between human spirituality and the cosmos 
is being rethought. Correspondingly, this problem introduces the second pair of terms that 
have influenced the direction of the thesis—anthropomorphism and anthropocentrism—
which further connect to terms such as ‘universality’, ‘unity’ and ‘cosmic order’. As Rosi 
Braidotti shows, this universalising lexicon, where the human remains at the centre of all 
things, continues to be challenged in poststructural, posthumanist discourses which radically 
intervene, critique and rethink the identity, purpose and place of the human in the greater 
cosmos.16 Interestingly, through the paradigmatic shift into diversity, multiplicity, plurality, 
heterogeneity and equality, and its wide-ranging critique of a static, unchanging, universal 
image (and thus language) of human existence, the relation between anthropomorphism and 
anthropocentrism remains curiously ambivalent. As film scholar James Lee Cahill describes, 
                                                 
16 Rosi Braidotti, “Posthuman Critical Theory,” in Critical Posthumanism and Planetary Futures, eds. D. 
Banerji and M.R. Paranjape (India: Springer, 2016), 13–16. 
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while “anthropomorphism supports an anthropocentric world view that places humans at the 
centre of the universe”, the two terms may also be understood as antipodes, where, as 
filmmaker Jean Painlevé describes, we are “constantly swinging between anthropomorphism 
and anthropocentrism.”17 This thesis is similarly questioning the desire for a singular image 
and language against this latter movement between the two, but does so by recognising and 
problematising the concept of movement itself. As the following passages clarify, I 
understand the difference between the two terms to be characterised by, ironically, a 
movement between the movement (and non-hierarchical participation) intrinsic to 
anthropomorphism, and the stasis (and hierarchical exceptionalism) intrinsic to 
anthropocentrism.  
 
Both anthropomorphism and anthropocentrism play influential roles in the formation of the 
western figure of the divine human: anthropomorphism imagines the humanization of the 
archaic, mythological gods, and then the Christian God;18 anthropocentrism believes in the 
human centre of both a divine cosmos, and the secularised, political world, due to the 
“sovereign and rationalist ideal” for the so-called “exceptionalism” of human reason.19 In this 
sense, both terms are deeply embedded within the earlier question regarding what it might 
mean to still be a spiritual human in our time, and whether the image of spirituality can move 
beyond dogmatic definitions that remain logocentric, institutional and closed rather than 
affective, individual and open. This is already to suggest that the concepts of possibility, 
change, transformation and becoming play a key role in my research, which has encouraged 
me to pursue what appears to be an ambiguous space between anthropomorphism and 
anthropocentrism. Followingly, I find it helpful to temporarily remove the anthropo- from 
these two terms: as the following passage describes, the etymology of morphism and centrism 
provides some foundational conceptual co-ordinates with which to advance a layered 
methodology that openly problematises the innately contradictory situation of being and 
becoming a spiritual human. 
 
                                                 
17 James Lee Cahill, “Anthropomorphism and its Vicissitudes: Reflections on Homme-sick Cinema,” in 
Screening Nature: Cinema Beyond the Human, eds. Anat Pick and Guinevere Narraway (New York; Oxford: 
Berghahn Books, 2013), 74 and 81. For an example of a less-defined interchange between the two terms, see 
Gary Steiner, Anthropocentrism and its Discontents: The Moral Status of Animals in the History of Western 
Philosophy (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2005), 1, 36 and 213. 
18 Adam Drozdek, “Xenophanes and One God,” in Greek Philosophers as Theologians: The Divine Arche, 
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007), 15–26. Also see F.E. Peters, Greek Philosophical Terms: A Historical Lexicon 
(New York: New York University Press, 1967), 132 and 194.  
19 Braidotti, “Posthuman Critical Theory,” 14. 
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Metamorphose, from the Greek metamorphoō, means to transform, transfigure, to change 
shape, implying the dynamics of movement and flux. In this sense, to morph means to 
become, to participate in the process of becoming. In ancient mythology, metamorphosis 
implies a change in the form of symbolic figures, for example, in deities who move between 
divine, mortal and animal identities. Recalling Walter Benjamin, metamorphosis may also 
suggest a mimetic act of change in actual figures, for example with the imaginary play of the 
child who becomes creature, fairy, demon or machine,20 or with the dancer or actor whose 
experimental practice similarly plays with, and discovers, new forms of identity. In these 
instances, the human body is the site of poetic transformation, and profoundly connected to a 
belief in the possibility of new modes of existence, beyond a purely ‘human’ form, through 
the power of the imagination.  
 
Comparatively, centrism, or centricity, comes from the Greek kentrikos, meaning sharp point, 
in or of the centre. In contradistinction to morphism’s symbolism and dynamic sense of 
movement and change, centricity implies a sense of stasis and stability, with the formation of 
concrete boundaries and categories. In the history of western thought, Catholicism remains a 
dominant and enduring example of centric thought, with its establishment and organisation of 
a static, social order of hierarchy, conformity, indoctrination and control. In contradistinction 
to the fluid change intrinsic to morphism, centrism implies an unchanging image of belief 
and existence within a fixed order of the cosmos. 
 
Toward the greater distinction between anthropomorphism and anthropocentrism then, I 
understand the concept of metamorphosis—and its etymological territory of boundary-
crossing, transformation, flux, change and movement—to be foundational in this task to 
rethink the nature and purpose of spirituality.21 The conceptual territory I am ultimately 
attempting to locate is not at all orthodox: I am searching for a process which openly 
advocates a movement between traditionally opposed belief systems: this territory must also 
allow a movement between metamorphosis and centricity, between a belief in change, and a 
belief in stasis, between the desire for participation and the desire for domination; following 
Painlevé, this belief may further be thought as continually swinging between 
                                                 
20 Walter Benjamin, “The Storyteller: Reflections on the Works of Nicolai Leskov,” in Illuminations, ed. and 
intro. Hannah Arendt, trans. Harry Zohn, 1st edition (New York: Brace and World, 1968). 
21 For the significance of metamorphosis to mythical thought, see Geoffrey Galt Harpham, On the Grotesque: 
Strategies of Contradiction in Art and Literature (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1982), 51–55. 
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anthropomorphism and anthropocentrism. As we shall see in Chapter One, this dynamic 
ambiguity also relates to a movement between the catalyst terms of presence and absence, 
which, however counter-intuitively, edges us closer to possible movements between the two 
diverse belief systems of Christianity and atheism.  
 
The third pair of terms concerns the two divergent modes of thought that are foundational in 
ancient Greek philosophy and theology, and remain equally significant to poststructural 
philosophy; logos (meaning speech, logic, rationale, reason, order) and mythos (meaning 
myth, tale, story, fable).22 Through the theorists I follow, most especially Nietzsche and 
Deleuze, both orders are shown to be connected to archetypal figures or messengers of truth. 
The figure of the thinker (the philosopher), who speaks the reasoned account of things in 
unadorned language, embodies logos; the figure of the artist (the poet), who delivers the same 
truth through symbolism, theatrical rhetoric, performative gesture and affective poetry, 
embodies mythos. Heidegger argues that although logos and mythos are not originally 
opposed in ancient Greek thought, the two modes already become separated in Plato’s 
work.23 This idea of a return to, or continuation of, a rhetoric that moves between the two 
modes of logos and mythos is significant to this thesis in the following senses. 
 
Firstly, the distinction between logical and mythical thought is a core theme in poststructural 
critiques on anthropocentric, logocentric theories of music and cinema. Morin’s complex 
ontology of cinema that emphasises a poetic mode of truth, Jankélévitch’s Bergsonian 
musicology that advocates Doing versus Saying, and Cholodenko’s deconstructive animation 
theory (each comprehensively detailed in Chapter One), are concrete examples of this.  
 
Secondly, this manner of prose that converges or moves between logos and mythos is actively 
practiced, in a diverse range of styles, by the majority of key theorists this research focuses 
on, including Plato, Nietzsche, Kierkegaard, Deleuze and Guattari, Jankélévitch, Morin and 
Cobussen. While the quotations that proliferate the thesis offer a sense of the persuasive and 
                                                 
22 Peters, Greek Philosophical Terms, 110–12, 74–75, 120–21. For discussions on Logos as the hidden order and 
harmony of the cosmos, as theorised by Heraclitus, also see Peter Turetzky, Time, The Problems of Philosophy 
(London; New York: Routledge, 1998), 8–9; Drozden, “Heraclitus and the Logos,” in Greek Philosophers as 
Theologians, 27–41. 
23 Martin Heidegger, What is Called Thinking?, trans. Fred D. Wieck and J. Glenn Gray, intro. J. Glenn Gray, 
Religious Perspectives (New York: Harper and Row, 1968), 10. 
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evocative power of such a style, they also affirm a sense of the complexity involved in 
theorising the relation between art and liminal modes of spirituality. 
 
This complexity within music and film philosophy alludes to a third dimension for the 
significance of mythos and logos, which emerges in aesthetic theories regarding the nature of 
thought. For example, Morin believes that the cinema constitutes a space where the “true 
rationality” of both the real and the imaginary proliferates, and where the forces of belief, in 
relation to death, return to a more primordial, pre-Christian archaism. Morin renders an image 
of spiritual identity we might call thinker-worker-madman-player, a complex figure who 
shares a remarkable affinity with Jankélévitch’s lover of music, who embodies the 
affirmation for the mystery of life. Also theorising the relation between belief and life, 
Deleuze perceives the role of the affective cinematic encounter as a catalyst for the 
transformation of belief. For Deleuze, there is an unthought power particular to the theatre he 
finds in Kierkegaard (see Chapter Four) and Nietzsche (see Chapter Two and Four), whose 
distinct poetic styles perform the philosophical themes of existence, possibility, choice, 
change, movement, becoming, transformation. Each of these examples, which move between 
a poetic and a philosophical sensibility, enjoys extensive exegesis and engagement within the 
thesis. 
 
Finally, this convergence between logical and mythical thought is taken up proactively and 
purposefully as part of my own thinking-writing process and practice for theorising spiritual 
complexity, and as such, is an integral part of this thesis. As a dynamic layer of the 
methodology, the development of this style is given extended qualification in the final section 
of this exegesis, entitled “Mythos-logos: an appropriate language for a method of 
complexity.”  
 
To conclude, the following three pairs of terms, and the discrete movements between them, 
constitute the first layer of the methodology; presence and absence, anthropomorphism and 
anthropocentrism, and logos and mythos, each of which participates in the act of theorising 
the nature of spirituality through music and cinema. Toward the greater goal of opening out 
and problematising the difference between opposing belief systems, this means that 
movement itself, as a concept, needs to be actively incorporated into the methodology in order 
to reimagine those polarising categories that characterise the divide between Christian faith 
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and atheistic belief, such as time/eternity, human/cosmos, essence/appearance, body/soul, 
real/ imaginary, knowledge/belief, and truth/falsity. 
 
2. Cobussen’s concept of the threshold 
Methodologically, Cobussen’s concept of the “threshold” is eminently suited to a theory of 
movement between things, including the movement between opposing belief systems. This 
core concept will continue to be developed throughout the thesis, and will be used in 
conjunction with the term liminality. Victor Turner’s anthropological understanding of 
liminality is useful here: recall its etymological origin, from the Latin limen, meaning 
‘threshold’, which for Turner is the archaic space “betwixt and between” the polarities of life 
and death where the spirit thrives.24 With this figure of a middle spiritual mode of existence 
in mind, let us gain a sense of the plurality and complexity of the threshold, as Cobussen 
develops it in his 2008 monograph, Thresholds: Rethinking Spirituality through Music. 
 
The threshold is a non-hierarchical, non-linear space of radical intervention, and potentially 
inexhaustible in its disciplinary and thematic application: for example, it is relevant 
mythologically, politically, socially, culturally, geographically, spiritually, creatively, 
scientifically, biologically, cosmologically, psychologically, philosophically, 
anthropologically. The threshold appears in many forms, guises and expressions as it captures 
or resonates with a prolific number of established poststructural terms; the space between, in-
betweenness, the inter-territory, the para-site, the gap, the interval, the intersection, the fold, 
the crossing, the middle, the medium, the conduit, the doorway, the margin, the edge, the 
outpost. For Cobussen, the threshold is neither one nor the other pole of a binary order, but 
both and neither at one and the same time. As such, the threshold is not a stable space: it is an 
indeterminate zone in motion, a medium through which things pass or attempt to pass; it is 
not its own separate, isolated, localisable ‘third’ space between two absolute, fixed and 
immobile poles, sites, states, territories or points, but the ambiguous space between them that 
somehow absorbs and resists both; for example, the threshold moves between subject and 
object, affect and reason, the real and the imaginary, the dark and the light, the known and the 
unknown, time and eternity, body and soul. The threshold embodies rhythms, forces and 
dynamics that refuse to settle. Characterised by a sense of ambivalence, paradox, ambiguity, 
                                                 
24 Victor Turner, “Betwixt and Between: The Liminal Period in Rites de Passage,” in Forest of Symbols: 
Aspects of Ndembu Ritual (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1967), 93–111; Victor Turner, The Ritual 
Process: Structure and Anti-Structure (London: Routledge and Kegal Paul, 1969), 94–130. 
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uncertainty, disorder, destabilisation, hesitation and confusion, the threshold is an imprecise 
space of continually moving displacement; it leads into an itinerant way of thinking, acting 
and feeling that Cobussen marks as movements of to-ing and fro-ing, of wandering, groping 
and erring, where thoughts, actions and feelings move through, across, within and beyond the 
containment of categorical frameworks, polarities, dualities, oppositions, spaces and times. 
Yet to immediately contradict this, the threshold is also the break, the border, the boundary, 
the limit, the line, the end, the obstacle, the impasse, the stumbling block. It is equally the 
space where a difficult realisation or quiet revelation strives to come through. The threshold 
entails both the nature of things (including the nature of the world, the self and relationships), 
and what things can do; in this sense, it is ontological and ethical. As a conceptual tool, the 
threshold opens out thought by destabilising and derailing particular tendencies and beliefs 
embedded within the logocentric, anthropocentric, phallocentric processes of (western) 
thought; it is a tool for challenging the habitus of linear, binary orders of hierarchy, in 
particular those of traditional western metaphysics, and for awakening processes that enable a 
rethinking—a reimagining—of what we understand the nature and purpose of truth, 
knowledge, belief, authenticity, choice and possibility to be.  
 
In all these ways, the threshold is the antithesis of ‘logical’ thought in the orthodox rationalist 
sense; it is not a concept that comes ‘to light’ immediately: comprehending and 
understanding its complexity does not unfold with pragmatic, economic linearity, but 
involves detours, cycles, non-linear fragmentation, dense thickets, murky waters, clouded 
vision, extended periods of confusion. A thinking in thresholds requires time, patience, self-
reflection, caution, psychological diving and leaps of faith, moments of real doubt and 
intellectual fatigue, a reckoning with the ironic tendency to outthink thought, a certain 
humility toward the limits of thought, a willingness to be suspended indeterminately in states 
of prolonged incertitude, a readiness to overcome, or at least remain within, the 
overwhelming frustration that such incertitude provokes. The threshold has the potential to 
intervene with how we think we think, if we are able to endure the discomfort of such 
counter-intuitive states. Following Henri Bergson, we could say that the threshold becomes 
the space where the qualitative, subjective time of durée is intensified to an extreme degree of 
discomfort, but where “true problems” also finally emerge to qualify and counter the false.25 
                                                 
25 Gilles Deleuze, Bergsonism, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (New York: Zone Books, 2011), 
13–21. 
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Toward the practice of original thinking, which leads into authentic action, Cobussen’s 
musical-spiritual threshold may further be understood as a sophisticated response to 
Heidegger’s influential declaration that “we are still not thinking”.26 
 
As Cobussen writes of the plural thresholds between music and spirituality, and of the sheer 
difficulty of thinking, writing, reading and speaking this imprecise zone, such a space, I 
believe, also thrives between music, spirituality and cinema, allowing us to “(re)think 
thresholds, to (re)think borders and limits, to (re)think the passage from one to the other, to 
pass through the passage, to stand still in and dwell upon the space between one and the 
other, between inside and outside”.27 In tune with Cobussen’s musical threshold of 
undecidability and “perpetual displacement”, which “eradicates any thinking in clear 
oppositions, any binary ordering”, and which is “the leaving of a remainder that cannot be 
thought within the framework of Western logocentrism”,28 there appears to be a unique 
opportunity available for integrating similar theories regarding the cinematic image and its 
complicated relation to identity, knowledge, belief, truth and illusion.  
 
As the space which destabilises and derails oppositions, the threshold also appears to be 
eminently suited to approach the controversial space between Christian and atheistic belief, 
and in so doing, offer a sense of the complexity that dwells within our post-religious and 
post-secular time. This is what I am theorising as spiritual complexity: inhabiting the space 
between music and film theories of ontology and ethics, spiritual complexity entails an 
ambiguous mode of existence within which the liminal soul, spectre, spirit and body all 
participate non-hierarchically in the flux of becoming, while being haunted by, or 
summoning, the intensely impressionable chimeras of being. Spiritual complexity involves 
the itinerant movement between different orders of belief through the presence of paradoxical 
thoughts, truths, feelings and actions, yet also presents a way of being and becoming which is 
genuinely open to possibility through the complexity that a thinking in thresholds avails. 
  
Correspondingly, the following layers of this methodology may also be understood as 
thresholds which together perform the movements intrinsic to liminality: on the level of 
theory, I am principally concerned with ways in which music and film theory reciprocate and 
                                                 
26 Heidegger, What is Called Thinking?, 4. 
27 Cobussen, Thresholds, 7. 
28 Ibid. 
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transform one another, that is, ways in which theories of one may be transposed into the 
other, through a circuit of reciprocity, to respond dynamically to existing arguments in 
theory. This attracts a collection of primary questions: how do liminal theories of either 
music or cinema influence orders of binary, logocentric, anthropocentric thought? What 
ontological and ethical significance does a liminal music theory have for cinema, and vice-
versa? What religious/non-religious intersections does this mode ultimately reveal for 
complex thought? How do the components of each mode further open out the thresholds 
between music, cinema and spirituality?  
 
With these guiding questions, the arguments of the thesis develop from the accumulation of 
concepts, contradictions, and problems that arise in the process of research and writing, the 
collation of which finds clarity and purpose when positioned within the context of 
components of liminal modes of existence. Methodologically, the components are the integral 
points or markers that progress the trajectory of each chapter’s argument, their collective 
significance reinforcing and affirming the concept of complexity itself. I use these 
components like map co-ordinates or cues for charting the course of the arguments that 
develop within each chapter, placing them within the context of existing theories and 
relations, to problematise the boundaries between discrete orders of belief. 
 
The following layer of the methodology, which begins the process of thinking in musical-
cinematic thresholds, concerns the sensory components peculiar to the formal ontological 
elements of music and cinema, all of which have equally strong mythical, symbolic 
significance, which leads directly into figures of liminal spirituality. 
 
3. Ontological-symbolic elements: the spirit-matter spectrum 
Cobussen asks whether we might understand music as “a modality of knowing and being in 
the world…”, whether it might “make us rethink the meaning, nature, and significance of 
certain experiences, of certain values…” and “address issues of place, identity, belonging, 
memory”.29 If music is “the threshold where one sheds the mastery of the eye/I”,30—the eye 
being the traditionally ‘superior’ sensual modality for knowing and being—how might the 
cinematic image—the space where the visible and the representable collude with the invisible 
                                                 
29 Cobussen, Thresholds, 3. 
30 Ibid. 
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and the unrepresentable—reciprocate, intensify and open out Cobussen’s already complex 
questions, rather than return them to the rigidity of a reductive hierarchy between the audible 
and the visible?  
 
 In “standing still” between musical sound and cinematic image, between the ear and the eye, 
I hope to respond critically and creatively to the gauntlet that I perceive cinema to throw 
down for thinking musical spirituality, and for seeking a dynamically reciprocal, theoretical 
communion between the two. For filmmakers and theorists who possess a musical sensibility, 
this threshold already has a tangible presence, with the form and feeling of music providing a 
synesthetic model for cinema to transpose. For Élie Faure, cinema is “a music which reaches 
us by way of the eye.”31 Germaine Dulac more specifically intuits an existential bond 
between the two artforms which also brings ontology and affect together: 
 
Should not cinema, which is an art of vision, as music is an art of hearing...lead us toward the 
visual idea composed of movement and life, toward the conception of an art of the eye, made 
of a perceptual inspiration evolving in its continuity and reaching, just as music does, our 
thoughts and our feelings? ...The integral film which we all hope to compose is a visual 
symphony made of rhythmic images... . To be visual, to reach the feelings through harmonies, 
chords, of shadow, of light, of rhythm, of movement.32 
 
Such ‘film musicality’ argues film musicologist Danijela Kulezic-Wilson in 2015, has a clear 
history in filmmaking practice and critical discourse, particularly with such influential figures 
as Sergei Eisenstein, Jean-Luc Godard, Andrei Tarkovsky and Michel Chion.33 Toward such 
connections, Kulezic-Wilson presents the first theoretical argument for the musical-cinematic 
commonalities of time, rhythm and movement, noting the philosophical and spiritual 
dimensions of time especially in relation to narrative film.34 Correspondingly, I take this 
intersection of time, rhythm and movement to be one of the fundamental premises for 
theorising a space where the sacred and the philosophical meet. Yet, in thinking a relation 
between human existence and the cosmos, this threshold between music and cinema is also 
                                                 
31 Élie Faure, Encyclopédie française, 16/64/19, quoted in Morin, The Cinema, Or The Imaginary Man, 8.  
32 Germaine Dulac, “The Essence of Cinema: The Visual Idea,” and “From “Visual and Anti-visual Films”,” in 
The Avant-Garde Film: A Reader of Theory and Criticism, ed. P. Adams Sitney, Anthology Film Archive Series 
(New York: New York University Press, 1978), 41, 33.  
33 Danijela Kulezic-Wilson, The Musicality of Narrative Film, Palgrave Studies in Audio-Visual Culture (New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015).  
34 Ibid., 94–102.  
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inhabited by the ontological and symbolic significance of those elements which make time 
and movement perceptible and imperceptible: sonority, silence, light, darkness, stasis, air, 
space and non-space. The greater complex of these elements, in various combinations and 
assemblages, forms the ground for theorising both the broader rubric of spirituality, and the 
more particular identity of ‘the spirit’.  
 
As the chapters demonstrate, each of these elements has a formal, ontological bond with time, 
rhythm and movement, yet each also has a mythical connection to the idea of eternity: in film 
theory, the elements are intrinsic to cinematic representations of the dead and the undead, that 
is, to the varying spiritual identities of the soul, the spectre and the spirit. For diverse theories 
of film and film music, such cinematic identities animate a measure of eternity within the 
world of time, leading naturally into archaic myths of immortality and the Christian belief in 
the immortal soul. Yet as Chapter Three establishes, the elements also form the ground for 
the living spirit, most especially the subtle body, also known as the spiritus, or the body of 
light, which is central to Christian mysticism’s musical practices of ecstasy and 
enlightenment. On the level of matter itself, as we shall see with Deleuze’s cinematic body of 
immanence in Chapter Four, the elements also actively participate in theorising the spiritual 
possibilities of the living body, with the subtle body sitting enigmatically beneath Deleuze’s 
philosophy of immanence. Through the elements that ground this spirit-matter spectrum, the 
chapters trace an existential progression from worlds of the dead, to worlds of the living. 
More-over, as the ontological-symbolic threshold between music, cinema, and these spiritual 
stages, this manifold of elemental forces allows theories of reality, mysticism, aesthetics and 
ethics to converge. As such, it forms a critical component for (re)imagining spiritual identity 
within a liminal framework.  
 
Recalling the need to “stand still” between the eye and the ear, the significance of this layer 
of the methodology could also be emphasised as follows: it is this complex of ontological-
symbolic elements—time, eternity, movement, rhythm, stasis, light, dark, silence, sound, air, 
space and non-space—that primordially invites cinema into Cobussen’s theory of the musical 
threshold, where the vision of the liminal soul, spectre, spirit and body, and the cosmological 
thresholds they come to inhabit, have—like meanings of music—an ethical grounding, 
inviting us to (re)imagine the nature, purpose and limits of spiritual belief itself, while 
continually being haunted by the Christian imperative for a static image of human identity. 
As already introduced, this is one of the main gestures of this thesis; to articulate the 
21 
 
continual shift from a traditionally sacred, stable and ordered conception of human identity—
the soul, the spirit, the body—to a liminal mode of existence that respectfully recognises the 
limitations of the Christian/atheist divide. In this way, I seek to develop a non-hierarchical 
conception of spirituality that responds to our own time of ideological ambiguity, thus 
dialoguing with, and extending, Cobussen’s own departure(s) from, and return(s) to, 
discourses in Christian mysticism and theology.  
 
4. Liminal modes of existence: the cinematic human figure and musical meaning 
The aim of this thesis is to draw out this series of liminal modes of existence, modes of 
paradox, ambiguity and irony, whose traditionally sacred polarities of existence—
presence/absence, soul/body, time/eternity, light/dark, heaven/earth—tend to collapse and fall 
away, even as they are being called up, reconfigured or returned in a new sense. Such 
complexity, I argue, finds its most ardent and concrete expression in two reciprocating 
components of cinema and music. In the case of cinema, spiritual complexity emerges in the 
mystical nature and purpose of the cinematic image of the human figure, where the visual 
representation of the human form attracts plural ontological interpretations, generating a 
manifold of liminal identities: as imprecise soul, undead spectre, living spirit and body of 
immanence—whose form is perceptible through particular ontological elements (light, dark, 
stasis, movement, sonority, silence)—the liminal cinematic figure inspires a more complex 
existence than either a Christian or atheistic belief system can individually accommodate. In 
the case of music, such complexity emerges regarding the mystical nature and purpose of 
musical meaning. In tune with liminal interpretations of the cinematic human figure, music’s 
reciprocating cosmomorphic and anthropomorphic meanings are, I suggest, equally open to a 
more complex mode that moves between discrete orders of belief. Conceptually and 
critically, liminal modes of existence offer provocative possibilities for rethinking spiritual 
belief beyond the historical boundary of Christianity, especially when placed within the 
context of the anthropological desire for an all-consuming unity between human existence 
and the cosmos. Earlier I introduced the significance of anthropomorphism as a force of 
movement within the imagination. Following Morin, I now introduce the responding 
movement of cosmomorphism. As the following layer of the methodology describes, 
anthropomorphism and cosmomorphism are reciprocating components of the desire for 
human-cosmos unity, which remains an enduring and central theme in the history of ideas. 
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5. human-cosmos unity: anthropomorphism, cosmomorphism, transformation  
This next layer of the methodology might best be introduced via the aura of mystery that, for 
the theorists I focus upon, is believed to be intrinsic to the discrete forms of music and 
cinema. This aura of mystique, which I also think of as music and cinema’s shared 
atmospheric, affective environment, aligns traditionally with esoteric and alchemic practices 
of magic, and has much to do with the forces of animism and metamorphosis that proliferate 
in mythology. In the ‘liminalist’ music and film theory of Chapter One—Bazin, Morin, 
Cholodenko, Jankélévitch and Cobussen—this aura of magic and mystique is given serious, 
theoretical weight, and in so doing, compels a conception of the soul that moves from centric 
essence, to unstable, indeterminate process. In concert with the threshold, there appears to be 
a certain reciprocity between Morin’s cinematic charm, and Jankélévitch’s musical charm. 
Writing in the mid-twentieth-century, both Morin and Jankélévitch share an affinity with the 
problem of language, the ineffable nature of their chosen moving artform, and its relation to 
the mystery of spiritual existence, with both rendering an image of the soul as an imprecise 
zone; as Jankélévitch writes, “the fugitive, ambiguous soul” participates in the flux of 
becoming rather than the stasis of being.35 In both instances, the Christian soul of eternal life 
becomes mercurial, indeterminate, unlocalizable. This idea of an imprecise soul, located 
through theories of film and music, is but one plane, or one stage, of a progressive series of 
liminal identities that materialise a plurality of metamorphisms, which gradually unfold 
through the spectrum of spirit and matter.  
  
Toward the complexity of the cinematic human figure and musical meaning, the mythical 
belief in metamorphosis takes on a more refined, prominent role when contextualised within 
the problem of an all-encompassing unity between human and cosmos. Recalling the bond 
between logos and mythos, the objective sites of the human and the cosmos have their 
symbolic, mythical reciprocates within the concepts of anthropomorphism and 
cosmomorphism. In The Cinema, or The Imaginary Man, Morin argues that our relation with 
the world emerges through a deeply subjective process of “affective participation” and 
imagination; we are within the world as much as the world is within us; knowledge and belief 
are in a constant state of fluid interchange, forming and reforming through the animistic 
                                                 
35 Vladimir Jankélévitch, Music and the Ineffable, trans. Carolyn Abbate, fore. Arnold I. Davidson (Princeton 
and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2003), 52–53. 
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circuit of “anthropo-cosmomorphism”.36 “Metamorphoses,” writes Morin, suggests “a fluid 
universe where things are not hardened in their identity, but participate in a great cosmic 
unity that is in motion.”37 Moving beneath the threshold of rational thought, anthropo-
cosmomorphism affirms, rather than destabilises, the primordial desire for (and belief in) 
wholeness, connectivity, universality, absolute communion: the cosmos, creatures, nature and 
things take on human traits, humans take on cosmic, creaturely, vegetative, nonhuman 
properties. Deeply bound up in what Morin calls the myth of immortality, this circuit is 
drawn from the poetic affective imaginary, rather than unaffected reason alone. 
 
Morin qualifies that within the primordial desire for unity, the processes of 
anthropomorphism and cosmomorphism are inseparably linked.38 For my own research, the 
cycle of anthropo-cosmomorphism, so important for Morin’s cinema, sheds a provocative 
light on philosophical-theological theories of music and cosmos, where the anthropo- appears 
to overshadow the cosmo-. For example, in Chapters One and Two especially, we see that for 
Platonic cosmology and its Christianisation, the anthropological desire for an all-
encompassing unity restores a fundamentally human essence to a musical cosmos. One 
example in particular, which privileges anthropo– rather than cosmo– interpretations, brings 
music and film theory into a properly dualistic relation, and in so doing acts as the catalyst for 
the primary intervention of this thesis. As Chapter One comprehensively details, the rapidly 
developing discipline of film music studies is founded on a theory regarding the existential 
bond between the cinematic human figure and music’s anthropomorphic meanings—most 
particularly, music’s embodied emotional meaning. With music’s cosmomorphic meanings 
remaining largely undeveloped, the opportunity to see how this argument participates in the 
near-universal desire for unity, and to then experiment with its conceptual components, offers 
the first stage of a process that will unfold slowly across the remaining chapters.  
 
Toward a musical conception of Morin’s anthropo-cosmomorphism, Chapters Two and Three 
work to temporarily separate anthropomorphism from its cosmomorphic reciprocate, to show 
the further complexity of each when placed within their most appropriate aesthetic context. In 
the case of anthropomorphism, Chapter Two emphasises the uncanny and ironic nature of a 
                                                 
36 Edgar Morin, The Cinema, Or The Imaginary Man, trans. Lorraine Mortimer (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2005), 72–74. 
37 Ibid., 72. 
38 Ibid., 73. 
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humanised music which restores a humanised cosmos: here, the beliefs of both Platonic 
thought and Nietzschean feeling converge to inhabit the same space, one that restores 
Nietzsche’s pre-Christian archaic sensibility while being strangely haunted by the 
Christianity of Platonism. Toward the equally significant force of cosmomorphism, Chapter 
Three rethinks both music’s anthropomorphosis and the cinematic human figure’s 
“humanness” through an ontologically unusual figure found in two particular dance-films, 
one by Maya Deren, the other by Norman McLaren: here, the cosmic properties of the body 
of light, the atmospheric spaces of night-sky and astral plane, and the ineffable processes of 
utopian desire—components which are all associated with mystical practices of music—quite 
literally manifest in the cinema to challenge the universality of the uncanny archaic spectre. 
The uncanny, the ineffable and utopian desire, along with absurd feeling, together form the 
aesthetic layer of the methodology. While these modes will be explained more 
comprehensively in the following section, I introduce them here to prepare a sense of their 
interconnection with the affective forces that animate both the musical and cinematic 
encounter. 
  
Returning to the concept of metamorphosis, Chapters One, Two and Three may be thought as 
genealogical predecessors to Chapter Four, where a radical reconfiguration of the basic 
notion of metamorphosis occurs. In this final chapter, and in keeping with Deleuze and 
Guattari’s ethical reconfiguration of the ontological stakes of presence and absence, 
metamorphosis still entails affective participation and imagination, but now speaks to the 
choices and possibilities regarding how we live, think, feel and act in the temporal world: 
change, transformation, becoming, indeterminacy and transfiguration no longer relate solely 
to mythological, mystical interpretations that allow eternity to have the last word on the 
nature of existence, but now (also) relate to Deleuze’s cinematic body of immanence, which I 
position as the final stage in the liminal spirit-matter spectrum. As the work of the thesis 
shows, this body resonates with the existential anxiety regarding the absurdity of existence, 
the ways in which the belief in an all-encompassing cosmic unity gives itself over to what 
Kierkegaard calls the “spiritual paralysis” of despair, and the problem of choice implicit to 
this. More specifically, this body offers a new spiritual context for understanding the ways in 
which the Kierkegaardian spirit influences Deleuze and Guattari’s paradigm-shifting 
statement regarding the absence of faith in “the world”, and the role of art to restore a new 
form of faith that moves beyond the Christian/atheist divide: “the problem,” they write, “has 
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indeed changed.”39 The liminal modes of existence in Chapters One to Three thus trace a 
gradual movement away from institutionalised, transcendental belief, and toward this 
“change” that is extensively critiqued in Chapter Four. Each one of these chapters builds its 
arguments through the movement of the threshold, and its shifting senses of 
metamorphosis—of which change, transformation and becoming are intrinsic—to advance 
the modal progression through imprecise soul, undead spectre, living spirit and body of 
immanence. 
 
Before we move on to the next aesthetic layer of the methodology, I note the following 
undergirding claims that emerge from the interconnection of these layers, which permeate the 
thesis as a whole. Understood as plural forms of liminality, the cinematic human figure and 
musical meaning—and the circuit of transformation created through their theoretical 
reciprocity—together offer germane contributions to the increasingly complex discussions on 
the post-secular problem of “the future of belief”.40 This plurality speaks directly to 
Deleuze’s earlier proclamation for a transformation of faith that moves beyond the either/or 
predicament of the Christian/atheist divide. The traditionally stable middle plane of the spirit 
now becomes the indeterminate, destabilised threshold for rethinking spirituality, rather than 
a bounded third space between the stable sites of time and eternity. Following Cobussen’s 
framework, this means that a spirituality that responds to the existential incertitude and 
ambiguity of our own time cannot be defined by, or reduced to, the traditionally hierarchical, 
tripartite order of soul, spirit and body. From the outset, my research has sought to locate 
visual ideas that compliment, extend and problematise the sonorous focus of Cobussen’s 
work; specifically, I have sought to locate a genealogy of music spirit(s) and cinema spirit(s) 
that reveals the complex movement between things, times, identities, ideas and spaces. With 
the Deleuzian cinematic body of immanence positioned as the final stage of a series of 
transformations that move through this liminal spectrum, the figure of the intermediary spirit 
ultimately becomes an axis for the two different modes of thought—the critical and the 
creative, the philosophical and the poetic, logos and mythos—to begin to work with and 
against one another, thus emphasising the ways in which this liminal spirit acts as both the 
obstacle and the possibility for theorising spiritual complexity.  
                                                 
39 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, What is Philosophy?, trans. Graham Burchell and Hugh Tomlinson 
(London; New York: Verso, 1994), 74–75. 
40 Joshua Ramey, The Hermetic Deleuze: Philosophy and Spiritual Ordeal, New Slant: Religion, Politics and 
Ontology (Durham; London: Duke University Press, 2012), 200. 
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6. Aesthetic modes: absurd feeling, utopian desire, the ineffable and the uncanny 
In keeping with the grounding concept of the threshold, this next layer of the methodology 
takes up four interconnected aesthetic modes—utopian desire, absurd feeling, the ineffable 
and the uncanny—to problematise the relation between affect and faith within the circuit of 
musical meaning and the cinematic human figure. Specifically, the aesthetic modes 
crystallise a connection between affective feelings of spirituality as they arise in the 
thresholds of musical meaning and the cinematic human figure, and liminal spaces of 
spirituality that are symbolically connected with those feelings. Following the key theorists of 
this study, these affective components are directly connected to the following liminal sites 
which problematise the belief systems of archaism, Platonic idealism, Christian mysticism 
and atheism: the secretive space between the self and the musical/cinematic encounter 
(encompassing the ineffable, the uncanny, utopian desire and absurd feeling), the absurd 
space between the inner self and the outer world of humans, the uncanny space of archaic 
Hades, and the utopian space between heaven and earth. Correspondingly, as the chapters 
demonstrate, the affective qualities that animate these spaces run the gamut of feeling, from 
hope to despair, ecstasy to melancholia, quietude to restlessness, heightened aesthesia to 
lifeless catatonia. 
 
Throughout the chapters, definitions and distinctions for these four aesthetic modes will 
continue to be refined and developed through the principle theoretical exegeses, 
demonstrating both Platonic and Christian definitions, Romantic interventions and post-
Romantic reconfigurations. The following section introduces the interconnected relevance of 
the four modes, with simplified, working definitions of each, to prepare a sense of the ways 
in which they participate in the overall thesis. 
 
Working definitions of aesthetic modes  
In the context of the tendency to imagine an all-encompassing unity between human and 
cosmos, utopian desire and absurd feeling stand as opposing, yet interlocked forces. One 
entails the longing for, and belief in, a rapturous and impenetrable unity, harmony, 
interconnection and wholeness; the other entails feelings of fragmentation, disconnection, 
dissonance and rupture between the inner self and the outer world. One claims the absolute 
meaning of existence; the other existential meaninglessness. One reaches toward absolute 
perfection, goodness, truth, beauty, the light; the other gives itself over to the darkness, 
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sensing the falsity, incertitude, or impossibility of such meaning. One imagines otherworldly 
eternal destinations beyond the world of time; the other believes the world of time itself to be 
a void, an oblivion, an abyss. One characterises those feelings of affirmation that have 
traditionally been categorised as good, healthy and positive, and which err toward a kind of 
sublime agony: joy, ecstasy, love, euphoria, hope; the other is characterised by feelings 
traditionally deemed unhealthy and negative: anxiety, despair, incertitude, hopelessness, 
resignation, anaesthesia, catatonia, the absence of feeling. One has faith in the future; the 
other cannot envisage a future. One is attracted to other “luminous” modes of mystery such as 
the sublime and the ineffable; the other is attracted to “dark” modes such as the uncanny and 
the grotesque. One takes itself earnestly, understanding that belief itself is a serious business; 
the other learns to laugh at itself, as it recognises the irony of its own futility, and the 
seriousness with which it nonetheless takes its absurd self. Between the two is Cobussen’s 
threshold, with one crossing over into the other in the endless movement between immersive 
participation and alienating isolation. 
 
As the thesis demonstrates, while musical meaning and the cinematic human figure are both 
catalysts and conduits for utopian desire, enlivening the presence of an absolute unity 
between human and cosmos, both also problematise the reciprocal existential anxiety 
regarding the sensed absence of this unity. As liminal spiritual identities whose components 
refuse a sense of stability and resolution, both the cinematic human figure and musical 
meaning may be said to move us between absurd feeling and utopian desire. Recalling the 
significance of the anthropo-cosmomorphic circuit of affective participation, this difference is 
both social and psychological; either music and cinema affirm our joyous participation in and 
of a world that accepts us unconditionally, or we see ourselves as islandic, alienated, isolated, 
alone. As the work of the chapters hopes to show, this is not a problem that can be delineated 
as being singular to either religious or non-religious thought: the two interwoven poles of 
absurd feeling and utopian desire have a place in both systems.  
 
The extent of this complexity is felt keenly in the philosophies of Deleuze, Kierkegaard and 
Nietzsche. In Chapter Two, we see how Nietzsche returns to ancient Greek culture, where the 
affective Dionysian forces of art, most especially music, restores a spirit of the earth, 
overcoming both the absurdity of existence and Platonic-Christian utopian desire. In Chapter 
Four, as the cinematic transformation of these ideas, I follow Deleuze to see how 
Kierkegaard’s “leaping” spirit of true Christian faith reckons with a gaping, universal 
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despair, and how Deleuze later absorbs this spirit into his own cinema of faith in the body of 
immanence, where Nietzsche also “dances”, and where the need for an existence of choice, 
hope and possibility is extensively developed in response to modernity’s endemic spiritual 
impotence and paralysis.  
 
This focus on aesthetic modes also stems from what I perceive to be a theoretical impasse in 
the argument earlier introduced which, appropriately, founds the niche discipline of film 
music studies in the late 1980s, and suggests that the modes of the ineffable and the uncanny 
also participate in the circuit of absurd feeling and utopian desire. As the first chapter 
critiques in detail, film musicology forges a dualistic bond, based upon presence and absence, 
between the uncanny spectre of silent film, and music’s illusions of emotional meaning. 
Significantly, this argument relies upon the affirmation of music’s ineffable mystery, and a 
reductive account of the undesirable uncanny, both of which remain conceptually under-
developed beneath the greater task of establishing music(ology)’s significance in film studies. 
While film musicology continues to develop as a discipline, this founding argument remains 
strangely uncontested. Thus, because of its stunningly atheistic rendering of the Platonic-
Christian theory of essence and appearance, and its forthright aversion to liminal existence, I 
see it as a fortuitous beginning for theorising spiritual complexity through this modal 
approach.  
 
The discrete affective components of the ineffable and the uncanny may also be 
contextualised through the Christian/atheist divide. Both modes invoke the aura of mystery 
and the problem of language already described for music and cinema, with their discrete 
senses of spirituality ultimately suggesting a distinction between an ethics and an ontology of 
death. Jankélévitch argues that music’s mystery of ineffable truth has led the history of 
western philosophy to treat music as a kind of metaphysical cipher for the secret meaning of a 
universe that remains contingent upon an otherworldly eternity: in contradistinction to this, 
Jankélévitch believes music to be a mystery of the positive, that is, a mystery of life, rather 
than the untellable negative mystery which is death, the absolute unknown. As its affective 
other, the secrecy of the uncanny leads thought into the unsettling territory of the unsayable 
and the untellable, where the feelings of foreboding, fear and dread surround the idea of 
finitude, leading thought into the haunting unsettlements of the undead, the living dead, and 
spectrality. Both suggest an altogether different order of feeling than the certitude that 
accompanies the devout belief in eternal afterlife. The haunting presence of monotheistic 
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religion, which permeates these distinctions, can also be situated within the context of hope, 
the core affective component of utopian desire. Jankélévitch’s philosophical intervention, 
which affirms a relation between hope and the imprecise soul, has its traditional Christian 
precedent. As W. T. Stace and others demonstrate in Chapter Three, the historical link 
between music and theology is most concretely sustained through The Ineffable that is God’s 
Mysterious Being. This is again where the sublime agony of utopian desire (or as Stace calls 
it, the “religious hunger” universal to all humankind) naturally dwells. By contrast, as 
Nicholas Royle’s extended study shows in Chapter Two, the spiritual liminality intrinsic to 
the uncanny is of another order entirely. As the antithesis of religious faith, the more 
supernatural, unnatural, unholy atmosphere of the uncanny is inherently inaccessible to the 
Christian believer who ‘knows’ there is nothing to fear in death. Royle’s work further 
articulates a threshold between the death of God and the returning presence of archaism in the 
secularised postmodern west. While the uncanny is more-often thought to begin, 
theoretically, with Freud’s canonical essay of the same name, Royle argues that it also 
permeates the earlier work of Nietzsche: I take this relation up in Chapter Two, forging a 
connection between Freud’s core paradoxical component of the strangely-familiar and 
Nietzsche’s figure of the hermit, both of which entail the component of secrecy. In the 
hermit, the inner secrecy of madness is not yet psychoanalytical; rather, it is theatrical: the 
hermit has an inner friend with two faces; he wears them as masks, performs proclamations 
and disguises his ignorance. Alongside those earlier uncanny components (for example, 
silence, darkness, the spectre, doubling), the hermit offers a provocative persona through 
which to radically challenge a clear boundary between anthropocentric and anthropomorphic 
meanings of music.  
 
The modes of existence, and their components, may be summarised as follows. Musical 
meaning and the cinematic human figure both embody modes of utopian desire, absurd 
feeling, the ineffable and the uncanny, which are grasped on the level of affective, sensory 
experience, through the ontological-symbolic threshold of elemental dualistic forces: 
light/dark, sound/silence, motion/stasis, space/non-space, time/eternity. These elements are 
also imbricated with the anthropological desire for human-cosmos unity, and its shifting 
senses of metamorphosis. The elements are integral to peculiar liminal identities on the spirit-
matter spectrum: imprecise soul, undead spectre, living spirit and body of immanence. By 
necessity, each spiritual identity inhabits a very peculiar spatial threshold: the fluid circuit 
between the self and music/cinema, the pre-Christian world of archaic Hades, the mystical 
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space between heaven and earth, and the intervallic boundary between the self and the world. 
Each figure, and its space, evokes particular affective components—joy, ecstasy, anxiety, 
incertitude, melancholia—which articulate a space between the eternalising processes of 
logocentrism and anthropocentrism and their temporal status. Ultimately, each mode offers 
an image and feeling of liminal existence for thought, a figure which collapses the boundary 
between the real, the imaginary, and the possible. In another way, each mode advances an 
image of faith in the affective, ethical possibilities of the threshold itself.  
 
7. Mythos-logos: an appropriate language for a method of complexity 
As earlier introduced, I present the final layer of the methodology as a caveat to the reader, 
for whom the style of prose may, from Chapter Two onward especially, be at odds with that 
of a traditional dissertation. In keeping with the concept of the threshold, the writing process 
of this thesis has actively engaged a movement between mythos and logos, which is to say 
that it also performs a movement between affect and reason, between feeling and thought, 
between a creative sensibility and a critical rigour. As already explained, this style follows 
the tradition of the figure of artist-thinker, with which the majority of the key theorists of this 
study have a strong affinity: this movement between affect and reason, I suggest, connects 
directly to their original interventions to theories of existence which circle consistently 
around the problem of language and its relation to thought, knowledge and truth. For 
example, Deleuze understands Nietzsche and Kierkegaard, and their discrete rhetorical styles, 
as variations of the artist-thinker—or the dramaturg-poet-philosopher—whose works 
demonstrate “an incredible equivalent of theatre within philosophy.”41 In both styles, there is 
a distinct sense in which logos lies beneath the threshold of mythos, where a theatrical 
rhetoric of plays, poems, masks, costumes, characters and scenarios animates and persuades 
its reader toward the unthought, which is life itself. This mode of rhetoric, where a poetic 
sensibility performs an underlying critical rigour (and within it a so-called universal message 
regarding the nature and purpose of existence), has its western origins in such ancient tomes 
as Aesop’s fables, Homer’s mythology and Plato’s dialogues. Each offers timeless lessons 
and cautionary tales regarding the meaning and morality of life beneath the veils of irony, 
humour, satire, burlesque and wit. Throughout this thesis, there are diverse examples of prose 
styles that play with this movement between mythos and logos. As Simon O’Sullivan 
suggests, an experimental writing practice is an integral part of Deleuze and Guattari’s 
                                                 
41 Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, trans. Paul Patton (London: The Athlone Press, 1994), 8.  
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determination to think differently, beyond the programmed structures of reason alone, so as 
to offer their “new image of thought”.42 While A Thousand Plateaus affirms the success of 
collaboration in developing this style, Deleuze’s individual oeuvre, which includes the 
cinema books, also marks a continual deviation from the traditionally logical and linear 
formalities of philosophical rhetoric.  
 
A more fluid, non-linear, affective style of rhetoric is also present in Cobussen’s Thresholds, 
and Jankélévitch’s Music and the Ineffable, each of which demonstrates a poetic-
philosophical voice that embodies, shapes or carries the ideas themselves. Cobussen’s 
contemporary work is, for the field of academia more generally and for musicology 
especially, still arguably unorthodox with its evocative and at times obscure compositional 
style, as it captures the uncanny nature of music’s secrecy and mystique, while reaching into 
extremely dense and sophisticated connections. Jankélévitch’s treatise (first published in 
1961) enlivens his themes and critiques in a different sense, with the overall effect of his 
prose resonating with the feeling of his core concept of ineffability, even as he develops his 
argument for understanding the distinction between poetic license and critical precision, and 
between artist and philosopher.43 Morin’s The Cinema, Or the Imaginary Man (originally 
published in 1956), also advances through a certain lyrical quality, yet, simultaneously, his 
cyclical, accumulative style reciprocates a sense of the circular movement intrinsic to archaic 
pre-Christian belief. The image of Morin’s primal, mythical spectre accumulates through the 
spiralling, looping pattern of his work, through a winding pathway of interwoven concepts 
which, like Jankélévitch’s work, resists a strictly linear model of discourse. That both Morin 
and Jankélévitch are not translated into English until respectively 2005 (by Lorraine 
Mortimer) and 2003 (by Carolyn Abbate) is almost certainly indicative of the changing needs 
of English-language research itself, and a desire by contemporary scholars to continue the 
tradition of sharing and engaging with new modes of discourse that do push the boundaries of 
method and style. 
 
As a final example, and as Deleuze already suggests, Kierkegaard and Nietzsche remain 
principle guides for this movement between mythical and logical thought. In Chapter Two we 
will see, with the help of John Sallis, how Nietzsche himself rescues “Plato the artist” from 
                                                 
42 Simon O-Sullivan, Art Encounters Deleuze and Guattari: Thought beyond Representation, Renewing 
Philosophy (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 1–2. 
43 Jankélévitch, Music and the Ineffable, 12. 
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“Plato the philosopher”.44 In Chapter Four, and through the work of Deleuze and Guattari, we 
shall see how it is that both Kierkegaard and Nietzsche communicate their philosophy via the 
rhetoric of theatre that Deleuze finds so provocative: toward a theatre of philosophy, such 
modes of rhetoric perform their arguments affectively and kinaesthetically, with shocks to the 
body (and spirit) of feeling,45 rather than delivering purely logical arguments whose objective 
reasoning is aimed to persuade the rational intellect alone.  
 
This palette of diverse styles has encouraged me to develop a method that is not only in tune 
with the themes and theorists of my research, but captures a sense of the modes themselves, 
and as such, strives to balance a poetic sensibility with philosophical rigour. The greater 
reason for this returns to the problem of spiritual identity itself. The work of this thesis not 
only grapples with the paradox of thinking, speaking and writing the ineffable, uncanny, 
utopian, and absurd aesthetic encounter, but a more nebulous question regarding whether the 
act of theorising itself becomes a possible pathway for living into a faith in spiritual 
complexity. Each mode, as an affect or feeling, is the ironic antithesis of the act of theorising; 
it is not itself a rational thought or idea, but an enigmatic presence or feeling that leads to 
thinking—the feeling of the ineffable, the uncanny, utopian desire and absurdity—all of 
which, thriving beneath the threshold of language, resist the framework of logic alone. I 
believe there to be a clear commonality between the core theorists I follow, each of whom, as 
we shall see, may be thought to be working in the thresholds of a complex method of thought 
which recognises the significance of both logical and mythical thought, and which 
materialises its arguments, theories and beliefs through a prose style that is both affective and 
critical. 
 
An integral aspect of this process has been to remain present to the many questions that have 
continued to unfold in the process of writing. Some of these questions are placed at the 
beginning of the chapters, to introduce the nature of the discussion that is to unfold, and the 
direction it will take. Others are organised within the body of the chapter to act as pivotal co-
ordinates or axis points, which allow further components of the mode to enter into the 
discussion so as to, together, accumulate the sense of liminality in question. The ways in 
which quotations are used, especially at the beginning of chapters or beneath the sub-section 
                                                 
44 John Sallis, Crossings: Nietzsche and the Space of Tragedy (Chicago; London: University of Chicago Press, 
1991), 31. 
45 Deleuze, Cinema 2, 156. 
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headings of Chapters 2 to 4, also requires a similar qualification. The quotes are carefully 
chosen and arranged for their relevance to the particular components of the mode of 
existence. Although these quotes may initially appear to be disparate fragments, over the 
course of the chapter, I slowly forge a connection between them, to arrive at the conception 
of spiritual complexity at hand. Throughout the chapters, these quotes and components 
reappear as reminders, markers and conceptual anchors with which to engage with and 
progress the argument. 
 
This final stylistic layer of the methodology ultimately reaffirms the manifold significance of 
the threshold. In reconciling the irony of thinking this unthinkable threshold between music, 
cinema and spirituality, each chapter privileges the affective poetics of each mode amidst the 
necessity for rigorous critical reasoning, thus attempting to materialise an image of spiritual 
complexity that reciprocates the convergence of mythos and logos. In another way, the core 
themes of liminality and complexity not only form the thematic basis of the thesis, and not 
only emerge in the styles of the theorists I focus on; they also influence the method, which 
recognises that thought moves itinerantly between logos and mythos, and that such a 
movement is perhaps the most appropriate language for “standing still” between musical 
meaning and the cinematic human figure. Through such a method, I have ultimately 
endeavoured to preserve the ironic complexity involved in contemplating what it means to be, 
in some sense, a spiritual human, while reconciling the measure of this existential 
indeterminacy.  
 
Choices in Literature 
Due to the cross-disciplinary, multi-conceptual nature of this study, there is no single 
literature review that exists to encompass its scope. The task to collate an appropriate body of 
literature, specific to each aesthetic mode’s spiritual bearing on musical meaning and the 
cinematic human figure, has entailed a rigorous review of the recognised canon of literature 
particular to each to arrive at working definitions formed through the components. 
Throughout the chapters, I make every effort to acknowledge relevant discourses in aesthetics 
as they relate to the most appropriate points of discussion. However, as each chapter is intent 
to engage deeply with the diverse ensemble of liminalist music and film theorists already 
introduced, and in keeping with the style of a poetic-philosophical rhetoric, these 
acknowledgements, contexts and connections have tended to occur within the footnotes, 
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which in traditional scholarship may be considered a space of lesser importance. In keeping 
with the practice of thinking in thresholds however, and following Cobussen’s own example, 
I do not approach the relation between the body of the thesis and the footnotes hierarchically: 
toward the organisation of the different tiers of literature, the footnotes have become a 
different space with which to transparently provide this necessary information so as not to 
disrupt the rhythm and style of the dialogue itself, and to do so in a voice that most 
appropriately and economically delivers this detail.  
 
There is another reason for this organisation of the literature which further affirms the 
significance of the threshold as a methodological tool: my research into the aesthetic modes 
has been motivated by the ambiguities and paradoxes intrinsic to the threshold. As already 
detailed, I have sought to locate the spiritual significance of each mode through their 
individual components, which together form the mode itself. More-over, I have sought to 
understand how these components variously affirm, negate, or problematise anthropocentric, 
logocentric systems of thought and belief. Correspondingly, those theorists who directly 
critique the tendencies of western thought by taking up such components have been given 
priority in terms of exegesis and application, for the greater purpose of developing a circuit of 
reciprocity and transformation between music and film theory. Throughout my research 
process I have sought to consistently follow the pathways that the key theorists (such as 
Cobussen and Deleuze) have themselves taken, whose work is not only musically or 
cinematically in tune with the aesthetic modes, either implicitly or explicitly, but also 
invested in a conception of spiritual complexity. Throughout the thesis, I provide in-depth 
exegeses of these theorists in the context of the modes’ components, paying special attention 
to certain paradoxes and ambiguities that activate a sense of liminal spirituality in their work.  
 
Ultimately, through this interdisciplinary approach, I hope to prepare an image of theory 
which captures a sense of our own post-religious, post-secular time; one where archaic, 
Platonic, Christian and atheistic beliefs cross over in search of the kind of spirituality that 
dwells in the opening reflections by Khan, Mellers, Tarkovsky and Deleuze. Such cross-
disciplinary engagement, I suggest, creates a dynamic circuit of reciprocity and 
transformation between music and film philosophies, not only to affirm the significance of 
each to the other, but to work toward a more complex understanding of this communion 
between the cinematic human figure and musical meaning than the discrete archives of film 
theory, musicology and film music theory have traditionally accommodated alone. Such 
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cross-disciplinary plurality, I argue, further affirms the rich relation between aesthetics and 
spirituality in a time when the paradigms of post-secular philosophy, cinematic ethics and 
music ethics are gathering ground.46 As such, it is toward an intersection between these fields 
that this research seeks to make an original contribution, inviting connections through 
existential and esoteric aesthetics, anthropology, mysticism, phenomenology, deconstruction 
and Deleuzian studies.  
 
Summation of Chapters: A Circuit of Reciprocity and Transformation  
Structurally, the circuit of the thesis, and its exchange between music and film theory, 
articulates the dynamics of the threshold, again reinforcing the core components of 
movement and transformation. Chapter One, which exemplifies those liminal modes of 
existence peculiar to theories of musical meaning and the cinematic human figure, acts as 
both a departure and return point for Chapters Two, Three and Four, where the practice of 
theorising spiritual complexity is more comprehensively developed. Enlivening the 
movement of the threshold itself, the chapters create a progressive series of reciprocating 
movements between music and film theory to rethink the Christian/atheist divide, and to 
reimagine the nature and purpose of spiritual identity beyond traditionally religious 
meanings. Each chapter accumulates and develops its claims, interventions and arguments by 
following the components of the modes, which are detailed in the following summation of 
chapters. 
 
Chapter One establishes the theoretical and spiritual territory of the thesis, drawing out music 
and cinema’s ontological alignment with the western philosophical categories of presence 
                                                 
46 For philosophy examples see “Spiritual Politics after Deleuze,” ed. Joshua Delpech-Ramey and Paul A. 
Harris, special issue 121, SubStance 39, no. 1 (2010), doi: 10.1353/sub.0.0069; Braidotti, “Post-humanism: Life 
Beyond the Self,” in The Posthuman, 13–54; Ramey, The Hermetic Deleuze; Daniel Colucciello Barber, 
Deleuze and the Naming of God: Post-secularism and the Future of Immanence, Plateaus: New Directions in 
Deleuze Studies (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2014), eBook, 
http://www.jstor.org.ezproxy1.library.usyd.edu.au/stable/10.3366/j.ctt9qdrtd.; Lambert, Return Statements. For 
film theory examples see Sarah Cooper, The Soul of Film Theory (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire; New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013); Screening Nature: Cinema Beyond the Human, ed. Anat Pick and Guinevere 
Narraway (New York; Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2013); “Cinematic Thinking: Film and/as Ethics,” ed. Robert 
Sinnerbrink and Lisa Trahair, Special Issue 141, SubStance 45, no. 3 (2016), doi:10.3368/ss.45.3.3; Robert 
Sinnerbrink, Cinematic Ethics: Exploring Ethical Experience through Film (Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon; 
New York: Routledge, 2016). For musicology examples see Cobussen, Thresholds (2008); Marcel Cobussen 
and Nanette Nielson, Music and Ethics (Burlington: Ashgate, 2012); “Colloquy: Vladimir Jankélévitch’s 
Philosophy of Music,” convenors Michael Gallope and Brian Kane, Journal of the American Musicological 
Society 65, no. 1 (2012): 215–56; Michael Gallope, Deep Refrains: Music, Philosophy and the Ineffable 
(Chicago: University of Chicago, 2017); ed. Robert Sholl and Sander van Mass, Contemporary Music and 
Spirituality (London: Routledge Ashgate, 2017). 
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and absence, and the ways in which this binary becomes ambiguous in the discrete liminal 
theories of musical meaning and the cinematic human figure. The core theoretical 
intervention occurs in this chapter, with emphasis on the ineffable and the uncanny, and the 
ways in which liminalist theorists understand these modes as interventions to the traditionally 
hierarchical ordering of the soul, spirit and body. 
 
To begin, I take up Maxim Gorky’s canonical essay as the theoretical origin for both film and 
film music theory, both of which focus on the figure of the silent cinematic spectre. In 
“standing still” between theories of the cinematic human figure and musical meaning, I 
contextualise what I call film musicology’s argument for presence through two key gestures. 
Firstly, I emphasise the liminal significance of Gorky’s spectre through the discrete theories 
of André Bazin, Edgar Morin and Alan Cholodenko, each of which offers subtle modal 
distinctions for rethinking spirituality beyond Christian theology, through more archaic 
systems of belief. Secondly, I situate the musical argument for presence within the broader 
western historical context of Platonic, Christian and Romantic thought, drawing from the 
more complex music philosophies of Cobussen and Jankélévitch. Both demonstrate the need 
for acknowledging and rethinking logocentric, anthropocentric thought systems through the 
ambiguity, paradox and secrecy intrinsic to the affective musical experience. While 
Jankélévitch directly mobilises the mode of the ineffable to theorise the musical secret, 
Cobussen moves more enigmatically between the ineffable and the uncanny, at times 
deconstructing Christian mysticism to locate music’s mystical significance, at others pursuing 
the renewed interest in archaism which follows the Nietzschean death of God. A further 
intersection occurs between Morin’s uncanny cinema of the imprecise soul, and 
Jankélévitch’s ineffable music of the imprecise soul. Following this modal emphasis, this first 
chapter seeks to demonstrate the spiritual complexity of both musical meaning and the 
cinematic human figure through the liminality intrinsic to the uncanny and the ineffable, and 
to situate these forces of affect within the broader modal context of absurd feeling and 
utopian desire. In this way, I prepare the conceptual foundation for developing the circuit of 
reciprocity and transformation between the two artforms, which constitutes the work of the 
remaining chapters of the thesis.  
 
Chapter Two adopts an explicitly introspective, ironic, theatrical posture, to perform a 
reconfiguration of the relation between the two principle opposing arguments in Chapter One: 
here, I rethink the so-called universal tendency to essentialise music’s meaning as human 
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feeling and emotion (as exemplified in film musicology’s dualist argument for presence) 
through the liminal film theory of the archaic, animistic, undead spectre (which is understood, 
most explicitly by Cholodenko, to be a universal theory for all forms of film). In other words, 
I take this liminal film theory as a model with which to imagine a musical theory of the 
uncanny, so as to understand (rather than condemn) the tendency to believe in music’s 
humanised (anthropomorphic) meanings. In framing the musical encounter as one that is 
animated and haunted by an uncanny human “presence-absence”, I am equally interested in 
the enigmatic movement between anthropomorphism and anthropocentrism, where the 
opposing categories of affect and reason appear to converge. Taking up the additional 
theoretical support of Nicholas Royle’s The Uncanny to isolate the mode’s paradoxical or 
ambiguous components—the strangely-familiar, doubling, secrecy, solitude, silence, 
darkness, the spectre, archaic Hades, liminality—and by focusing on the traditionally 
opposed music philosophies of Plato and Nietzsche, I imagine a musical ‘friend’ for cinema’s 
uncanny spectre through Nietzsche’s own figure of the hermit: this gesture allows me to 
recognise, reconcile and rethink my own ‘leap’ to a humanised musical truth. Nietzsche’s 
work on ancient Greek theatre and mythology also emphasises the apothecary role of music, 
and its connection to truth and belief in relation to the fundamental absurdity of existence: in 
the circuit of theoretical reciprocity and transformation, this so-called anthropological 
problem of absurdity, so healed by music, returns in its cinematic transfiguration in Chapter 
Four, with Deleuze’s cinema of faith in the body of immanence responding to both a 
Nietzschean and a Kierkegaardian absurd.  
 
Chapter Three takes up the notion of utopian desire within the context of Christian 
mysticism. Following Morin’s circuit of anthropo-cosmomorphism, the isolated concept of 
cosmomorphism acts as a principle catalyst for moving beyond the anthropo- focus of 
musical meaning and the cinematic human figure, where the desire for human-cosmos unity 
extends out toward the physical elements of the cosmos, rather than inward to the human 
centre. Here, I am interested to see how cosmomorphism has a bearing on mystical practices 
which use music as a conduit for divine empowerment—and for actions of choice and 
possibility in the world—and how it problematises the archaic, pre-Christian ontology of the 
uncanny cinematic human figure as theorised in Chapter One. Specifically, this chapter takes 
up the cosmic bond of sonorous and luminous vibration, and what I perceive to be a 
corresponding mysticism between musical tone and the cinematic body of light, which 
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converges on the threshold of the living subtle body (also known, quite literally, as the body 
of light).  
 
The challenge of this chapter is ultimately to reimagine the stakes of utopian desire through 
this figure, and to locate a new sense through which spirituality might be thought, one which 
reflects the incertitude and ambiguity of the age that follows both the ongoing presence and 
the death of God. Collectively, the chapter traces the following manifold of components: the 
body of light (as it arises in music and in cinema), hope, the language of negation, the 
Ineffable God, the sacred significance of contradiction, the luminous spiritus of Christian 
mysticism, and Cobussen’s space between heaven and earth where the a-theological mystic 
wanders in a musical a-topia. Through the progressive pathway of these components, I argue 
that the cinematic body of light creates an obstacle for privileging a theory of uncanny 
archaic spirituality alone, marking the crossing—the threshold—between an ‘old’ spirituality 
of quietude and certainty, and a ‘new’ mode of unsettling indeterminacy.  
 
Chapter Four establishes the final stage of the spirit-matter spectrum of spirituality through 
the Deleuzian body of immanence, which resonates as an empirical transformation of the 
subtle body, and which lies at the heart of Deleuze’s cinema of faith. In the circuit of music 
and film theory, this body also resonates with Nietzsche’s music philosophy outlined in 
Chapter Two, where a new image of faith emerges in the relation between absurdity and the 
arts. This chapter also emphasises Deleuze’s reconfiguration of the concept of absence 
established in Chapter One: here, absence is no longer understood purely in terms of 
ontology; it is also thought in terms of an ethics of existence, or in Deleuze’s words, the 
creation of new modes of existence, where choices and possibilities of becoming animate the 
time and feeling of life itself. This existential thread materialises most acutely with Deleuze’s 
call for a cinema of faith in the body of time and feeling, and its subtle connection to 
Kierkegaard’s philosophy of despair. Correspondingly, this chapter attempts to draw out an 
image of the cinematic human figure which further problematises the Kierkegaardian 
influence of Deleuze’s “immanent conversion of faith”.47 Thus, I follow Deleuze’s 
reorganisation of the problem of presence and absence, and the place of cinema in relation to 
the absurdity of existence, with absence now understood as the lacuna of faith in humanity, 
                                                 
47 Paola Marrati, Gilles Deleuze: Cinema and Philosophy, trans. Alisa Hartz (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2008), 86.  
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and spiritual identity now framed through the body of immanence. Noting the plurality of 
Deleuze’s own theoretically diverse influences, I argue the significance of a profoundly 
Kierkegaardian presence amidst his more noted influences of Nietzsche, Spinoza, Bergson, 
and Artaud. I ask whether Kierkegaard’s writings on living into a ‘faith, by virtue of the 
absurd’ provide a properly existentialist dimension to Deleuze’s cinematic body, and how 
this body might prepare a burlesque spiritual sensibility. Here, the components of this figure 
converge between the theatrical absurd and the philosophical absurd. Alongside 
Kierkegaard’s components of the middle spirit, despair, choice, possibility, humour, ‘faith, by 
virtue of the absurd’, and ‘Give me a body then’, I include the following components which 
move between absurd feeling and Deleuze’s oeuvre: the intervallic body between the inner 
self and the outer world, the cinematic body of immanence (time and feeling), the shock of 
the unthought, the gestural practice of repetition, the paradoxical presence of seriousness and 
nonsense, humour, the figure of the jester, the theatre of faith.  
 
In conclusion, the chapters develop a series of liminal modes of existence, located in the 
thresholds of musical meaning and the cinematic human figure, which move through the 
spirit-matter spectrum of imprecise soul, undead spectre, living spirit and body of 
immanence. As complex, affective modes of spirituality, the figures inhabit different spaces 
where adversarial orders of belief exist at one and the same time, and in so doing, open out 
the paradox, ambiguity and irony intrinsic to the desire for timeless ideals such as human-
cosmic unity. Toward the future of belief, this thesis argues that liminal modes of musical 
meaning and the cinematic human figure allow us to theorise spiritual complexity, to imagine 
new modes of existence that inhabit the thresholds between archaic, Platonic, Christian and 
atheistic belief systems, and to contemplate a faith in the ontological-ethical possibilities of 
liminality itself.  
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Chapter One: The Uncanny Spectre, Ineffable Music,  
and the Problem of the Soul 
 
Gorky’s Kingdom of Shadows: A Beginning for Theory 
Last night I was in the Kingdom of Shadows.  
If you only knew how strange it is to be there. It is a world without sound, without colour. 
Everything there—the earth, the trees, the people, the water and the air—is dipped in 
monotonous grey. …It is not life but its shadow, it is not motion but its soundless spectre. 
Here I shall try to explain myself, lest I be suspected of madness or indulgence in symbolism. 
I was in Aumont’s and saw Lumière’s cinématograph—moving photography. …All this 
moves, teems with life and, upon approaching the edge of the screen, vanishes somewhere 
beyond it. 
And all this in strange silence… . Nothing. Not a single note of the intricate symphony that 
always accompanies the movements of people. Noiselessly, the ashen-grey foliage sways in 
the wind, and the grey silhouettes of the people, as though condemned to eternal silence and 
cruelly punished by being deprived of all the colours of life, glide noiselessly along the grey 
ground. …Before you a life is surging, a life deprived of words and shorn of the living 
spectrum of colours—the grey, the soundless, the bleak and dismal life.  
It is terrifying to see, but it is the movement of shadows, only of shadows. Curses and ghosts, 
the evil spirits that have cast entire cities into eternal sleep…Three men seated at the table, 
playing cards… . It seems as if these people have died and their shadows have been 
condemned to play cards in silence unto eternity. …This mute grey life finally begins to 
disturb and distress you. It seems as though it carries a warning, fraught with a vague but 
sinister meaning… You are forgetting where you are. Strange imaginings invade your mind… 
          —Maxim Gorky1 
 
For the fields of both film studies and film music scholarship, Maxim Gorky’s 1896 
“Kingdom of Shadows” remains an archival lamplight, his ruminations on silent, sepia 
spectres, the movement of shadows, and a lost symphony of life marking a beginning for 
scholars from each discipline to think respectively—and largely to the exclusion of the 
other—the nature of the human figure in cinema, and anthropomorphic meanings ascribed to 
music in relation to this figure. While the disciplines of film theory and film music theory 
                                                 
1 Maxim Gorky, “Last Night I was in the Kingdom of Shadows,” in In the Kingdom of Shadows: A Companion 
to Early Cinema, compiled by Colin Harding and Simon Popple (London: Cygnus Arts; Madison, NJ: Fairleigh 
Dickinson University Press, 1996), 5–6.  
41 
 
remain largely separate, both have a vested interest in the problem of cinematic realism, with 
both theorising cinema’s relation to reality through the problem of presence and absence 
intrinsic to Gorky’s silent spectre, a figure that I situate beneath the broader rubric of the 
cinematic human figure. In the most elemental sense, presence and absence are the forces of 
life and death which, together, form the ground for conceptualising the liminal identity of this 
figure. More-often however, theories of realism—be they from a cinematic or musical 
perspective—necessarily privilege cinema’s representation of the living over and before its 
evocations of the dead or the undead. Thus, the positive illusions of presence overshadow the 
silent spectre’s equally complex traces of absence.  
 
In film studies, models such as indexicality and motion theory recognise the uncanny 
ephemera of cinema’s nature, yet more often, these interpretations are quite removed from 
the more mystical dimensions of Gorky’s archaic afterlife.2 Christian Metz, for example, 
reconfigures the uncanny simultaneity of presence and absence to draw out—in place of 
comparatively esoteric theories—paradoxes of perceptual illusion.3 Through the collapsing 
categories of the real and the unreal, and through our psychological participation with 
cinema’s fantastical images of corporeal motion, cinematic presence becomes a “real 
unreality”, with the human figure’s ontology rendered through its illusions of a physical, 
rather than spiritual, life-force:  
 
Two things…are entailed by motion: a higher degree of reality, and the corporality of objects. 
…The objects and characters we see in film are apparently only effigies, but their motion is 
not the effigy of motion, it seems real. …The strict distinction between object and 
copy…dissolves on the threshold of motion. …In the cinema the impression of reality is also 
the reality of the impression, the real presence of motion.4  
 
In themselves, theories of corporeal presence do have strong ontological possibilities for 
contemplating cinema’s impression of reality, provided the nature of this reality remains 
                                                 
2 For a summation of indexicality and motion theory, see Tom Gunning, “Moving Away from the Index: 
Cinema and the Impression of Reality,” Differences: A Journal of Feminist Cultural Studies 18, no. 1 (2007): 
29–52, doi:10.1215/10407391-2006-022.  
3 Christian Metz, Film Language: A Semiotics of Cinema, trans. Michael Taylor (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1974), 3–15; also see Cooper, The Soul of Film Theory, 68-69, 98–104. 
4 Metz, Film Language, 7–9. 
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anchored within the province of the ‘real’ objective world.5 This movement toward a 
cinematic corporeality has a natural affinity with a materialist, secularised sense of the world, 
leaning more toward the psychoanalytical, cognitive, and semiotic,6 rather than the esoteric, 
mystical and animistic. The tendency to renounce the cinematic human figure’s spiritual 
ambiguities, in favour of its now ubiquitous identity “the body” has recently enjoyed some 
focused theoretical attention.7 As Sarah Cooper’s The Soul of Film Theory (2013) argues, this 
definitive shift toward the corporealization of the figure obscures not only a speaking of the 
soul, but also a speaking of the darker, otherworldly indeterminacy that Gorky himself 
registers.8 For Cooper, the gradual erasure of terms such as soul and spirit has much to do 
with “a prevailing philosophical and scientific culture in which the body—whatever gender, 
creed, nationality, or race—is taken increasingly to surpass the need for any further 
explanatory principle.”9 As Cooper shows, a more complex archive exists to theorise the 
spiritual nature of cinema, one which articulates the shifting definitions of soul, mind and 
spirit through the history of film theory. With explicit regard to the cinematic human figure, it 
is within this marginalised history that we also find those theorists who not only preserve the 
ontological ambiguity of Gorky’s silent spectre, but problematise its resistance to such 
traditionally dualistic, archetypal categories as positive and negative, presence and absence, 
soul and body, life and death, time and eternity. Such theories—which harness the liminal 
significance of this figure—offer an invaluable departure point for a theory of spiritual 
complexity. By way of introducing the complexity of liminal theory, let us begin with the 
archaic, uncanny spectre as André Bazin, Edgar Morin and Alan Cholodenko each theorise it, 
which for following chapters, and in tandem with comparative liminalist music philosophers, 
will lay the foundation for theorising spiritual complexity. 
 
Affirming Liminal Existence: Archaic Film Theory  
As Gorky suggests, cinema begins as an ambivalence and a rupture, the moving image of the 
human figure disturbing the difference between phenomenal reality—and with it the vitality 
of life, consciousness, being, the plenitude of existence—and an otherworldly vault of 
                                                 
5 Lisabeth During and Lisa Trahair, eds., introduction to “Belief in Cinema: Revisiting Themes of Bazin,” 
special issue, Angelaki 17, no. 4 (2012): 2, 
http://dx.doi.org.ezproxy1.library.usyd.edu.au/10.1080/0969725X.2012.747326.  
6 Cooper, The Soul of Film Theory, 68–69. 
7 Ibid., 2.  
8 Ibid., 2–6. 
9 Ibid., 2.  
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silhouettes “condemned to eternal silence.” One of the more enduring metaphors for cinema’s 
ineffable, intangible form resurrects the shadowy illusions that flicker upon the walls of 
Plato’s allegorical cave.10 However, to assume a metaphysical similitude between the 
shadowy realms of Gorky’s cinema and those of Plato’s allegory would be folly for certain 
film theorists with a self-consciously archaic—rather than classical or ‘enlightened’—
sensibility.11 When Bazin, Morin and Cholodenko discretely take up the problem of 
cinematic reality, the threshold between the ‘real’ world—of bodies, things, movement, time, 
space, light, darkness, sound and silence—and cinema’s metamorphosis of this world invokes 
Homer’s mythology rather than the Platonic dialogues, with the ontological ambiguity of the 
cinematic human figure acting as the recurring catalyst for theorising film’s animistic 
properties through the archaic conception of spirit or spectre. While their schools of thought 
will be seen to be radically diverse, each scholar theorises a conception of this cinematic 
spirit through the core threshold of presence and absence, with a keen sensibility toward 
certain cosmological, ontological and ethical components particular to the mode of the 
uncanny. Loitering ambivalently between this world and other worlds, the figure’s unsettling 
homelessness reawakens those Platonic questions regarding essence and existence, truth and 
illusion, with the incertitude intrinsic to its form neither abandoned nor resolved by 
privileging its “life” polarity over its darker, deceased other, or vice versa. Throughout these 
texts, the affective forces of light, darkness, silence, space, stasis, motion and time are 
accorded varying degrees of significance in relation to the presence of life, and enmeshed 
within these are components of death which the problem of absence disturbs—mourning, 
memory, loss, preservation, belief, desire, eternity, the myth of immortality, and more 
controversially, the question of the soul. And while each grounds cinema within the archaic 
world, each pursues this complex of forces and affects through diverse methods, privileging 
particular aspects of cosmology and existence over others. Taken together, what emerges is a 
rather beguiling conception of cinema as an imaginary manifold cosmology, one that includes 
Hades’ subterranean realm in Cholodenko’s spectrality, the luminous space “between heaven 
and earth”12 through Bazin’s utopian desire, and in Morin’s magical metamorphosis, a more 
“total” conception of a dynamic, ahistorical, fluid universe. Comparatively, Bazin’s oeuvre is 
the more diversely critiqued, and is now enjoying a new renaissance, offering an appropriate 
                                                 
10 Plato, Republic 514a–520a. Also see T. Jefferson Kline, “The Film Theory of Bazin and Epstein: Shadow 
Boxing in the Margins,” Paragraph, 36 no.1 (2013): 68, doi:10.3366/para.2013.0078.  
11 See Cooper, The Soul of Film Theory, 6–9. 
12 Cobussen, Thresholds, 39.  
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beginning for introducing the stakes of spiritual complexity.13 In problematizing the extent to 
which his seminal essay “The Ontology of the Photographic Image” influences the disparate 
interpretations of non-religious and sacred cinematic realism, I am interested in rethinking 
such polarities through the tentative liminality embedded within Bazin’s archaism. 
 
André Bazin: Between Heaven and Earth 
In Savage Theory: Cinema as Modern Magic, Rachel O. Moore writes of the strong 
resonance between Bazin’s ontology of film and early classical film theory’s belief in 
cinema’s profound archaism.14 For luminary figures such as Jean Epstein, cinema is a form of 
ancient magical ritual, recreating “the enchantment by the uncanny double” through its 
phantasmagorical, photographic nature, its most fundamentally magical feat to “render 
lifelike what is, after all, merely light and shadow.”15 Following Philip Rosen’s interpretation 
of Bazin, Moore writes,  
 
Cinematic representation depends on lack, on negation, on replacing the real entirely with a 
likeness to appear real. …The coexistence of the physically absent reality to which the image 
differs and defers and the presence of the film image fuel spectator desire. …The “gap” as 
Philip Rosen refers to it, “between referent and signifier” without which “Bazin’s ontology 
could not exist” is as much a part of cinema’s appeal for Bazin…as its indexicality. …“It is 
precisely this gap,” writes Rosen, “which is filled in by subjective projection as variable 
manifestations of human imagination.” …The film image can be seen as the spirit double of 
the real thing it shows, always independent of that thing, an exact copy that is thoroughly 
autonomous and exists as part of the spirit world that is cinema.16 
 
While Moore does not rigorously theorise the significance of presence and absence as such, 
her acuity to a more occult understanding of a Bazinian spirit-world is precisely the territory I 
wish to explore by foregrounding both Bazin’s attention to the ambiguity of presence, and its 
connection to the magical archaism of cinema, a connection which is readily overshadowed 
by both indexical and Christian interpretations of his work. 
                                                 
13 Justin Horton, “Mental Landscapes: Bazin, Deleuze and Neorealism (Now and Then),” Cinema Journal 52, 
no. 2 (2013): 25; Kline, “The Film Theories of Bazin and Epstein,” 68–69; During and Trahair, “Belief in 
Cinema,” 1–7. 
14 Rachel O. Moore, Savage Theory: Cinema as Modern Magic (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2000), 1–
11. 
15 Ibid., 84–85.  
16 Ibid., 86-87. Quotation source: Philip Rosen, “History of Image, Image of History: Subject and Ontology in 
Bazin,” Wide Angle 9, no. 4 (1987): 15.  
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Indexicality  
For Bazin, presence is an “ambiguous”, multivalent force in cinema,17 its first sense bound up 
in the processes of the medium’s autonomous, photographic nature: “All the arts are based on 
the presence of man, only photography derives an advantage from his absence.”18 Bazin 
understands that such absence leads to a very different order of presence within the image 
itself, one of revelation, where this lack of human subjectivity, intervention and artistic 
interpretation enables the object and its image to “share a common being, after the fashion of 
a fingerprint,”19 or “the molding of death masks… . One might consider photography…as a 
molding, the taking of an impression, by the manipulation of light.”20 Through this process of 
luminous embalming, where a trace of the real remains strangely within the image, cinema 
satisfies “once and for all, and in its very essence, our obsession with realism.”21 These are 
the threads with which Bazin becomes aligned with the theory of indexicality, his seminal 
essay “Ontology” largely accepted as its archetypal document.22 
 
The index is one of the triad of signs developed by semiotician Charles Sanders Peirce, for 
whom the index, the icon and the symbol all function together as “a complex system of 
interlocking concepts that comprise not only a philosophy of signs but a theory of the mind 
and its relation to the world.”23 In Tom Gunning’s view, and in direct relation to Bazin’s 
thesis, “within theories of cinema...the index has been largely abstracted” from Peirce’s 
complex system, and “given a rather simple definition.”24 Its “simple definition” states that 
an existential bond exists between model and copy—between reality and cinema—by virtue 
of a kind of contact, where a trace, an impression, of the real remains in that which has been 
“impressed.” The index is most often exemplified in such things as “the footprint, the bullet 
hole, the sundial, the weathervane, and photographs—all signs based on direct physical 
connection between the sign and its referent.”25 Within this notion lies an intrinsic causality, 
where the impression is created by a tactile force that causes its existence.  As Mary Ann 
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Doane states, “the work of the index depends upon association by contiguity (the foot touches 
the ground and leaves a trace, the wind pushes the weathercock, the pointing finger indicates 
an adjoining site, the light rays reflected from the object “touch” the film).”26  
 
Gunning believes that while this diminished concept of indexicality has given film theory 
some valuable insights into the nature of film and photography, its usefulness may have 
reached its limits, particularly in the age of digitality, and certainly within the field of 
animation.27 Gunning also goes to some length to show that such a reading of Bazin’s work is 
ultimately incongruent to Peirce’s system. While Peirce seeks to create a logic of signs based 
on rational processes, Bazin speaks of photographic realism as the “irrational power…to bear 
away our faith.”28 As Gunning argues, “[t]his “magical” understanding of photographic 
ontology is clearly very different from a logic of signs. In Peirce’s semiotics, the indexical 
relation falls entirely into the rational realm.”29 Daniel Morgan also argues that an indexical 
reading of Bazin’s ontology negates the profound depth of his enquiry, and stresses that the 
index be struck from Bazinian interpretations, for “[w]hat Bazin argues is something far 
stronger, more powerful, and, in some deep ways, stranger.”30  Indeed, the following passage 
reveals an undeniable incongruence with a consistent theory of indexicality: 
 
The photographic image is the object itself, the object freed from the conditions of time and 
space that govern it. No matter how fuzzy, distorted, or discolored, no matter how lacking in 
documentary value the image may be, it shares, by virtue of the very process of its becoming, 
the being of the model of which it is the reproduction; it is the model.31  
 
Such “strangeness”, I think, emanates from, and surges through, the ambiguity of presence, 
which for Bazin is not only grounded in the absence of the artist, but in the charm of the 
medium—its magical illusions—to enigmatically dissolve the boundary between real 
presence and an otherworldly “re-presence.”   
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Bazin’s Ambiguous Presence  
Writing in 2008, not long after Moore, Morgan and Gunning, Dudley Andrew discovers a 
concrete connection between the ambiguous elements of “Ontology” and Sartre’s The 
Imaginary,32 through the interrelation of the archaic “fetish power of the image” and the 
imaginary processes of perception, where art’s magical power compels a feeling of faith and 
an impression of life, even in the actual absence of this life.33 Andrew argues that it is this 
Sartrean fusion of presence and absence, steeped in an archaic sensibility, which influences 
Bazin toward the ambiguous nature of cinema.34 For Andrew, this Sartrean influence provides 
a more legitimate foundation for Bazin’s “scandalous claim” to the identical sameness of 
presence and its cinematic re-presence,35 leading Andrew to recognise “two Bazins”: 
 
On the one hand stands the sunny, textbook Bazin, for whom cinema reveals reality. This is 
the Bazin for whom films are the monstration of the world’s self-presentation, offering 
epiphanies to the vigilant. On the other hand, as has become increasingly evident, a darker 
Bazin prefigures several philosophers in the post-Sartrean French context right up to our own 
day (Derrida, Deleuze, Nancy, Rancière).36 
 
Most certainly in “Ontology”, this “darker Bazin” resurrects and legitimises Gorky’s own 
kingdom of shadows, where the “real” world and an uncanny other world seem to collapse 
into one another, the boundary between the real presence of the human figure and its 
cinematic re-presence becoming less certain. Most significantly, this problem of presence is 
equally a problem of time: here, Bazin marks the difference between the still photograph and 
the moving image through time’s varying degrees of intensity—the instant “now” of 
photographic stasis and the cinematic passage of duration—the latter a less “disturbing” proof 
of preservation: 
 
Those grey or sepia shadows, phantomlike and almost indecipherable…the disturbing 
presence of lives halted at a set moment in their duration, freed from their destiny; 
photography does not create eternity, as art does, it embalms time…rescuing it simply from 
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its proper corruption. …the cinema is objectivity in time. ...Now, for the first time, the image 
of things is likewise the image of their duration, change mummified as it were.37 
 
In “Theatre and Cinema—Part Two,” Bazin further develops the ambiguity intrinsic to 
cinema’s “strangely paradoxical” presence, where reality’s forces of time and space 
collude.38 “Presence, naturally, is defined in terms of time and space.”39  Here, Bazin 
contends that cinema is the supreme challenge to the living presence of the theatre actor: as 
“a mirror”, cinema becomes an intermediary, opening a “middle stage between presence and 
absence” that hitherto has not been possible in the arts.40 This is the “gap” to which Rosen 
refers, the threshold between presence and absence, the in-between territory that proffers a 
very different kind of life-force, one which challenges absolute negation through its 
preservation of time as the ether of existence. For Bazin, this gap, or interval, invokes an 
archaic sensibility, fulfilling the basic human desire for the immortalisation of life against the 
unthinkable truth of death. That is, cinema satiates the primordial desire to preserve life 
through the ritualistic representation of this life,41 whereby the time of life itself is embalmed. 
In this way, the image of the human becomes both a real presence and its representation: it is 
the living, temporal body strangely immortalised, suspended in its luminous mould, enabling 
us to defy a “second spiritual death.”42  
 
Sacred Realism and Ancient Spirituality  
Steeped in such heady mystical overtones, it is not surprising that Bazin’s “Ontology” leads 
into fairly controversial theological territory, particularly when compared with his later 
writings. While the archive on indexicality exists outside of, or in oblique repudiation of, 
such spiritual realism, the premise that film—as this modern conduit for existential 
salvation—is somehow mediating a sacred threshold is not without its problems for a more 
aggressive atheistic sensibility. Kline criticises the contradictions strung amongst Bazin’s so-
called essentialism as being “not merely a rhetoric device but a basic tenet of Bazin’s 
(Christian) existentialist beliefs.”43 As Cooper says, Bazin’s “profound belief in the soul of 
the world” and his “faith in the Platonic Idea” leads him “to see in cinema the revelation of 
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the ‘universal soul’ ” and to take the “discussion of the soul into religious, specifically 
Catholic, terrain.”44 While Cooper’s account of Bazin concentrates on later writings which 
clearly extoll the virtues of a Christian existential “phenomenology of salvation and grace”,45 
“Ontology” itself does not seem to me to be clearly authorising such stridently Platonic or 
Christian ideals. Certainly, Bazin advocates cinema as revelatory, where “the natural image 
of a world that we neither know nor can know” is given through film’s “power to lay bare the 
realities.”46 And though Bazin does articulate cinema’s power to restore presence as an act of 
salvation against the inevitability of death, its mysticism is much older than Christian faith, 
aligning with archaic burial practices of mourning and consolation that pragmatically manage 
the very real human fear of becoming forgotten, practices that rely upon the ambiguity, rather 
than the certainty, of presence.  
 
In tune with this anthropological urge to memorialise, Bazin’s essay is a meditation on the 
artistic act of preservation and its defiance of finitude through this new, cinematic rite of 
luminous embalming: as modernity’s incarnation of more ancient forms of mourning 
practice, cinema autonomously creates and preserves the silent spectre, whose liminal form 
defies the certitude of death. That he begins “Ontology” with an exposition on the rituals of 
ancient Egyptian embalming leaves no doubt to his fascination with the obsessive human 
desire to transcend the inevitability of death and decay: 
 
The religion of ancient Egypt, aimed against death, saw survival as depending on the 
continued existence of the corporeal body. Thus, by providing a defence against the passage 
of time it satisfied a basic psychological need in man, for death is but the victory of time. To 
preserve, artificially, his bodily appearance is to snatch it from the flow of time, to stow it 
away neatly, so to speak, in the hold of life.47 
 
Through this restoration of the pre-Christian archaic, Bazin is able to conceptualise cinema as 
the supreme form of contempt, flouting as it does the finitude of death. While he does speak 
of faith, it is not through a dogmatic orthodoxy, his vision of art’s purpose fixed more broadly 
on the anthropological rather than the theological: 
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Civilisation cannot…entirely cast out the bogy of time. …No-one believes any longer in the 
ontological identity of model and image, but all are agreed that the image helps us to 
remember the subject and to preserve him from a second spiritual death. Today the making of 
images no longer shares an anthropocentric, utilitarian purpose, but of a larger concept, the 
creation of an ideal world in the likeness of the real, with its own temporal destiny. “How 
vain a thing is painting” if underneath…we do not discern man’s primitive need to have the 
last word in the argument with death by means of the form that endures.48 
 
While theology and indexicality—and their respective sacred and non-religious realisms—
may well rewrite Bazin to their own advantage, perhaps what is written is not so much the 
indoctrinated proof of either, but the disturbance of the certainty of both. “Ontology” speaks 
to the epic continuum of an anthropological desiring for eternity through art, and in this 
sense, errs toward a belief in the luminous aura of cinematic technology, rather than orthodox 
religiosity. More-over, eternal desire moves across historical boundaries, rather than 
inhabiting Christianity alone. That this ambiguous cinematic presence channels the ancient, 
poetic ideal for the light of hope—for immortality—beyond monotheistic religion, suggests 
that such utopian consciousness is indeed, as Ernst Bloch believes, the lot of humanity, rather 
than the fanatic.49 In this sense, Bazin presents cinema as a kind of non-Euclidean 
cosmological threshold for thinking the liminal spirit, for thinking a space between belief and 
desire: in this ambiguous threshold between indexicality and essentialism, the cinematic spirit 
wanders between this world and other imaginable worlds, between heaven and earth, 
between time and eternity.  
 
Edgar Morin: The Fluid Universe 
The original question which science snatched away from religion and philosophy in order to 
take it upon itself, the question which justifies its ambition as science: ‘What is man, what is 
the world, what is man in the world?’, science today sends back to philosophy, still 
incompetent in its eyes because of its addiction to speculation; and it sends it back to religion, 
still illusory in its eyes because of its inveterate mythomania.  
—Edgar Morin50 
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Writing on cinema in Bazin’s own time, Edgar Morin’s mid-century work The Cinema, Or 
the Imaginary Man practices what he will later come to call his method of complex thought, 
which refuses to mutilate, reduce, simplify or hierarchically subordinate forces such as 
incertitude, chaos and liminality, and “which emphasizes the interaction between researcher 
and researched, and participation as a way of being in the world.”51 Beyond dualistic thought, 
and its “principles of disjunction, reduction, and abstraction” which Morin calls the 
“paradigm of simplification”, complexity entails  
 
the disturbing traits of a mess, of the inextricable, of disorder, of ambiguity, of uncertainty. 
Hence the necessity for knowledge to put phenomena in order by repressing disorder, by 
pushing aside the uncertain. In other words, to select the elements of order and certainty, and 
to eliminate ambiguity, to clarify, distinguish, and hierarchize.52 
 
Against the “light” of Cartesian Reason which has “driven myths and “darkness” to the dregs 
of the human spirit”,53 Imaginary Man is a work that prophecies this later thesis through an 
anthropological grounding which refuses to privilege life, logos, and reality before death, 
mythos, and the imaginary. For translator Lorraine Mortimer, Morin’s film theory is the 
natural extension of his earlier book, L’Homme et la Mort:  
 
Morin’s refusal to reduce and mutilate, aspiring to truth and totality while recognizing that 
totality is impossible and uncertainty our lot…takes place in a context, is played out against a 
backdrop, which is dramatic itself. For all our incertitude, there is one certainty humans can 
count on: death. Resistance to the cruelty of the world is the most profound and primordial of 
resistances. … [Morin] needed to elaborate an ‘anthropo-social’ conception of two neglected 
aspects of anthropology that the problem of death threw into relief: the biological reality of 
the human being, mortal like all other living beings, and the human reality of myth and the 
imaginary, which posited a life beyond death.54 
 
Drawing from his own experiences, Morin’s confrontation with the “theoretical and 
existential complexity” of death ultimately “meant abandoning the ideology of Christianity 
and western humanism that man is above nature and it meant recognizing the omnipresence 
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of contradiction”.55 To mark out such a terrain, Morin casts an extraordinarily wide 
interdisciplinary net, mixing the philosophical vitalism of Henri Bergson with Sartre’s 
existentialism, and interweaving anthropological staples such as Lévi-Strauss with the early 
classical film theory and criticism of such luminary figures as Epstein, Balázs, Gance, and 
Eisenstein, while re-animating the cinematographic magic of Méliès—“that great naïve 
Homer”56—and the photogenic wonder of the Lumières’s banalities. 
 
Undoubtedly, Morin traverses the same complex, liminal territory that Bazin’s “Ontology” 
more intuitively gropes through, so as to preserve the integrity of incertitude. While Bazin 
alludes more enigmatically to the liminality and paradox of cinema (leaving his work 
vulnerable to precisely those systems of mutilation that Morin condemns), such 
indeterminacy principally guides Morin’s method, so as to plunge deeply into the nature of 
the human mind and spirit, and our profound connection with cinema as an object of art, 
science, magic, and spiritual belief.57 Like Bazin, Morin is profoundly influenced by Sartre’s 
psychological processes, his attention to the problem of presence and absence as it relates to 
the difference between the imaginary and the real, and what this might mean for moving 
images and their magical presence.  
 
Morin worries that words like myth, dreams, the imaginary, the poetic, metamorphosis and 
magic have no serious place in a world driven by science, empiricism, and sober rationality; 
they belong to a pre-modern, “pre-civilised” age, to the theologian, the Sharman and the 
prophet, to the anthropologist and the alchemist, to the fool, the child and the madman. And 
of course, the artist. Yet, as Mortimer explains, Morin’s “[t]rue rationality recognizes 
irrationality and dialogues with the unrationalizable”, and “is profoundly tolerant in regard to 
mysteries”: 
 
One of the most potent truths in Morin’s book about death concerns the way we live: the 
human being inhabits the earth not just prosaically but poetically. Myth and the imaginary are 
not just superstructures, vapors. Human reality is itself semi-imaginary. Myth and the 
imaginary have a radical place in Morin’s complex anthropology, which never sees man 
principally defined by technique and reason. Homo sapiens and Homo faber are also Homo 
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demens et ludens. Affectivity and the “lived poetry of the surrealists” are at the heart of his 
anthropology.58  
 
For Morin, the “charm” of cinema, with its restoration of a mythical universe, returns us to 
our true rationality, our poetic being in the world, our thinker-worker-madman-player self 
who creates and partakes in the complex circuit of “magic, sentiment, and reason” which is 
the “contradictory unity of the Gordian knot of all anthropology.”59 As the incomparable site 
mediating death’s finitude, cinema opens the space where the “substance of the imaginary is 
mixed up with our life of the soul, our affective reality.”60 In this unreservedly 
anthropological sense, Morin will theorise cinema as sating the mad desire for immortality 
and providing a defence against the unimaginable vanishing that lies ahead. As the “fluid 
universe”61  of an animistic, mystical order, as the surreal encounter of a luminous sleeping 
awake, a Morinian cinema enlivens us to our poetic, archaic self, emphasising process rather 
than essence. In its diaphanous theatre of shadows, cinema is our own dance with death, 
intimately communing with the primordial desire for immortality, a desire which links our 
mortality—and the inevitability of our own death—with the figure of the double itself.  
 
Presence-Absence and the Archaic Double 
[T]he cinema brings to the world a feeling, a faith, the “return to ancestral affinities of 
sensibility.” This is where the mystery begins… At the most archaic level, the kingdom of 
the dead is a universe of doubles that copies the universe of the living in every way. …The 
image represents—the word is right—it restores a presence. 
—Edgar Morin.62 
 
For Morin, the forces of presence and absence—as forces of life and death—catalyse our 
subjective participation with cinema, restoring us to the complexity of a pre-civilised, pre-
enlightened sensibility that modern thought tends to either neglect or reject. To elaborate the 
universe of cinematic presence as magical, Morin takes the Sartrean imaginary and its liminal 
casting of presence well beyond the ambiguity that Bazin outlines, commuting across an 
eclectic assemblage of images, all of which exude, in varying degrees, this uncanny aporia: 
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mental images in the mind’s eye (dreams, memories, hallucinations, ideas, prophetic visions), 
artistically created material images (drawings, engravings, painting, sculpture), and those 
images which present a more ephemeral degree of this existential liminality—the shadow, the 
silhouette, the mirror, the water reflection, the spirit, the spectre, the photograph, the 
cinema.63  Ultimately, Morin understands cinema’s place in this assemblage of images as 
belonging to a more distant genealogy that ‘begins’ with archaism, where magic, 
metamorphosis, mythical cosmologies, and the exaltation of the human spirit reigns. Sired 
from this line, cinema triumphantly restores “the double, the image-specter of man”, which is  
 
universal in archaic humanity…the single great universal human myth. An experienced myth: 
its presence, its existence leave no doubt. …This image is projected, alienated, objectivized to 
such a degree that it appears as an autonomous specter, endowed with an absolute 
reality...[which] is at the same time an absolute superreality: the double is the focal point of 
all the needs of the individual, as if they were realized there, especially his most madly 
subjective need: immortality.64 
 
Here, Morin is preparing the ground for the ways in which images possess, and are possessed 
by, two kinds of archaic, mythical death: “the survival of the double”, who is “other and 
superior” to its original form and moves “freely in the universe of metamorphoses”, and the 
process of “death-renaissance”, that is, of rebirth or reincarnation, which, like the double, is a 
“universal of archaic consciousness.”65 Shedding its decomposing body, the spectre is free to 
participate in the divine polyphony of continual metamorphoses:    
 
Then, holding man’s amortality, it possesses a power so grandiose that death changes it to 
become a god. The dead are already gods and the gods are descended from the dead, that is, 
from our double, that is, from our shadow, that is…from the projection of human individuality 
into an image that has become external to it.66  
 
It is in this psychological, desiring sense that cinematic presence takes on its surreal, occult, 
and intuitive dimensions, where the magical quality of Epstein’s photogénie is central, 
imbuing the mundane life it captures with a poetic “quality that is not in life but in the image 
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of life”, where the revelatory, supernatural power of the cinema realises itself, where organic 
sight is doubled by “oneiric vision”, and where the real and the magical intersect.67 While 
keeping such phantasmagorical company as dreams, hallucinations, religion, magic, artworks 
and apparitions, cinema equally captures (embalms) and transforms the elemental forces of 
light, darkness, movement, space and the manifold intensities of time (stasis, acceleration and 
deceleration, temporal reversal, kaleidoscopic collages of the past, present and future, the 
sense of eternity in the restoration and preservation of presence),68 endowing the material 
world of the animate and inanimate with the peculiar je ne sais quoi of photogénie.69 More 
rigorously than Bazin, Morin speculates on the difference between photographic and 
cinematic impressions of life through this more mystical lens of light, motion and time, 
revealing the extent to which photogénie, as occult possessor of such omnipotent presence, 
also exudes the forces of absence: 
 
Although motionless, the photographic image is not dead…Yet they are not animated. … 
With the cinematograph, we could believe that the presence of the characters comes from the 
life—the movement—that is given to them. In photography, it is obviously presence that 
gives life. The primary and peculiar quality of photography is the presence of the person or 
the thing that is nevertheless absent….as if, to use Sartre’s words, the original had incarnated 
itself into the image. … Healers, sorcerers, and seers…treat and heal through 
photography…cast a spell or a charm; evil spells of bewitchment are performed on 
photographs…the photograph…is a real presence of the person represented…70 
 
For Morin then, photography practices a magic of morality which performs a very particular 
function as the immortalised memory: with its “virus of presence” which “knows no borders 
between life and death”,71 and as a medium of doubling, photography externalises the 
imaginary mind—the organic, temporal, perishable medium—whose function is to represent, 
that is, to restore a presence. If the “most banal of photographs harbors or summons a certain 
presence”,72 it is through its enigmatic doubling of our own inner ‘camera’ which has ever 
created the illusion of presence, yet which will inevitably perish. Returning again to Sartre’s 
“mental image” which, for Morin, is the reciprocal medium for both “the presence of the 
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world in man [and] the presence of man in the world”, it is the permeations of absence, 
haunting the margins of the real, which allow presence to flourish:  
 
But at the same time, the image is only a double, a reflection—that is, an absence. Sartre says 
that “the essential characteristic of the mental image is a certain way that the object has of 
being absent even in the midst of its presence.” Let us immediately add the converse: of being 
present even in the midst of its absence. As Sartre says, “The original incarnates itself, it 
enters the image.”  The image is a lived presence and a real absence, a presence-absence.73  
 
That cinema is this ungovernable expression of presence-absence, where the survival of the 
double and death-renaissance flourishes, means that it also possesses the divine forces of 
prophecy, in diabolical and radiant strains, now the bearer of a dreadful existential incertitude 
that haunts the finitude of death, now the glorious messenger of something utopian beyond 
such finitude:  
 
Successive layers of beliefs have been superimposed and mixed in the double. From the time 
of Homeric Greece, the double has just as well, and even simultaneously, brought anguish or 
deliverance, victory over death or the victory of death. … The mental image and the material 
image potentially enhance or debase the reality they present to our view; they radiate fatality 
or hope, nothingness or transcendence, amortality or death.74 
 
The Morinian Soul 
It is in such passages that the force of Morin’s complex thought announces itself, for what is 
ultimately at stake amidst this collusion of presence and absence, mental and material images, 
gods of the dead, nothingness and transcendence, is not only our anxiety toward absolute 
negation, but the unsettling residue of religiosity that comes with such utopian idealism.  Like 
the ancient spiritual realism of Bazin’s “Ontology”, this same ambiguity of the imaginary 
immortal is haunted by the presence of the soul, a term which Morin will not condemn, 
negate, or evade, but entirely recast through the tenets of complex thought. Animism—
understood as an encounter with archaism through the revelation of photogénie—is more than 
simply “subjective presence”, but something uncanny and “atmospheric”, a metaphorical 
soul: 
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Thus things, objects, nature, under the combined influence of rhythm, time, fluidity, camera 
movement, magnifications, games of shadow and light, gain a new quality. …This soul, of 
course, we must understand in a metaphorical sense, since it is a question of the state of the 
spectator’s soul. The life of objects is obviously not real: it is subjective. But an alienating 
force tends to extend and externalise the phenomenon of soul into an animistic phenomenon. 
Objects hoist themselves up between two lives, two levels of the same life: external animistic 
life and internal subjective life. There are in fact two meanings to the word soul, the magical 
(alienated) sense, where the soul is transferred onto the contemplated object, and the 
subjective sense, where it is experienced as internal emotion.75 
 
This plural conception of soul is integral to Morin’s complex method, which opens out an 
alchemy of concepts, problems and relations, where the imaginary, participation, magic, 
animism, photogénie and cinema’s fluid metamorphosis of movement, time and space 
together create a cosmology “at the limit of materiality, visibility, and palpability, precisely at 
the border of a nature that is fluid, frothy, nebulous, gaseous, or aqueous.”76 Yet matter itself 
is not to be discarded, for Morin also demonstrates “a keen appreciation of the materiality of 
existence, of the concrete and the sensuous”, where the human body, as well as the soul, in 
both the spectator and the cinematic world, is thought in relation to the forces of time and 
motion. Incorporating Bergson’s notion of duration (where the psychological, qualitative 
feeling of subjective time opposes the metronomic, scientific precision of quantitative clock-
time), Morin speaks of cinema’s “fluid time” in terms of degrees of mobile intensity, as being 
contingent upon motion’s “strange compressions and elongations”, where the “acceleration of 
time vivifies and spiritualises” while the “slowing down of time mortifies and materialises”,77 
all of which activates the circuit of an all-encompassing affectivity:  
 
Movement has a double face: it is not only a power of corporeal realism, but also an affective 
power, or kinaesthesia. It is so bound to biological experience that it brings with it the inner 
feeling of life as well as its external reality. Not only the body but also the soul. Not feeling 
alone, not reality alone: the feeling of reality.78 
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Morin runs the gamut of a potentially infinite score of “in-betweens”, which are themselves, 
continually in motion, flux and flow, and which charter the warp and weft of an immense 
poetics of incertitude. Between the self and cinema stretches a vast and burgeoning threshold 
unfolding the complex circuit of affective participation—projection, alienation, anthropo-
cosmomorphism—the ungraspable totality of which summons the process, rather than the 
essence, of magic,79 all of which ultimately circulates around the relation between the time of 
life, the reality of death and an image “animated with a life more intense or more profound 
than reality…in possession of a supernatural life”: 
 
Then a force as powerful as death radiates from it, sometimes a Proustian power of time 
recovered, sometimes a spiritualist power. It is as if in man the need that battles against the 
erosion of time fixes itself in a privileged manner upon the image.80 
 
In this alchemic reciprocity of the real and the imaginary, it is not only the cinematic double, 
but we ourselves, as spectator, who become itinerant vagrants wandering the threshold of a 
host of collapsing binary oppositions: between life and death, divine and earthly, human and 
cosmos, corporeal and spiritual, waking perception and oneiric surrealism, the self and an 
‘other’ self, memory and prophecy, recollection and phantasy, “primitive” archaic and 
“civilised” modern thought. In this sense, Morin’s double, with its indefinable, multivalent 
presence, has a deeply anthropological function that resonates with Bazin’s own theory: 
through this aporetic figure, the finality of human life is outfoxed, the mad desire for 
immortality satiated.81 If Morin indicts the modern world’s saturation of cinema with an 
excess of soul—now “all slimy and lachrymal”, oozing, overflowing, “smeared with soul”—
it is because we “moderns”—heirs to “evolution” and “civilisation”—confuse soul with 
magic, feeling with seeing.82 Morin is adamant to preserve, against the mutilating essentialist 
and dualistic definitions, the indeterminate nature of the soul, returning it to the disorder of 
process rather than the order of essence: 
 
What is the soul? It is this imprecise zone of the psyche in its nascent state, in a state of 
transformation, this mental embryogenesis where all that is distinct is confounded, where all 
that is confounded is in the process of becoming distinct, in the midst of subjective 
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participation. Let the reader who wears his soul on his sleeve forgive us. The soul is only a 
metaphor for us to designate unspecified needs, psychic processes in their nascent materiality 
or decadent residual state. Man does not have a soul. He has soul.83  
 
Furthermore, the problem for Morin is not humanity’s recurring creation of mythical realities 
and imaginary other worlds for the consolation of our existential incertitude: this is our basic 
human condition, our endlessly performed rite. The problem is that modern humanity no 
longer considers the genealogies of archaic magic—including the “imaginary reality of 
myth”84—as spiritually meaningful, as a significant part of our participation with the cosmos. 
The problem is that The Soul, understood as essence rather than process, “degrades itself in 
exaggerating itself. It loses communication with the nourishing channels of the universe.”85 
Not only have we confused the soul as something that can be known by mutilating its 
complexity, we have also lost touch with those creative conduits that enable us to live 
poetically. Again, this is cinema’s restorative purpose: not only does it respond to the “mad” 
utopian desire for eternal life, but to other needs and beliefs “that practical life cannot fulfil”: 
the “need to escape oneself…to lose oneself…to forget one’s limits, to better participate in 
the world”.86 
 
Morin’s anthropology is a unique response to the mutilating thought that surrounds him, one 
of his more radical claims being that in this disenchanted world, the modern invention of 
cinema exhumes and restores the archaic sensibility to live poetically with the dead—with 
those who are no longer lost to the corrosions of time, organic memory and forgetting but are 
now cinematically eternalised—allowing us to participate meaningfully in the world. It is an 
idea that, decades later, Alan Cholodenko will later ‘re-animate’ to a much darker degree 
through a decisively different school of thought again. 
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Alan Cholodenko: The Animatic Spectre 
The Kingdom of Shadows Gorky characterises is the Kingdom of shades, ghosts, spectres, 
evil spirits. This Kingdom is for me, Hades, the underworld, the land of the spirits of the 
dead, but of the dead who return to haunt the living as the living dead. This Kingdom, this 
empire of phantoms, is the Kingdom of Cinema. This Kingdom is ruled by Pluto…and by 
Satan. It is a land of the devil, of the evil demon. 
         —Alan Cholodenko87 
 
Writing from the 1990s, Cholodenko works out of the well-established post-structural 
continental school, privileging an interdisciplinary approach to scholarship, and drawing 
principally from the aporias, in-betweens and undecidables of Derridean deconstruction and 
Baudrillardian post-structuralism.88 In the appeal to legitimise the theoretical significance of 
animation film against the tendency in “Film Studies” to privilege live action film,89  
Cholodenko will take up Gorky’s “Kingdom of Shadows” directly, and place it within a 
composite that continually cycles back to the ancient senses of animation. This composite 
primarily includes concepts from Derrida’s thanatological complex (the crypt, the spectre, the 
trace, the “hauntological” and “lifedeath”), Freud’s work on the uncanny, mourning and 
melancholia, and Cholodenko’s own meticulous revision of ancient Latin and Greek 
etymology.90 Through this composite, Cholodenko rethinks the nature and experience of film 
through what he calls “the Cryptic Complex of the uncanny, the return of death as spectre, 
endless mourning and melancholia and cryptic incorporation.”91 Though Cholodenko does 
not cite a Morinian influence, the thanatological, mythological and conceptual components of 
Cholodenko’s mortuary complex do resonate as a kind of deconstructive echo to Morin’s 
archaic double. Yet even with its grounding in the aporetic space between life and death, 
Cholodenko’s theory is, I believe, a more radical “darkening” of cinema as the irresolvable, 
traumatic encounter with negation—death, absence, loss, evil, trauma—a Derridean 
darkening of the “light” of presence that marks the history of ideas.  
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On Derrida and The Metaphysics of Presence 
When Cholodenko forges a relation between Gorky’s “Kingdom of Shadows” and the archaic 
forces of animation, he does so by critiquing Gunning’s canonical “cinema of attractions” 
theory which is itself based on Gorky’s account, and which, for Cholodenko, unwittingly 
reveals the principally “animatic” nature of film.92 Yet it is in the relation forged between 
Gorky and Jacques Derrida that Cholodenko marks out the more rigorously conceptual terrain 
of animation, and where Gorky himself comes to prophecy Derridean thought.  
 
Energising Cholodenko’s Cryptic Complex is Derrida’s critique of the anthropocentric, 
logocentric, phallocentric “metaphysics of presence”, with Derrida’s own work extending 
Heidegger’s earlier phenomenology.93 For Heidegger, “Being is determined as presence by 
time”, 94 the idea of presence itself understood as the privileged force in both the temporal 
and the eternal sense. As Carol J. White explains, “Even the [Platonic] Forms and God are 
real in an eternal “now”… even the traditional characterisation of Being as temporal, 
timeless, or supratemporal is a particular metaphysical interpretation…”95 Following 
Heidegger, Derrida writes:  
 
The history of metaphysics, like the history of the West …[determines] being as presence in 
all the senses of this word. It would be possible to show that all the names related to 
fundamentals, to principles, or to the center have always designated the constant of a 
presence—eidos, arche, telos, energeia, ousia (essence, existence, substance, subject), 
aletheia, transcendentality, consciousness, or conscience, God, man, and so forth.96 
 
For Derrida, the metaphysics closes out the significance of both absence and liminality; 
instead, the binary oppositions of presence and absence are thought through an 
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uncompromising, hierarchical system that privileges a higher ‘one’ before a lesser ‘other,’ 
resulting in the subordination and marginalization of the latter.97  For Cholodenko, this is 
precisely the system in which animation studies remains marginalised. It will be useful here 
to present Cholodenko’s own account of Derrida’s critique, to prepare a deeper appreciation 
for how it is that this same tendency endures not only in film studies, but also in film music 
theory: 
 
For Derrida, Western metaphysics has determined Being as presence, a fullness of living, 
meaning, truth, essence, ideality, etc., interiorizing and centring it against a lack, an absence, 
a deficiency of itself. Metaphysics does this through a set of binary oppositions which even 
today stand for what is self-evidently logical and true, including fullness/emptiness, 
essence/superfice, interior/exterior, subject/object, proper/improper, literal/figurative, 
good/bad, truth/falsity, reality/fiction, adult/child, male/female, serious/frivolous, 
health/disease, cure/poison, light/dark, animate/inanimate, speech/writing, etc. A 
hierarchization of these antinomies elevates the first term as belonging to presence and 
subordinates and excludes the second of each pair of opposites as a falling off from 
presence.98 
 
In this regard, Cholodenko understands the “Platonism of Film Studies” to be the 
continuation of the metaphysics of presence, the theoretical significance of animation film 
readily overshadowed by the discipline’s concentration on “ ‘photographed live action 
film’…either excluding [animation] by defining [it] as a form of graphic art unrelated to film 
or marginalizing it as an inferior, frivolous, merely mechanical form or appendage of film for 
children.”99  Ultimately, while Cholodenko’s theory of the animatic (as opposed to the 
cinematic) is intended to legitimise and proliferate animation studies, his premise is that “not 
only is animation a form of film, all film, including cinema by definition, is a form of 
animation”,100 animated by both life and death: 
  
Put simply, the first, last and enduring attraction of cinema as form of animation as form of 
what we call the animatic is the uncanny reanimation of the dead as living dead, of what after 
Jacques Derrida we call lifedeath.101  
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Here, Cholodenko returns us directly to a liminal casting of the human figure in film—to the 
figure of the spectre who disturbs and decentres the supremacy of the plenitude of life—
whose “trace” is “the mark of the radical other”, an “undecidable” which, in Cholodenko’s 
theory of film, is animation itself.102 It is an argument which directly challenges both a belief 
in the soul, and where such pure presence resides beyond the threshold of death.   
 
The Soul and the Spectre 
In claiming a privileged place for animation film in the broader field of film theory, 
Cholodenko writes that the “two major ideas of animation—life, movement” raises “the most 
profound, complex and challenging questions of our culture, questions in the areas of being 
and becoming, time, space, motion, change—indeed life itself”, its proof given through the 
very definition of animation, which he sources from Webster’s Dictionary: 
 
animate…[<L. animatus, pp. of animare, to make alive, fill with breath < anima, air, soul].   
1. to give life to; bring to life. 2. to make gay, energetic, or spirited. 3. to inspire. 4. to give 
motion to; put into action: as, the breeze animated the leaves. adj. 1. living; having life. 2. 
lively; vigorous; spirited. SYN.-animate implies a making alive or lively (an animated 
conversation) or an imparting of motion or activity (animated cartoons); … 103 
 
Like Morin, Cholodenko understands that film, so endowed with both life and movement, 
“poses the very questions of life itself, of movement itself and their relation”, with cinema 
inhabiting the space between the archaic and the modern, the occult and the scientific: 
 
[W]here various forms of energy, animism, magic, élan vital, etc., catalyze or transform the 
inanimate into the animate, we will find animation as ‘endowing with motion’ engaged in 
some form or manner, be it transformation, metamorphosis, metaphor, acceleration, etc. …the 
inescapable implication of the modes of animating as endowing with life, authoring, creating, 
etc., given us by the creationist myths of religion, classical mythology, magic, the 
supernatural, etc., and the institutions and discourses which propound them—notably the arts 
and the humanities—with the modes of animating as endowing with motion proffered by 
science and technology over the centuries…104 
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Here, in this rendering of cinema as both modern invention and heir to an ancient world 
through the intersecting forces of animation, the alchemies of science, art, magic and religion 
once more trespass unswervingly into the controversial territory of the soul, a territory written 
into the very definition that Cholodenko provides. But we must not presume to interpret this 
essentialist meaning as Cholodenko’s ontology of film; we must not leap to the conclusion 
that if “all film is a form of animation”, and that because animation itself means “soul” 
(coming from the Latin anima), then the soul of cinema ‘is’ animation. If such an argument 
seems to be deeply paradoxical, it is because Cholodenko is theorising the paradox of 
animation’s essentialism: 
 
I theorize the animatic as not only the very logics, processes, performance and performativity 
of animation but the very ‘essence’ of animation—the animation and animating of animation. 
The animatic—the very singularity of animation—is anterior and superior to animation. It 
subsumes animation, is its very condition of at once possibility and impossibility…The 
animatic is that nonessence enabling and at the same time disenabling animation as 
‘essence’…105 
 
In this sense, to say that cinema has a soul in the orthodox, institutionalised, colloquial sense 
would negate the complexity of aporia, indeterminacy, decentring and disturbance that 
deconstruction seeks to make room for. To say that animation or the animatic is ‘the soul’ of 
cinema, would be to return to the hierarchical manoeuvres of the metaphysics in its most 
ideal sense, where such an inimitable presence not only pertains to the fullness of life, but to 
the transcendental realm of afterlife, the immortal body, and the eternal soul. As Cooper 
writes of the general poststructuralist disinclination to a thinking in terms of ‘core’ or 
‘essence’, “To promote belief in the soul would re-introduce the very essentialism that 
theoretical argument was seeking to deconstruct, and would have been deemed regressive 
rather than progressive.”106 In keeping with Derrida’s deconstructive “cryptology” then, 
Cholodenko rethinks the very notion of an essence or ontology of film beyond the 
consolation of such certainty. He does this by returning to archaic Hades, and the lifedeath of 
the spectre, which is not only the privileged “figure of all figures” in film, but forms the 
ground for thinking itself: 
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For Derrida, all analysis is enabled by the spectre, is itself a conjuring of the spectre. For him, 
the spectre is not of the order of ontology but of hauntology. He writes, ‘Ontology opposes it 
[hauntology] only in a movement of exorcism. Ontology is a conjuration’. Ontology wishes to 
conjure away the spectre that enables, conjures, it. The hauntological makes every concept a 
concept of the spectre and a spectre of the concept.107 
 
As with Bazin and Morin, the idea of preservation as it relates to the ambiguity of the spectre 
is paramount, and in this sense, cinema—as not only the uncanny refuge for the living dead, 
but as a spectre itself—is the crypt which, in its incorporation of melancholia, and in staving 
off the surety, resolution, or consolation which normal, healthy mourning processes afford, 
remains the province of  lifedeath, where the spectre wanders transiently between the world 
of the dead and the feeling of the living:  
 
As spectre, the cinema is never not of the order of the living dead. It always returns from 
death, lives with death and returns to it, that is, always returns from, lives with and returns to 
the crypt. …The life of the spectre in and of the crypt, the life of the spectre in and of the 
crypt of cinema, is that of lifedeath, at once the life of death and the death of life, life and 
death inextricably coimplicated, haunted, cryptically incorporated, making it impossible to 
determine, reconcile, and resolve them—life and death—individually and jointly, even as 
they cryptically incorporate the world and the spectator–subject, and vice versa. 108 
  
Like Morin, Cholodenko sees that the return to archaism is critical for exorcising the 
essentialist definition of the soul, yet rather than taking a ‘difference in kind’ approach, 
Cholodenko will take the etymological path. In returning to Homer, Cholodenko emphasises 
a crucial distinction between the soul as psyché and the spectre as psuché, both of which 
relate to animation. Here again, I feel a liberal quotation allows Cholodenko’s work to 
resonate more succinctly with the broader aims of deconstruction: 
 
While the word animation is rooted in Latin anima, it goes by another in Greek, whose 
significance for our argument cannot be overstated. The ‘equivalent’ for anima in Greek is 
psuché. Psuché, as Jean-Pierre Vernant tells us (Vernant, 1991, p. 186), is a form of eidolon. 
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Eidolon in Greek means double. Psuché is the simulacral figure, the spectre, that leaves the 
body of the dead one to wander as flitting shade in Hades, which is, not insignificantly for us, 
Gorky’s Kingdom of Shadows, his (for us) Kingdom of Cinema, of Animation. … Here, at 
the ‘origin’ of animation, psuché as spectral simulacral eidolon animates, spectring and 
exorcising with its apparition…most notably… Plato’s reversal and ontologizing of the 
Homeric psuché as soul, inherited in the Latin anima (air, breath, soul, spirit, mind) and in the 
soul of Christianity. And in animation thought as ontological, that is, of the order of presence, 
essence, the Platonic psyche, the Latin anima, the soul of Christianity.109 
  
Such a distinction means, for Cholodenko, that as in Hades, so too in cinema—the soul and 
the spectre are not at all the same thing, in the same way that “ontology” differs from 
“hauntology,” and where the “cinematic” might be rethought as the “animatic.”  
 
Arguably, one of the more revealing aspects of Cooper’s compendium on the soul in film 
theory is the way in which the liminal figure of film co-habits with other “immaterial” or 
psychical spaces of the self (such as the mind, the emotions, and the psyche) beneath the 
greater rubric of “soul”, of which presence—as the plenitude of life, animism, vitality, spirit, 
energy—is central. Equally central to these ideas are the ways in which the pre-Socratic, pre-
Christian world generates this plurality. Cooper writes, “While classical scholarship suggests 
that the Homeric framework presents no unified concept of soul, ‘psyche’ and other notions 
all cluster in meaning around the concept of life-force.”110  Yet for Cholodenko, it is this very 
proclivity to privilege the presence of psyché as “life-force” that must be rethought, and 
rethought as lifedeath, as the animatic—the radically, irreducibly Other111—which Gorky 
originally describes as uncanny, extraordinarily unique and complex, shocking, destabilising, 
and traumatic, an invocation of evil, “where vice alone is being encouraged and 
popularised.”112  
  
For Cholodenko then, cinema’s kingdom of shadows returns us to the ‘origins’ of animation 
itself, to the undecidable, to the crypt of animism, and most emphatically, to aporetic modes 
of existence endowed with movement and life, through a spectre more demonic than Bazin’s 
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luminous shadows, and significantly silent regarding the potential for goodness that Morin 
believes in.  
 
Cinema, Death, Time and Eternity 
This is the sadness which adheres to all finite life…[a] sadness which, however, never attains 
actuality, but rather serves for the eternal joy of triumph. Thence the veil of sadness which is 
spread over all nature, the deep, unappeasable melancholy of all life.  
—Friedrich Schelling113  
 
In introducing the archaic spirit through Bazin, Morin and Cholodenko, I have tried to frame 
the ontological liminality, ambiguity and paradox intrinsic to the cinematic human figure as 
the restoration of an uncanny presence, of which absence also loiters ambivalently, whereby 
presence—that which is ever placed above and before absence—is decentred and disturbed, 
deposed from its historically hierarchical, privileged position. This is not a figure that affirms 
life over and before death, nor one that negates life or death, but is both and neither at one 
and the same time; between life and death.  
 
Crossing the boundaries of belief and desire, truth and illusion, this liminal spirit is of an 
entirely different order to that of reality, even as it is drawn from, returns to, and departs from 
reality. As such, the nature of reality is itself destabilised, because presence—reality’s 
catalyst and compass—cannot be quarantined or definitively enclosed. ‘Presence’ is now the 
dispossessed outcast, wandering ambivalently across the territories of temporal and eternal 
realms, through the affective forces of light, time, motion, space, darkness, stasis and silence. 
Within this, the concrete, physical world holds no privileged position over and above 
imaginary worlds, just as the divine can no longer truly overcome the earthly. There can be 
no ‘one’ that is privileged over a lesser ‘other’ because both, or rather, all realities are the 
ground of desire, however much we may privilege our consciousness, our sentience, and the 
life of the world over and beyond an ungraspable, unknowable afterlife, or however much we 
privilege the utopian realm of the transcendental absolute over and beyond the dystopian 
decay of the real world. These are the boundaries which the act of doubling disturbs, where 
the hierarchy of life and death can no longer be sustained. The double cannot be thought as a 
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purely negative absence which requires the presence of something ‘deeper’ to restore its 
plenitude. Nor is it awarded the highest privilege of pure presence: it is an existential 
quandary, wandering in a no-man’s-land, moving ambivalently between worlds, between 
realities.  
 
In this way, it is possible to say that the “presence-absence” or the “lifedeath” of the double 
creates or opens a space between time and eternity, thus overcoming, however momentarily, 
the fear of finitude. If, as Marciniak writes, death is the ground upon which all else stands,114 
the utilitarian purpose of this figure could be thought, in response to such finality, as the 
provocation of an abundant, primordial curiosity toward the nature of existence. In constant 
communion with paradox and ambiguity, the cinematic spectre becomes the catalyst for 
reawakening the purpose of art in relation to the question of existence, and those irresolvable 
problems ever deemed ‘spiritual’: the time of the self, the inevitability of death, formations of 
belief, myths of immortality, the natural inclination for hope against the basic anxiety toward 
absence, with absence understood as pure negation, nothingness, annihilation, an abyss, a 
vanishing, forgetting and becoming forgotten. To preserve, to re-present, to restore; cinema 
creates a moving body of light and shade that is in alchemic negotiation with its future 
extinction, a body outstripping unimaginable loneliness, emptiness, and intolerable 
incertitude; a spiritual body that remains. As Robert Hunter writes: “In our art, in our 
religions, our cultures, our moral codes, our institutions, our architecture and design, we have 
found ways to let ourselves live on beyond the moment of our own individual extinction.”115 
The cinematic spectre fulfils this compulsion, liberating us from a total vanishing where, 
knowing we will die, we endlessly immortalise ourselves. Walter Benjamin speaks of 
memory as “the epic faculty par excellence” where the “idea of eternity has ever had its 
strongest source in death.”116 Following Morin, Françoise Dastur writes that we live not only 
with the living, but “with those who have gone before. …human life is a life ‘with’ the dead”: 
 
[T]here is no culture except where a certain mastery over the irreversible flow of time is 
assured, and this implies the bringing into play of a multitude of techniques aimed at 
alleviating the pain of absence. And absence par excellence is the absence of the dead. They 
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disappear not momentarily, but absolutely and irreplaceably. This is why it is not illegitimate 
to see in mourning, understood broadly as coming to terms with an absence, the origin of 
culture itself.117  
 
As the simultaneous restoration of presence and absence, the cinematic human figure—
understood as uncanny spectre, spirit, and double—not only reenergises the tendency to 
ritualistically cast out an unthinkable nothingness, but becomes the concrete manifestation of 
an imaginary, otherworldly space that has ever accompanied this tendency. As such, it is not 
surprising that, from Gorky’s dark ruminations, film theories which preserve the spiritual 
complexity of this mercurial figure—such as those by Bazin, Morin and Cholodenko—find 
such plenitude in the connection between archaic belief and cinema’s visionary illusions of 
life. 
 
If Gorky’s kingdom awakens a spirituality ground in visions of ambiguity, his reflections are 
also significant for their attention to an ‘image’ of eternal silence, his lost symphony of life 
anticipating, with ironic simplicity, a belief in music’s purpose regarding cinema’s so-called 
lacuna of presence. If ineffable, instrumental, non-diegetic music becomes the unlikely 
weapon that eliminates the existential ambiguity intrinsic to such silence, it is a problem that 
theology will ironically rejoice in. With music ever affirmed, throughout western history, as 
the vehicle of mystical transcendence—as the bearer of essential, secret truths to human and 
cosmic existence—this legacy of hierarchical essentialism enjoys a non-religious 
reconfiguration in twentieth century aesthetics.  As we shall now see, the privileging of 
music’s humanisation in film music theory follows a patently Platonic-Christian-Romantic 
course, becoming the cognitive, emotive incarnation of a formerly divine presence of soul. 
 
Gorky’s Legacy in Musicology: The Argument for Presence 
In the discrete field of film music theory that also speaks to the question of cinematic realism, 
the complex relation between musical meaning and the cinematic human figure is yet to be 
theorised through a liminal framework, with similar ideals to those of film studies prevailing 
to restore cinema’s spirit-reality to the living, corporeal, secularised world. Within this 
archive, one argument in particular subsists to carefully erase the ambiguities of liminality, an 
argument I should like to call—following its poststructural namesake, the metaphysics of 
                                                 
117 Françoise Dastur, Death: An Essay in Finitude, trans. John Llewelyn (London: The Athlone Press, 1996), 9.  
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presence—the argument for presence, where music’s invocation of ineffable feeling restores 
a plenitude and presence to the ‘lifeless’ cinematic spectre. Ultimately, in its reliance upon 
essentialism, this founding argument remains faithful to traditional Western binary thought, 
where music is privileged as the highest order of art through its transcendental allusions to 
the ineffable divine. 
 
While this argument for presence is yet to be critiqued in film music theory, it enjoys 
enduring critical engagement in broader musicological circles. Continuing the Romantic 
effort to rethink enlightenment’s legacies, Vladimir Jankélévitch and Marcel Cobussen 
theorise the ontological and ethical significance of music beyond anthropocentric, logocentric 
thought, focusing on the ineffable, unsayable meaning of music, so as to rethink the meaning 
of spirituality itself. As we shall soon see, Jankélévitch and Cobussen respond diversely to, 
and parry with, such problems as the aura of secrecy between music and spirituality, the 
metaphysics of music as it relates to cosmological and anthropomorphic meanings, the 
persistence of rationalistic thought, and mythology’s continued relevance for theorising ‘the 
spiritual’, allowing the colloquial and institutionalised definition of spirituality itself to be 
reimagined. Like the archive of liminal film theory, such theories of music, I suggest, present 
equally rich possibilities for theorising spiritual complexity through this emphasis on liminal 
modes. In another way, as part of the ether or aura of mystery intrinsic to both artforms, such 
modes as the ineffable and the uncanny allow us to engage conceptually and creatively with 
the existential ambiguity and paradox that accompanies the charm of both the cinematic 
human figure and musical meaning. For it is through such modes that an otherwise 
unthinkable space between archaic, Christian and atheist belief systems becomes possible.  
 
Ultimately, for us to locate this ambiguous space, one continuing premise requires 
intervention: the idea that music “means” the fullness of presence, and that this “inner” 
presence is the remedy which restores a plenitude of life to the silent spectre.  In the 
following section, I comprehensively address those examples from film music scholarship 
that re-rehearse the tendency to hierarchically resolve the liminality intrinsic to this figure, a 
tendency which, by necessity, cannot engage liminal thought as a method, not merely as it 
relates to the music-cinema encounter, but as it also relates to more complex theories of 
(spiritual) existence where incertitude thrives. Such incertitude, I suggest, provides a concrete 
foundation for critically engaging with both the difference between liminality and absence, 
and the ironic, ongoing tendency to privilege human presence.  For now, let us see how the 
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argument for presence not only erases the liminality intrinsic to the uncanny spectre, but 
reconfigures its identity to mean pure absence, lack, and emptiness, whereby death itself is 
mastered, not so much through music’s restorative powers of life, but through a logos which 
also, ironically, longs for a kind of Christian immortality.  
 
Music, Silence and the Ineffable: Eliminating Spectrality 
[T]here is something uncanny about any movement that is perfectly silent. It would be even 
more uncanny for several hundred people to sit together in a hall in absolute silence for hours 
on end. It is striking that it is only the absence of music that attracts our attention; its presence 
passes without notice. 
         —Béla Balázs118 
 
It has been said often enough now—the cinematic spectre was never entirely alone; as Morin 
alludes, from its beginning, cinema “bathes” in music’s affective presence, opening the 
circuit between “the soul’s exaltation” and “cosmic participation.”119 That film theory has 
“neglected” to properly account for the presence of music, particularly in terms of cinema’s 
verisimilitude to reality, has also been well noted.120 What is yet to be more thoroughly 
addressed is the way in which presence—as it relates directly to the silent spectre—endures 
as the catalyst for arguing such authenticity, and how the relation between the two might be 
rethought beyond hierarchical binary orders. To do so however, requires the disruption of the 
metaphysics of presence from the point of view of those music philosophers who, in the 
twentieth and twenty-first centuries, seek to preserve the complexity and incertitude of 
musical meaning. In the same way that our liminal film theorists challenge and pursue the 
spiritual ambiguities of the cinematic human figure, Jankélévitch and Cobussen also 
challenge ontological and ethical dilemmas in musicology.121 Before broaching their 
                                                 
118 Béla Balázs, Béla Balázs: Early Film Theory; Visible Man and The Spirit of Film, ed. Erica Carter, trans. 
Rodney Livingstone (New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2010), 78. 
119 Morin, The Cinema, Or The Imaginary Man, 78–81, 110–11. 
120 Robynn J. Stilwell, “Music in Films: A Critical Review of Literature, 1980–1996,” The Journal of Film 
Music 1, no. 1 (2002):19–21, doi: 10.1558/jfm.v1i1.19.  
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representation, by rethinking the complexity of affective experience. Here I think immediately of Susanne 
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Art Developed from Philosophy in a New Key (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1953), Jean-Luc Nancy’s 
discussion on presence and absence in Listening, transl. Charlotte Mandell (New York: Fordham University 
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studies: see, for example, ed. Ian Buchanan, Marcel Swiboda, Deleuze and Music, Deleuze Connections 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2004); Edward Campbell, Music after Deleuze, Deleuzian Encounters 
72 
 
respective critiques on the historical systems of belief that have come to define music’s 
spiritual course, I begin with the negation of silence, and the leverage this provides for the 
relatively late establishment of the film music discipline. 
 
Silence: The Malady of Absence and the Musical Cure  
People are never comfortable with the unknown which is where fear can breed freely. 
             —Vwadek P. Marciniak122 
  
There is a world of difference between mute dialogue and the music of silence. 
        —Germaine Dulac123 
 
In musicological contributions to the paradigm of cinematic realism, early accounts of film 
criticism which register the unsettling aspects of silence, such as Gorky’s, are foundational to 
the legitimisation of the film music theory discipline. Here, the connection between cinematic 
silence and absence (as death) leads musicologists to argue a gaping abyss within the binary 
structure of music and image, one that, I suggest, ironically mirrors the binary-ordered reality 
of inner essence and outer appearance. In this sense, silence is broached as a kind of mortuary 
malady, as the fatal negation of the plenitude of life, with the cure of music’s sentient 
presence restoring such plenitude. As Losseff and Doctor argue, the traditionally conservative 
field of musicology is yet to embrace the ineffable threshold between music and silence as a 
spiritually-complex encounter beyond the enculturated negative association of silence, for 
fear of “wandering into realms of the personal and spiritual that may embarrass many who 
protect as paramount ‘objectivity’ in the discipline”:  
 
                                                 
(London and New York: Bloomsbury, 2013); ed. Sally Macarthur, Judy Lochhead and Jennifer Shaw, Music's 
Immanent Future: The Deleuzian Turn in Music Studies (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2016). Certainly, these 
works resonate beautifully with the themes of this thesis, and given the space, would offer rich possibilities for 
further developing the theory of spiritual complexity. Notably, Langer, Nancy and Deleuze all enjoy an 
established presence in music studies. As such, and due to the limitations of this thesis, I remain focused on the 
works of Jankélévitch and Cobussen, both of which are now attracting critical attention in the English-speaking 
literature: while Jankélévitch has a venerated presence in European scholarship, his work is relatively new to the 
English-speaking sector; on the other hand, Cobussen is a contemporary scholar whose less orthodox, creative 
approach to theorising the relation between music and spirituality is yet to enjoy a wider readership within the 
musicological community. For recent discussion on Jankélévitch, see Gallope and Kane, “Colloquy: Vladimir 
Jankélévitch’s Philosophy of Music”; and Gallope, Deep Refrains; for further discussion on Cobussen, see 
reviews by Peter Atkins in Psychology of Music 37, no. 4 (2009): 494–498; and Robert Sholl in Music and 
Letters 93, no. 1 (2012): 90–93.  
122 Marciniak, Towards a History of Consciousness, 47. 
123 Dulac, “From “Visual and Anti-Visual Films”,” 32. 
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The unsaid and the unsayable—and undifferentiated time—gape before us. Dictionary 
definitions of silence privilege its negative qualities: absence of sound, prohibition on speech, 
refusal to communicate. These negative characteristics reflect a rather narrow European 
perspective, where silence is too easily equated with the passive, the submissive and the 
void.124  
 
As I hope to show, this negation of silence provides a solid grounding for film music theory, 
where the ambiguity intrinsic to the spectre undergoes a radical reorganization through the 
metaphysics of presence, with music’s intimate communion with human emotion given 
ontological primacy. Bound by its logocentric, anthropocentric rule, the argument for 
presence preserves the intuited belief that music, as the ineffable artform par excellence, 
means something intangibly “deep”, speaks something significant, that music is 
(Romantically speaking) the universal language of emotions even while such meaning 
refuses definite disclosure.125 Music fills the negative void of silence with feeling. This is the 
bedrock of emotionally-oriented discourse on non-diegetic, instrumental film music in 
Hollywood’s classical narrative film style in particular: as the animating essence which 
transforms liminality into the plenitude of life, and therefore cures the malady of death, music 
viscerally expresses, communicates, speaks, means, embodies, reveals an emotional depth 
otherwise unknowable, imperceptible, unexpressed, in the cinematic image and/or narrative 
alone. Necessarily then, the spectre’s forces of presence and absence become polarised, their 
original ambiguity entirely rerouted to enthrone music as a kind of atheistic saviour, 
resurrecting, once more, however unwittingly, the soul which endows the body with life.  
 
If film musicology has a binding attachment to such ideals, it is in no small way influenced 
by the fact that this argument is primarily responsible for the foundation of the discipline 
itself. When music critics, composers, historians, and theorists discuss music’s role in relation 
to the silent spectre, testimonies like Gorky’s carry enormous weight in affirming music’s 
privileged presence as the restorative force of life, plenitude, and wholeness. Certainly, while 
film music scholarship today may be appreciated as an eclectic, and necessarily 
interdisciplinary domain, it is a field that only becomes legitimised in the late 1980s by 
rerouting earlier discourses through methodologies of contemporary cultural theory.126 Such 
                                                 
124 Nicky Losseff and Jenny Doctor, introduction to Silence, Music, Silent Music, ed. Nicky Losseff and Jenny 
Doctor (Aldershot, England; Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2007), 3, 1.  
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legitimacy also begins by locating film theory’s failure to address the presence of music 
against the centrality of the omnipotent image, using phrases such as “visual bias”, the 
“ideology” of the eye and the “tyranny of the image”.127 Writing in the early 1990s, Caryl 
Flinn critiques the enduring hierarchical relation between the eye/image/sight and the 
ear/music/sound, and the difficulties such a tendency poses for theorising the relation 
between the image and the score: 
 
Sound has thus come to function as sight’s lesser counterpart, performing the role of an 
irrational, emotional “other” to the rational and epistemologically treasured visual term. 
Although film theory is increasingly cognizant of this idea, it does not always move beyond 
it. Consider the following insights by Mary Ann Doane: 
 
The ineffable, intangible quality of sound—its lack of concreteness which is 
conducive to an ideology of empiricism—requires that it be placed on the side of the 
emotional or the intuitive. If the ideology of the visible demands that the [film] 
spectator understand the image as a truthful representation of reality, the ideology of 
the audible demands that there exist simultaneously a different truth and another 
order of reality for the subject to grasp.128 
 
The opportunity for musicologists then, lies in the exploitation of music’s relation to this 
‘other’ order of reality, resulting in the inversion of this visual supremacy and musical 
neglect through such powerful theoretical systems as Marxism, psychoanalysis, and gender 
studies. Overturning this “visual chauvinism”,129 the discipline of film music theory is 
founded through arguments which secure music’s “deeper” truth, yet in so doing, performs its 
own acts of violence, not merely through the mutilation of silence, the spectre and music’s 
complexity, but through the reductive modification of originally complex criticism and 
theory. While the following quotations may seem excessive, I feel them necessary to trace the 
certain erasure that cinema’s liminal spirit undergoes through the negative framing of both 
silence and sepia imagery. I begin with Eisler and Adorno’s oft-quoted passage which 
                                                 
127 Caryl Flinn, Strains of Utopia: Gender, Nostalgia and Hollywood Practice (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1992), 5–6; Annette Davison, Hollywood Theory, Non-Hollywood Practice: Cinema 
Soundtracks in the 1980s and 1990s, Ashgate Popular and Folk Music Series (Burlington, Vt: Ashgate, 2004), 
12–15, 120; Kathryn Kalinak, “A Theory of Film Music,” in Settling the Score: Music and the Classical 
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suggests the mystical forces of both spectre and music, and which is later recast in Claudia 
Gorbman’s pioneering theory of music in narrative film: 
 
The pure cinema must have had a ghostly effect like that of the shadow play—shadows and 
ghosts have always been associated. The magic function of music…probably consisted in 
appeasing the evil spirits unconsciously dreaded. Music was introduced as a kind of antidote 
against the picture. The need was felt to spare the spectator the unpleasantness involved in 
effigies of living, acting, and even speaking persons, who were at the same time silent. The 
fact that they are living, and nonliving at the same time is what constitutes their ghostly 
character, and music was introduced not to supply them with the life they lacked...but to 
exorcise fear or help the spectator absorb the shock.130  
 
To which Gorbman responds: 
 
[Eisler and Adorno write] that sound, in the form of music, gave back to those “dead” 
photographic images some of the life they lost in the process of mechanical reproduction. 
Words such as three-dimensionality, immediacy, reality, and, of course, life, recur throughout 
film music criticism in its attempt to describe the effect and purpose of film music…earlier 
critics described the film image as dead, empty, or unnatural, and saw music as providing life, 
immediacy, or a magical antidote to cinema’s ghostliness…[Christian] Metz characterises the 
film image as signifying the “presence of an absence,” being only the representation of what 
was present, not the thing itself. This absence or lack has something to do with what London, 
Eisler/Adorno, and others call flatness, emptiness, ghostliness.131    
 
For Flinn, this silence is the pure negation of human presence, and so the death of inner 
feeling, a death which the mechanistic, visual medium of cinema imposes and which only the 
anthropomorphic forces of music can revive: 
 
But just as music is classically said to enhance cinematic verisimilitude…so too is it said to 
bestow “a human touch” upon the cinematic apparatus, something that the apparatus 
intrinsically “lacks” due to its technological basis. ...And, due to its widely understood 
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connection—via late nineteenth-century romanticism—to emotional expression more 
generally, music has been associated all the more with the sense of human feeling. In these 
ways, music appears to offer the apparatus a means of rounding itself out, of adding a human 
dimension to its technological base, of imposing upon it the stamp of subjectivity. … 
“Unaccompanied film images,” [Charles Berg] writes, “were described in negative contexts 
as ‘noiseless fleeting shadows,’ ‘cold and bare,’ ‘ghastly shadows,’ ‘lifeless and colourless,’ 
‘unearthly and flat.’ Whereas Berg identifies all of this as a discomforting “silence” of the 
early cinema, I think it even more convincingly testifies to the fundamental lack of human 
presence and liveliness critics associated with early cinema. Each of the words he selects 
described death or some form of barren condition… . The metaphors of lack and lacunae that 
organise these critical discussions reveal a deeper preoccupation with losses of other kinds, 
particularly when associated—as they so frequently are—with the human body.132  
 
This last, by Lawrence Kramer, appears in the 2013 Oxford Handbook of Film Music Studies, 
the volume itself testament to film music theory’s long-awaited arrival within the academy: 
 
[T]he cinematic body requires music to constitute it. …the cinematic image of the body is 
spectral, and its spectrality persists even once the primitive state of the medium has been left 
behind. ... In order to flesh out the spectral image, the image must be joined to a vibratory 
depth, and to do that the cinematic image must be combined with music. …The body is a 
vibratory depth; its depth is where music vibrates; to add music to the primitive cinematic 
image is literally, not metaphorically but literally, to give the image a body. …To make them 
living images, as opposed to the disturbingly undead, music must supply its sensorial 
dimension to the bodily image as form or figure.133 
 
In claiming the value, meaning, and identity of music in the cinema, the continued reliance 
upon this hierarchical binary opposition recasts the complexity of the spectre as pure negation 
because of the silence music directly overcomes. Dead, lifeless, lacking inner depth, suffering 
a loss of vitality, sentience and substance through its objective mechanical reproduction, the 
spectre is marked as the diminished other to its real-life model. Through music’s animating 
forces, the originally liminal nature of this figure is quietly annihilated. In Flinn’s critique, 
the meaning of music cycles around an intuited essence of human feeling and its historically 
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omnipotent role as the supreme animator of feeling, with music’s grave moral purpose the 
salvation and resurrection of life. In Gorbman, Metz’s reductive borrowing of Morin’s 
“presence of an absence” is stripped of its original, paradoxical complexity; instead, presence 
and absence are reconfigured as dualistic signifiers of a hierarchical whole which, so 
resolved, satiates the desire for reality’s more consoling unity and familiarity.134 The 
invocation of an undeniable hierarchy is equally potent in Kramer’s rendition, where music 
“gives the image a body”. Here, across each of these accounts, it is not the affective presence 
of luminous motion and time that evokes the impression of life and reality, but music’s 
auditory, vibratory source that eradicates the traces of melancholic loss.  
 
Ultimately, such musical discussions rely upon a recalcitrant anthropocentric reasoning 
which, as we saw for film theory, also has deep historical, cultural roots for the image. With 
the wholeness of existence securely restored through this humanised presence of music, with 
the consolation of the sounding world placed over and above the disquieting uncertainty of 
the optical kingdom of shadows, the metaphysics of presence reduces silence to the category 
of emptiness, negation, and nothingness that ‘is’ death. It is precisely the kind of thinking 
that, following Derrida, Cobussen describes as  
 
a struggle for mastery in which an entity asserts itself by reacting against ‘the other,’ thereby 
enclosing itself within the secure “solitude of solidity and self-identity” (Derrida: 1978: 91). 
Everything is what it is, the outside is out and the inside in. After all, that is how identity 
could be defined: the condition or fact that a thing is itself and not something else.135  
 
For Cobussen, silence has a very different kind of spiritual meaningfulness, thought instead 
as music’s condition of possibility rather than the mark of pure negation.136 Comparatively, 
film music theory’s argument for presence refuses such possibility, its musical ‘cure’ re-
centring and restabilising its boundaries of identity against the greatest human fear: death, 
certainly, but then within death, the unthinkable horror of eternal limbo, the eradication of 
which results, ironically, in the atheistic resurrection of the soul. In this regard, we might 
appreciate a very particular silence called for by Jankélévitch, who argues that, throughout 
history, it is the charm of music’s ineffability that ironically provokes an irresistible speaking 
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of the deepest musical meanings imaginable, meanings which turn upon the ‘origin’ of 
creation itself, thus refusing the affirmation of genuine mystery and the incertitude of 
unknowing intrinsic to the life of time. 
 
Vladimir Jankélévitch: Music, the Ineffable and Plato’s Sickness  
Music is no cipher; it is not awaiting the decoder. Musical works do not express emotion or 
reflect optical phenomena, nor do they tell stories, nor represent ideologies…Music has a 
power over our bodies and minds wildly disproportionate to its lack of obvious or concrete 
meaning, as to its slippery aesthetic status. Nonetheless, music in general, musical devices 
and processes, and specific musical works in particular, are always bound to the “world down 
here below,” to a human experience of time, to human bodies and human spirituality, to 
culture and to past.  
——Carolyn Abbate137 
 
In petitioning music’s identity as the “magical antidote” to cinema’s darker forces through its 
supreme animation of emotion in both the spectre and the spectator, film music theory’s 
“deep” relation to music is, I suggest, the natural continuation of a long history of theorising 
quintessential meanings through the metaphysics of music, of equating its affective forces 
with a human essence and morality, within which, for Platonic and Christian thought, the idea 
of an immortal, enlightened soul is central:  
 
Music is a moral law. It gives a soul to the universe, wings to the mind, flight to the 
imagination, a charm to sadness, and life to everything. It is the essence of order, and leads to 
all that is good, just and beautiful, of which it is the invisible, but nevertheless dazzling, 
passionate, and eternal form.138  
 
Throughout the history of ideas, music bears this timeless reverence, role and responsibility, 
this incomparable, transcendental mystique, a mystique often spoken, within the metaphysics 
of music, through the gauze of what Jankélévitch will call “a metaphorical psychology of 
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desire”, a desire which begins its intellectual pursuit for divining music’s secret hidden 
meanings through this anthropocentric connection between the highest order of the human 
and the highest order of the cosmos, that is, through the name of the soul: 
 
Throughout history, those human beings who are fond of allegory have sought that which is 
signified by music beyond the sound phenomenon…(the invisible harmony is more powerful 
than the visible). For there is an invisible and inaudible harmony, suprasensible and supra-
audible… . Music is of another realm. …It is the metaphysician, and not the musician, who 
disparages actual physical harmony for the sake of transcendental paradigms and supernatural 
music… . Music “created the world” says Alexander Blok…it is the essence of the spiritual 
body, of the flow of thought…It is critical to point out, however, that all such metamusic, 
music thus romanticized, is at once arbitrary and metaphorical. It is arbitrary because one 
cannot see exactly what justifies taking the acoustic universe and privileging and promoting it 
to this degree above all others.139  
 
If Jankélévitch renounces such transcendental paradigms, potent metaphorical meanings and 
an acoustically-privileged universe, it is because music’s meaning is ineffable, that is, music 
is not of the logocentric order of gnostic Saying that has come to define the practice of 
hermeneutic interpretation, but of the order of drastic Doing.140 Through poetic acts of 
listening, composing and playing, music is a process of becoming, an affective encounter 
with music’s transformational “Charm”, rather than the carrier of a secret, divine essence that 
allows the intelligible realm of ideas to master the sensible world of bodies.141   
 
Deeply influenced by Henri Bergson, Jankélévitch aims to differentiate between a 
metaphysics of music and its subjective temporal experience, and to do so beyond the prolific 
tendency to humanise music. Ultimately, rethinking the musicological desire to siphon ideas, 
images, emotions, or stories from a space somewhere within the depths of music necessarily 
begins by dismantling the dialogues of Plato, with special attention to the connection between 
philosophical idealism, music and morality, of which the rational, truth-seeking soul is 
central.142 For Plato, music’s purpose carries a great moral burden: through the goodness it 
gives to the soul, through its apothecary purpose to care for the soul, music makes a more 
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‘holy’ human, the soul itself being “the authentic interlocutor of music.”143 That music may 
“touch and condition the psyche”, means that it works to philosophically “cure” the soul of 
the perils that the passive, impressionable body presents.144  As Francesco Pelosi writes, 
“philosophy makes use of music to take care of the soul, but this occurs while (and because) 
the soul is bound to a body. …for Plato, music is not only useful, but dangerous. The 
particular ways in which music addresses the body and psyche are also sources of disquiet 
and apprehension.”145 When Dastur suggests that there is an intimate affinity between death 
and philosophy, it is because “both result in the disconnection of the soul from the body. In 
[Plato’s] Phaedo, therefore, one encounters the idea that thinking and philosophizing are a 
metaphorical death because they assume a separation from the corruptible nature of the body 
and an exit from time into the intemporality of the idea.”146 To practice philosophy correctly 
is to prepare oneself for death, to spend one’s life practicing soul-body separation, with this 
care already granting the philosopher a certain degree of immortality. If music gives “wings 
to the mind”, it is because it is a music that inspires and compels this separation through an 
austerity and reserve that will not mar the beauty of truth with the melancholy of corporeal 
suffering.   
 
Jankélévitch’s spiritual relation to music is nothing if not complex, his own conception of the 
soul coming remarkably close to that of Morin’s for the cinema: embracing aporia, 
Jankélévitch does not jettison the soul, but understands it as an enigma in the 
transformational flux of life, as a process of becoming, whose place within the 
psychophysiological sphere is ambivalent, wandering beyond the grasp of language while 
paradoxically calling language up; if the soul is ‘like’ music at all, it is because of such 
indeterminacies, with the ambiguity of presence and absence pervading its field: 
 
Soul, thought, life, and individual presence are inherent in the existence of a body in 
general—and nonetheless the soul cannot be pinpointed here nor there in the body: the soul is 
not localizable, but more a diffuse presence… The soul, which exudes carnal presence in 
general like a perfume and nonetheless evades all topographies, the fugitive, ambiguous soul: 
is it not a kind of Charm? The soul is the Charm engendered by the body. This ubiquity, this 
everywhere and nowhere exclusive of a somewhere, this omnipresent presence that is at the 
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same time omniabsence, also characterises the present absence of meaning in a sentence, and 
of the Charm in music.147 
 
Certainly, such declarations become clearer when their purpose is reinforced. Jankélévitch 
writes that Plato is preoccupied “with moral education and with frugality, [railing] only 
against the “Carian muse,” the muse of those who weep and of effeminate sobs.”148 Plato 
does so, because, for him, music is the bearer of both virtue and vice: for music to possess a 
moral function, explains Jankélévitch, “it would seem necessary to amputate and discard all 
its pathos, everything heady and orgiastic in it…to deprive oneself of poetic intoxication in 
any form.”149 “The purpose of the severe Muse, the serious Muse, is to induce virtue and not 
enchant us by singing”.150 For Plato, a music that is too flamboyant, too ecstatic, too 
expressive, is a song of bacchanal trickery and dark causality, a bewitchment of the body’s 
sensual proclivities, contaminating the ruling, logical part of the soul, the higher, thinking 
part that loves and longs for immortal truth. To yield to the musical Charm, interprets 
Jankélévitch, is to submit to the Siren, the seducer of sailors, to submit to madness, suffering, 
and death: 
 
Plato thinks that the power to drive onlookers mad should not be left to any random flutist; 
that the musician, like the orator, plays with dangerous forms of enchantment; and that the 
state should regulate the use of musical influences and contain them within a framework of 
sound medicine. That which is “musical,” however, is not the voice of the Sirens but rather 
Orpheus’s songs. The mermaid sirens, enemies of the Muses, have only one goal: to reroute, 
mislead, and delay Odysseus. In other words, they derail the dialect, the law of the itinerary 
that leads our mind to duty and truth. … To avoid seduction, what can one do besides make 
oneself deaf to all melody and suppress, along with temptation, sensation itself?151 
 
Here Jankélévitch underscores the ways in which Plato’s populace might be better controlled 
through a spiritually-edifying music, a role that music seems destined to perform with the 
creation of God. Jankélévitch however, is more concerned with how this particular belief in a 
music stripped of all “orgiastic” splendour influences thought toward a sterile asceticism 
devoid of true mystery: in pursuing serenity, wisdom and virtue, the musical thinker must 
                                                 
147 Jankélévitch, Music and the Ineffable, 52–53. 
148 Ibid., 6. See Plato, Laws VII, 800e. 
149 Jankélévitch, Music and the Ineffable, 9. 
150 Ibid., 7. 
151 Ibid., 3. See Plato, The Republic 398–403. 
82 
 
make exiles of all the inner “others”, such as the inner madman, child and artist described by 
Morin. In making oneself deaf to sensation, in becoming immune to the affective Charm of 
music, one is able to locate music’s innermost truth, “the place where music is hiding its 
messages.”152 Such a truth not only saves us from the petrifying sorcery of a ruinous, 
annihilating music, but enables us to conquer the fear of death itself through our 
transcendence of feeling. For the cure, thinks Plato, one must be anaesthetised. Thus, if 
Jankélévitch makes the following distinction between the ineffable and the untellable through 
the reciprocal distinctions of life and death, and enchantment and bewitchment, it is to 
explain us to ourselves, so as to overthrow this Platonic legacy of a life ever in combat with 
both its mortality and the eternal life that the musical preparation for death secures through 
its allusive utopian promise: 
  
[T]he mystery transmitted to us by music is not death’s sterilising inexplicability but the 
fertile inexplicability of life, freedom, or love. In brief, the musical mystery is not “what 
cannot be spoken of,” the untellable, but the ineffable. ... If the untellable, petrifying, all-
poetic impulse induces something similar to a hypnotic trance, then the ineffable, thanks to its 
properties of fecundity and inspiration, acts like a form of enchantment: it differs from the 
untellable as much as enchantment differs from bewitchment. Ineffability provokes 
bewilderment, which, like Socrates’s quandary, is a fertile aporia. … Among the promises 
made by ineffability is hope of a vast future that has been given to us.153 
 
Dastur also reminds us that for Plato, the fear of death is not only mastered by reason, but 
also through belief, and “whoever sets out to experience thinking in dying to his body (sic) 
discovers the immortality and indestructibility of the soul in this very exercise. …eternal life 
itself is born.”154 In contrast, Jankélévitch offers us a new thought for our own Platonic 
processes of enchanted moralization: if the ineffable presence of music causes us to speak so 
easily of music’s sentient essence, it is less because music communes with the dead and an 
eternal spiritual life, and more because it resonates with all the fertility, possibility, urgency 
and mystery of temporal life. 
 
Film music theory’s argument for presence would seem then, in its own leap to rational 
thought, to openly assert the Platonic malady, with the presence of music now annihilating 
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the existential incertitude of the silent spectre: in refusing an engagement with ‘spirituality’ 
of any kind through its decisively non-religious turn, the attributes of life, rather than 
afterlife, are privileged over both finitude and liminality, thus establishing an atheistic, 
rationalist essentialism. This Saying of “inner truth”, the mark of logos, overcomes more than 
the unsettling disturbances of silent film’s infirmary and its spectral maladies, but the musical 
aporia as well. With the duty of resurrection now its primary purpose, and with the moral 
polarities of good and evil reaffirmed through, respectively, music (soul) and image (body), 
music becomes immortal, and so beyond the reach of melancholy, suffering and the fear of 
death: not only does it cure and care for the soul, music creates a soul when before there was 
none. While Jankélévitch himself speaks of music’s recourse to life, rather than death, we 
must not presume that he is in some way reinforcing (rather than problematizing, as I have 
tried to show) the film music theory that argues music’s resurrection of life. The argument for 
presence validates logos, categorical truth, unity, order, essence, certainty, depth and 
spatiality through its hierarchical binary structure, the totality of which Jankélévitch refuses 
to privilege for the violence it does to the affirmation of music as an ineffable force of time, 
feeling, and becoming.  
 
 While situating the argument for presence within the Platonic tradition allows us to see the 
resilient persistence of essentialism in the time of postmodernism, it does not entirely resolve 
the problem: while Antiquity’s enlightenment rules the method of interpretation, its 
humanising identity of feeling is also uncannily Romantic, to which Jankélévitch’s steady 
credo of ineffability and Charm again presents a more complex manifold for reimagining 
spiritual identity.  
 
Schopenhauer’s Quintessence 
Almost no-one has grasped the link, very subtle but also very profound in Jankélévitch’s 
writings, between charme as it is engendered by music and love toward another person. 
Without the one, without the other, we are dead, not dead like the dead, but dead like the 
living.  
        —Arnold I. Davidson.155 
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It is tempting to think, particularly in the bond forged between the moral powers of love and 
music, that Jankélévitch may himself be a ‘hopeless’ Romantic, particularly in his belief that 
a music lacking the je-ne-sais-quoi of charme, however proficiently composed and brilliantly 
performed, “lacks a soul. Everything is present, except the heart…the enchanted soul is not a 
bewitched soul, but an enamoured soul.”156 It is also tempting to accuse Jankélévitch of 
taming music through this most humanising of essences. Yet any such equivalence between 
music and other forms of becoming—such as human sentience—is metaphorical, and while 
the metaphor is the natural home of the poet—who is “licensed to say everything”157 and 
relieved from the task of explaining himself—if the philosopher is to practice such poetry, it 
is with the proper grammatical caveats in place, without which there can be no earnest 
engagement with the ineffable’s mystical refusal of the mastery of language: 
 
Everything hangs upon the meaning of the verb to be and the adverb like, and just as 
sophisms and puns slip without warning from unilateral attribution to ontological identity…so 
metaphysical-metaphorical analogies about music slip furtively from figural meaning to 
correct and literal meaning.158 
 
Jankélévitch’s “call for silence”, then, is (figuratively speaking) the raising up of a mirror, 
exposing philosophy’s reluctance to grasp its own poetic immersion and anthropomorphic 
interchange, its ironic tendency to satisfy the psychological desire to see in the mirror of 
music its own face. We must also remember that, like Morin’s complex notion of soul ‘in’ 
film, here too soul is not an essence that stabilizes and centres the human, the world and the 
cosmos, but an indefinite something bound up in the vital processes of change and becoming, 
just as the alchemy and metamorphosis of magic is this ineffable process. If music possesses 
soul, it does so metaphorically, with any unity between human life and the life of music 
meeting on the thresholds of Charm, ineffability, and the material phenomenon of time; not 
love itself, but like love, music’s true reality is one of dispossession: 
 
Musical reality is always somewhere else…evoked by means of evasive expressions with 
double meanings; this spiritual geography…makes all localization fugitive, fleeting: would 
we not say that music, as a temporal phenomenon, in general refuses spatialization? …the 
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doubtful homeland of a Charm that is not here, and not there, but everywhere and 
nowhere…just as the soul challenges all cerebral localization, and God terrestrial 
localization…pure music itself, exists on no map.159 
 
If Romanticism fairs little better than Antiquity in Jankélévitch’s erudite demolition of 
philosophy’s soul in music, it is because of this recourse to an impossible topography 
vouchsafed through this unwitting metaphysical-metaphorical identification.  In the age that 
precedes Gorky’s cinema, the existential bond between music and feeling reaches its zenith, 
the idea of an ensouled music—in both an objective-ontological and subjective-affective 
sense—coming to dominate Romantic aesthetics: “Music is the art of expressing sensations 
by modulated sounds. It is the language of emotions.”160 ... “While language expresses our 
feelings in words, music expresses them by sounds.”161… “The composer’s task is to copy 
nature...to stir the passions at will...to express the living movements of the soul and cravings 
of the heart.”162…“[T]he organ of the emotions is sound, its intentionally aesthetic language 
is music.”163 With the feeling rather than thinking soul now firmly at the fore—the swooning 
heart now racing before the sober mind—music’s Romantic identity is ultimately, for 
Jankélévitch, another anthropocentric falsity which refuses to be understood as such. 
  
Romanticism’s idea of an emotional soul ‘in’ music is most notably attributable to Arthur 
Schopenhauer (1788–1860), who rejects the omnipotence of enlightened Reason, thinking 
instead that “the human Will dominates the soul, that the inner forces of desire and love 
navigate one’s actions, and that reason, intellect and morality are ultimately undermined by 
the Will’s power.”164 For Schopenhauer, the Will may only ever truly manifest through 
music, in that only intangible music “penetrates the Will itself.”165 Moreover, the composer 
becomes godlike, for only this particular kind of Creator can reveal the inner nature of the 
world.166 Contra Enlightenment, such ideals are openly embraced, nurtured and developed by 
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Richard Wagner, for whom Schopenhauer’s Will was primary. Schonberg recites that in 
composing Tristan und Isolde (Wagner’s masterpiece of endless longing and melancholia),  
 
Wagner believed himself to be compelled by the power of his will, honouring this force that 
manifested its existence in his art. ‘I plunged into the inner depths of soul-events and from the 
innermost centre of the world I fearlessly built up to its outer form…Life and death, the whole 
meaning and existence of the outer world, here hang on nothing but the inner movements of 
the soul.’167 
 
For Berlioz too, an intimate bond endures between the two: 
 
Love or music—which power can uplift man to the sublimest heights? It is a large question; 
yet it seems to me that one should answer it in this way: Love cannot give an idea of music; 
music can give an idea of love. But why should we separate them? They are two wings of the 
soul. 168 
 
For Jankélévitch, such intoxicating, sublime communions are inexhaustibly given yet 
inherently flawed, for neither love nor music are “ideas” comparable with logos, leading 
Jankélévitch to reluctantly depose Schopenhauer’s Will as “the quintessence of essences”.169 
If music is sentient, it is so metaphorically, however much our romantic thinker-self wagers a 
conception of truth on the allegorical approximation by confusing subjective affect with 
objective ontological meaning. Music can only ever indefinitely allude to, vaguely and 
equivocally suggest or evoke the enigmatic illusion of human feeling; it can never be this 
definite univocal expression, or directly ‘speak’ this or that particular emotion.170 
Nonetheless, and despite music’s ineffability, infinite “anthropomorphic and anthroposophic 
generalizations” continue to spiral out through the medium of metaphorical transcription, and 
it is this endless confusion between what music is and what it does, between the illusion of a 
secret inner truth and the affective response, between the ineffable and allegory, that 
Jankélévitch continues to challenge:  
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The “metaphysics of music”…always loses sight of the function of metaphors and the 
symbolic relativity of symbols. A sonata is like a précis of the human adventure that is 
bordered by life and death—but is not itself this adventure. …The sonata, the symphony, and 
the string quartet…are like a thirty-minute recapitulation of the metaphysical and noumenal 
destiny of the Will but are no means this destiny per se. 171  
 
Once more, this humanising gesture is echoed in cinematic discussions that have yet to 
relinquish such powerful parentage. Gorbman writes that music is the primary catalyst for 
signifying “emotion, depth, the obverse of logic”, bringing “a necessary emotional, irrational, 
romantic, or intuitive dimension…augmenting the external representation…with its inner 
truth.”172 Against its continuation and proliferation in cognitive theory especially, Gerald Sim 
argues that such a viewpoint oversimplifies the complexity of the film-music-emotion 
experience:    
 
[C]ognitivist investigations into film music generally restrict interpretation to narratologically 
dominant readings, and can thus be aloof to the ways that films’ emotional polyphony can 
trigger interpretations that transcend both the text and spectatorial subjectivity.  
Comprehending the link between film music and emotion as a cognitive-psychological 
process undervalues the many moments when cinema transcends the sum of its parts, 
overwhelming the capacities of current cognitivist models. ... Scientific method relies on a 
doctrine of precision and empiricism, requirements that can be incongruent with artistic 
expression. ...treating music only as a set of emotional signifiers or cues can also carry both 
methodological and ideological consequences.173 
 
If there is a spiritual consequence at stake also, it not only comes in the negation of the silent 
spectre’s rich theoretical possibilities, but in this dependence upon a binary logic embedded 
within classical linear narrative, and its heady authorization of a deep, stable (humanised) 
centre, moral resolution and righteous consolation. As Jankélévitch shows, music’s 
ineffability summons a deep confusion between moral and ethical meanings, between 
judgements and choices: transcribed into cinematic discourse, we could say that the relation 
between the silent spectre and the argument for presence has less to do with cinematic 
narrative than an underpinning process of moralization that would seem to haunt the history 
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of music itself. This continuation for civilising, humanising and moralizing the silent spectre 
through music, which is itself civilised, humanised and moralized through rational thought, is 
inherited from the spiritual wells of Platonic and Romantic thought, however much it resists 
such philosophy, and however much it blithely reconfigures the basic coordinates of life and 
death to negate the ‘vice’ of silence against the ‘virtues’ of music’s ensouled presence. In so 
doing, it is, ironically, the mastery of logos, and not music, which ‘cures’ the cinematic 
spectre of its own dark magic, guiding it back from the edge of an unimaginable abyss, and 
toward the deep centre of life, enlightenment (and so afterlife) and love. Drawn from this 
course, the argument for presence is a stunning microcosm of the cultural universe that 
coddles it, one where, inevitably and inextricably, philosophy and theology converge. In this 
final dimension of historical influence, I rely upon Cobussen’s rethinking of the relation 
between music and spirituality, to most clearly emphasise the extent to which a Eurocentric 
religiosity influences what is purported to be an atheistic argument of realism.  
 
Marcel Cobussen: Music, Spirituality and Catholicism 
‘The spiritual’ is not a positively definable quasi-entity beyond or above common reality, 
referring to something otherworldly or the absolute presence of a divinity; rather it functions, 
in an ambivalent way, as an alien or monstrous turmoil in the margins of a discourse. 
         —Marcel Cobussen174 
 
When Cobussen presents the human body as the condition of possibility for music’s 
spirituality, he is challenging the one institution whose love for the Word has the soul entirely 
in its grasp, and whose regulation of music realizes the Platonic ideal. In Cobussen’s 
phenomenological sense of spirituality, music operates as a movement between rupture and 
rapture, as a force that moves us ambivalently and paradoxically “between heaven and 
earth”, in the liminal non-space that is beyond the governance of a Heaven constructed by the 
morality of organised religion:  
 
[Music] takes its place between the etherical and the corporeal. The world in which music 
exists is a spiritual world. Music is an art of time, flowing in a bodiless world. It surpasses the 
borders of the universe of bodies. We cannot grasp music in the same way that we can touch 
and feel matter in our world. Like air, music does not show itself. But even when we thus 
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assume a close connection between music and spirit, this spiritual dimension needs to be 
incarnated in order to sound, which means that this incarnation is no accidental supplement, 
but an inevitable necessity. Not only do we need our ears to hear music, the musician needs 
his body and/as an instrument to awaken music. Ears, drumming hands, stamping feet, the 
bow that moves the strings of the cello: these are all part of a bodily world. Music is born in a 
space that connects a spiritual and an embodied world. …Music’s spirituality is heavenly as 
well as earthly and simultaneously none of these two, that is, it cannot be reduced to one of 
the poles.175  
 
Here, Cobussen is responding to the meaning of music as it relates to the metaphysics and 
morality of Catholicism, both of which intersect on the threshold of the soul, preserving the 
basic lessons of Platonic thought. Music, as the prime mover and soul of the universe and its 
celestial bodies, and so the prime mover of human souls with their yielding bodies, continues 
to suffer this grave charge steeped in moral reckoning. Growing up out of Neoplatonism, 
Catholicism borrows all of its love and loathing for music from this same reflex, burying its 
secret “melomania” beneath the “furious energy of melophobia”, as Jankélévitch says.176 
Again, music’s medicinal purpose is to enlighten the fallen soul which tempers the dangerous 
body, to return us to the innermost centre of the self where truth (God) dwells, toward the 
consolations of cosmic interconnectivity, wholeness, and oneness, toward the good, the 
beautiful, the just and the true, and toward eternity. In The Sacred In Music, Blackwell writes 
of Christianity as founded on musical suspicion, and steeped in an ambivalence toward its 
apothecary role in a suffering, imperfect world, its very form “instantiating our fallen 
condition”, and (quoting Steiner) “communicating the urgency of a great hurt” which 
manifests in “Christianity’s continued struggle with questions of music’s spiritual value.”177 
While music’s purpose is ideally one of worship, salvation and spiritual purification, it is also 
tied to “pagan practices [of] carnality” and forbidden sensual pleasure, making its fleshy 
temptations a “distraction from the communal sharing and divine worship it was supposed to 
serve.”178 When in Confessions, Augustine confronts his own fall from grace and 
contemplates the redemptive, healing power of divine worship through song, he feels himself 
deeply troubled by music’s affective power, which he fears might become too much of a 
“temptation, a potential addiction, precisely because of its capacity to penetrate him so deeply 
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and move him so irresistibly” as to become lost to his weaknesses.179 The “furious energy of 
melophobia” makes haste, convincing Augustine that his own weeping in the presence of 
music’s beauty comes not from the sensual persuasions of lush, melodic intoxication, but 
from the piety of the text sung: beneath the word of worship the melody must obey, else 
bodies and minds may descend into the carnal wreckage that has hedonism in its grip. It is a 
distinction that, for Blackwell, prophecies the trajectory of “western Christian attitudes ever 
after”: 
 
It is the opinion that music’s primary role in Christian worship is to serve the meaning of 
sacred texts, with a secondary role—more a concession to human weakness than a mandate—
of “indulging the ears” of “weaker spirits,” that they might “be inspired with feelings of 
devotion”.180  
 
The regulation of such a hierarchy enables Augustine to restore Plato’s earlier belief that 
music’s immateriality is a “warrant of its ability to reach the transcendental realm”, that 
music is “a privileged medium when it comes to expressing philosophical or religious ideas” 
and can  
 
foster man’s detachment from the material world and his ascent to God. This is possible, 
Augustine continues, due to the numerical nature of music, which it shares with the material 
world–created and ordered according to number, as well as with God: the immaterial source 
of all number and order.181    
 
As Jankélévitch writes, for Augustine, “any singing perceptible to the ears and the body is the 
exoteric envelope of a smooth, ineffable, and celestial melody”,182 that is, the harmony of the 
spheres, which, interchangeably ‘means’ the music of the spheres, which interchangeably 
‘means’ perfection, order, virtue, eternity.   
 
That the harmony and order of God’s spiritual polis might be regulated by music, that 
spirituality itself cannot exist beyond the “menacing yet reassuring doctrine of the Church”, 
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are primary problems for Cobussen. Taking up the legacy of the Nietzschean death of God,183 
Cobussen turns to those spiritual theorists who have become disenchanted with both religion 
and the ‘soullessness’ of nihilistic capitalism, yet who nonetheless desire spiritual 
meaningfulness amongst the absurdity and futility of the human condition, who seek 
sincerity, accountability and an ethical sensibility amidst cynicism, narcissism, and 
materialistic decadence. For Heidegger, Catholicism’s humanised identity of God—the 
“metaphysical construction” of “long-established truth dogmas”——is a betrayal of the 
unknown truth of God due to the reliance upon faith, a faith Heidegger discards for the 
“metaphysical homelessness” of this unknown entity.184 Gianni Vattimo similarly “rejects the 
image of a God which contains all characteristics of omnipotence, absoluteness, eternity, and 
transcendence, calling them “projections of human desires,” which reinforce a dependence 
“upon a Supreme Being.”185 In bringing music to bear upon this rift between established 
religious constructions and their emancipation, Cobussen returns to the problem of harmony 
that marks the Platonic-Catholic operation: 
 
According to Jacques Attali, music is—or at least was—a strategy running parallel to religion. 
Primordially, music as well as religion has as its function the creation, legitimation, and 
maintenance of order. Its primary purpose is not to be sought in aesthetics, which is a modern 
invention, but in the effectiveness of its participation in social regulation. Both music and 
religion produce harmony and are produced to make people believe, to believe in order…186 
 
Arguably, film music theory’s own reservation toward the liminal silent spectre, as a thing 
that requires resolution through regulation, is sired from this dogmatic line. As the specified 
site of inner truth, non-religious instrumental music continues to fulfil this sacred function, 
making order from disorder, harmonising the dissonance of the undead, recapitulating the 
religious rule. When an explicitly theological theory arrives in Kutter Callaway’s 2013 
Scoring Transcendence: Contemporary Film Music as Religious Experience, its call to 
restore divine presence through music is bricolaged from the very flaws, omissions, and 
generalisations that have ever obstructed a properly liminal appreciation of cinematic-musical 
complexity: 
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[T]he music we hear in film does not simply invite a theological response; it demands one. … 
I want to explore…what it means for God to converse with human beings in and through the 
images we hear. … In contradistinction to live-action films, the world that exists within an 
animated film is wholly constructed, every sound, every shadow, and every movement is the 
direct product of the filmmakers’ intentional, shaping influence. Consequently, music is 
frequently called upon to invest this wholly constructed world with a modicum of “life.” 
Music functions in these films to “animate” the animation; it inspirits and breathes life (or 
anima) into images that are patently artificial and entirely virtual. …the very presence of 
music in film signifies emotions.187  
 
With Callaway’s sweeping endorsement of those hierarchies that obscure the meaningfulness 
of the animistic silent spectre, the sacred traces that haunt the argument for presence become 
apparent, however much film musicology itself avoids such open religiosity. Compelling us 
beyond the ‘dangerous’ immorality of the disturbingly undead and returning us to the 
innermost depths of the soul, music ushers in the ineffable presence of the divine, becoming 
the singular means with which to engage with existential “near-universals”: 
 
Loneliness, isolation, and the loss of loved ones are near-universal categories that are deeply 
embedded in the human experience. Yet…the music is uniquely able to address these realities 
by opening the audience out into something larger than themselves, something that lies 
beyond the representational capacities of moving images. It signifies an ineffable presence 
that pervades the immanent frame of the cinematic world—a delicate yet distinctive beauty 
that somehow exists in the midst of the pain and the chaos.188 
 
Against anti-theistic credos of nihilism, the absurdity of life’s labours, and the anguish of 
death, Callaway’s ineffable music (as God’s messenger) ultimately resides more in the realm 
of eternity than time, where “through our discovery of wisdom, we actually enter into the 
presence of the transcendent Spirit of God who is immanent in the world”. 189 As such, music 
remains the sublime messenger of hope, annihilating anxiety, incertitude and liminality, and 
overcoming the solitude and finitude of death.  
 
                                                 
187 Kutter Callaway, Scoring Transcendence: Contemporary Film Music as Religious Experience (Waco: Baylor 
University Press, 2013), 11, 14, 22.  
188 Callaway, Scoring Transcendence, 57.  
189 Ibid., 56–57.  
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Conclusion: Cinema, Music and Death  
God is dead. God remains dead. And we have killed him. How shall we comfort ourselves, 
the murderers of all murderers? 
         — Friedrich Nietzsche190   
 
As problems of death themselves, are the forms of cinema and music haunted by the loss of 
the soul, the sacred, and the divine, that is, the loss of a particular consolation that comes with 
such transcendental certainty? If claiming the presence of eternity in an age well past 
Nietzsche’s “proclamation”191 comes with this ironic caveat, is it possible to rethink the 
spirituality of music and cinema beyond such severe divisions, away from the “certainty” that 
Callaway’s theology privileges, and towards Cobussen’s more complex spirituality that 
nomadically wanders, gropes and errs?192 Such wandering necessarily requires a rather 
different stance to the solemnity associated with orthodox faith, and thus, calls upon a rather 
different perspective toward the boundaries of existence itself. When Deleuze and Guattari 
speak of the joy that binds music and death,193 they are clearly invoking the Dionysian forces 
of Nietzsche rather than Socratic wisdom or Christian piety:   
 
 Music is never tragic, music is joy. But there are times it necessarily gives us a taste for 
death; not so much happiness as dying happily, being extinguished. Not as a function of a 
death instinct it allegedly awakens in us, but of a dimension proper to its sound assemblage, 
to its sound machine, the moment that must be confronted, the moment the transversal turns 
into a line of abolition. Peace and exasperation. Music has a thirst for…destruction, 
extinction, breakage, dislocation.194 
 
As “the antithesis of the traditional, Platonic approach” to music,195 Deleuze and Guattari are 
not here suggesting the eternal soul’s final release from a body that sullies the pious pursuit 
of knowledge and rational thought, nor are they appealing to the psychoanalytical death-
                                                 
190 Nietzsche, The Gay Science, 181. 
191 Barber, Deleuze and the Naming of God, 1–4. 
192 Cobussen, Thresholds, 139. 
193 For the broader significance of joy to Deleuze and Guattari’s formulation of desire, see Jay Johnston, Angels 
of Desire: Esoteric Bodies, Aesthetics and Ethics, Gnostica: Texts and Interpretations (London; Oakville: 
Equinox, 2008), 137.  
194 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. with a 
foreword by Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), 299.  
195 Ronald Bogue, Deleuze on Music, Painting and the Arts (New York; London: Routledge, 2003), 16.  
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drive: their “moment that must be confronted” is the moment that the argument for presence 
carefully denies. 
 
Is it possible to suggest that the life of music might equally be a reckoning with death—
perhaps as the euphonious spectre that ironically haunts death—if death itself is a thing that 
can be haunted as it endlessly haunts the living? Morin’s rapturous myth of immortality for 
cinema has its musical counterpart, though, as Jankélévitch and Cobussen have shown, music 
is so persuasive in its spiritual illusions that we stifle the rupture death gives to thought: with 
music pressed within the cinematic human figure, with life so secured, the many marks of our 
own finitude go quietly away: the void, the abyss, the gnawing absurdity of life, the negative 
residue that clings to silence and darkness, the anxiety of oblivion, the desire to 
excommunicate the primal fear of an eternal solitude. Those aspects of consciousness that the 
silent spectre evokes—death, loss, forgetting, loneliness—are those things that are carefully 
evaded for their proximity to the unthinkable possibility of belonging nowhere, neither ‘down 
here’ nor ‘up there’. David Lynch’s elephant man dies to Samuel Barber’s Adagio for Strings, 
and surely there is no purer ascent to heaven than upon the wings of this music.196 Yet his 
death is an act of suicide, a resignation and escape from the grotesque creaturely body that 
incarcerates the beautiful human mind. In this macabre moment, does God make an 
exception? If film music possesses a positive annihilating function, it is to eradicate these 
primordial uncertainties through the revival of the soul, whose place beyond death must not 
be Gorky’s no-man’s-land. This either/or predicament is precisely the mode of thought that a 
complex liminal perspective reimagines. 
 
Through Bazin, Morin and Cholodenko, the silent spectre remains a figure of spiritual 
complexity, of uncanny, liminal forces, of ambiguity, incertitude and paradox. 
Comparatively, we might also suggest that this complexity thrives in a similar threshold that 
Jankélévitch and Cobussen theorise for musical meaning, a similar liminal space which 
negotiates the boundary between ineffable musical mystery and an intuited human essence, 
where presence and absence again converge to complicate, rather than resolve, music’s aura 
of spiritual significance. Limited by its own binary logic, the argument for presence in film 
musicology refuses the extraordinary theoretical possibilities of this shared liminal zone. 
                                                 
196 The Elephant Man, dir. David Lynch (1980; Universal City, CA: Universal Home Video, 2006), DVD. 
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Unable to speak of the incertitude of death itself or the moment of dying, unaware of its 
reflexive restoration of transcendental thought, the argument for presence performs as the 
affirmation of the living, yet unwittingly sides with the essence of eternity, refusing to speak 
of time itself as the primordial ground for our experience of life, music, and cinema. 
Ironically, the argument for presence is haunted by the vision of the spiritual obstacle that 
cinema itself poses for our paradoxically post-secular, post-religious time, a vision of liminal 
belief. As such, I see a remarkable opportunity to contemplate the significance of those 
liminal modes, such as the ineffable and the uncanny, that not only permeate the aura of 
mystery intrinsic to both the cinematic human figure and musical meaning, but also, as we 
shall continue to discover, participate diversely within discrete theories of pre-Christian, 
Platonic, Christian and atheistic belief.  
 
In leaving the discipline of film musicology now, I appreciate its argument as the catalyst for 
revealing the spiritual complexity it denies, through the very controversy it simultaneously 
exudes and evades. Toward a theory of spiritual complexity, I wonder if it is possible to 
restage the argument for presence to understand, rather than unknowingly repeat or reactively 
depose, this recalcitrant, apparently universal faith in music’s sentience, and could we do so 
through the paradoxical components of the uncanny itself? How complex might music’s 
secret, anthropomorphic meanings become if I attempt to theorise—from a transparently self-
reflective, ironic, theatrical perspective—the uncanny presence of a Nietzschean and Platonic 
belief that haunts the “inner monologue” of my own narcissistic musical encounter?  
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Chapter Two: Unmasking a Musical Uncanny: Making a Friend for 
the Spectre  
 
[T]he secret of all music perhaps, is to make you believe that it possesses some sayable secret. 
—Marcel Cobussen1 
 
Have you ever seen your friend asleep—and found out how he looks? What is the face of 
your friend anyway? It is your own face in a rough and imperfect mirror. 
—Friedrich Nietzsche2 
 
All music is melancholy, but modern music knows its own melancholy. 
         —Michael P. Steinberg3 
 
All thought is anthropomorphic… . If man realized that the universe like him can love and 
suffer, he would be reconciled. 
—Albert Camus4 
 
This is the strangeness of the uncanny, a flickering moment of embroilment in the experience 
of something at once strange and familiar.  
—Nicholas Royle5 
 
 
An inner (subconscious) monologue for the musical encounter… Or, notes from the journal of 
a narcissistic musicophiliac:6 
 
Music…my strange and melancholy friend…the friend I know secretly knows (me)…my 
confidante, my consort who desires (my love), who feels (my feelings), who speaks of 
sadness without speaking at all…who haunts my thinking, speaking, desiring and 
                                                 
1 Cobussen, Thresholds, 4. 
2 Friedrich Nietzsche, “On the Friend,” in Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for None and All, trans. with preface 
by Walter Kaufmann (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1978), 56.  
3 Michael P. Steinberg, “Music and Melancholy,” Critical Inquiry 40 (Winter 2014): 291, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/674116. 
4 Albert Camus, The Myth of Sisyphus, Great Ideas ed., trans. Justin O’Brien, (London: H. Hamilton, 1955; 
London: Penguin Books, 2005), 16.  
5 Nicholas Royle, The Uncanny (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003), vii.  
6 I borrow this term ‘musicophilia’ from Oliver Sacks’ same-titled book, Musicophilia: Tales of Music and the 
Brain (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2008). 
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feeling…who longs as I long, and envies as I envy, who steals my thoughts to make me a 
stranger to myself…I give music a mask and a mirror with which to fulfil my own desire…I 
make its strangeness familiar…yet in the end, I am master of nothing…yet then again, and 
secretly, I know I am somewhere in this music…I feel it…I am losing myself in the mirror…I 
am lost in a “wilderness of doubles”7…I am making a friend for the spectre in film…  
 
Nietzsche’s Hermit: The Friend with Two Faces 
“There is always one too many around me”—thus thinks the hermit. “Always one times 
one—eventually that makes two.” 
I and me are always too deep in conversation: how could one stand that if there were no 
friend? For the hermit the friend is always the third person: the third is the cork that prevents 
the conversation of the two from sinking into the depths. Alas, there are too many depths for 
all hermits, therefore they long so for a friend and his height. 
         —Friedrich Nietzsche8 
  
Nietzsche’s hermit is a beginning for thinking the musical uncanny.9 Or rather, Nietzsche’s 
hermit is a way into this inner monologue, a way to think the uncanny nature of thought in 
the midst of the musical encounter, in the threshold where the true being of feeling and its 
musical semblance strangely become ‘one.’ The uncanny is nothing if not a problem of self-
identity, of self-division and doubling, self-loathing and love, lunacy and 
illumination…within which incertitude would surely undermine knowing if not for the third 
person, without which the secret dialogues of I and me would vanish into “too many depths.” 
Hermitic thought is uncanny.  
 
In Nicholas Royle’s study The Uncanny, the spectre of film is deservedly present.10 Yet 
music—specifically instrumental music—with its anthropomorphic hauntings, its doublings 
of thought and feeling, and its illusions of a nameable, knowable meaning, remains 
                                                 
7 Richard Kurth, “Music and Poetry: Wilderness of Doubles: Heine–Nietzsche–Schubert–Derrida,” 19th-
Century Music 21, no. 1 (1997): 3-37, http://www.jstor.org/stable/746830. 
8 Nietzsche, “On the Friend,” in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 55. 
9 This Nietzschean approach to the uncanny process of thought in the musical encounter appreciates and 
acknowledges the precedence of earlier genre-related texts that approach film music as uncanny. See, for 
example, K.J. Donnelly, The Spectre of Sound: Music in Film and Television (London: BFI Publishing, 2005); 
Isabella van Elfren, Gothic Music: The Sounds of the Uncanny (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2012).  
10 Royle, “Film,” in The Uncanny, 75–83. 
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profoundly absent. Nonetheless, Royle’s conceptual framework captures precisely the 
spiritual ground with which I seek to theorise a musical uncanny: 
 
Uncanniness entails a sense of uncertainty and suspense, however momentary and unstable. 
As such it is often to be associated with an experience of the threshold, liminality, margins, 
borders, frontiers. …[in his] essay of 1919 ‘Das Unheimliche’ (‘The Uncanny’)…Freud was 
perhaps the first to foreground the distinctive nature of the uncanny as a feeling of something 
not simply weird or mysterious but, more specifically, as something strangely familiar… . 
The uncanny involves feelings of uncertainty, in particular regarding the reality of who one is 
and what is being experienced…The uncanny is a crisis of the proper: it entails a critical 
disturbance of what is proper… . It is a crisis of the natural, touching upon everything that 
one might have thought was ‘part of nature’: one’s own nature, human nature, the nature of 
reality and the world. …The uncanny can be a matter of something gruesome or terrible, 
above all death and corpses, cannibalism, live burial, the return of the dead. But it can also be 
a matter of something strangely beautiful, bordering on ecstasy...It can involve a feeling of 
something beautiful but at the same time frightening, as in the figure of the double or 
telepathy. It comes above all, perhaps, in the uncertainties of silence, solitude and darkness. 
The uncanny has to do with the sense of a secret encounter...something that should have 
remained secret and hidden but has come to light. But it is not ‘out there’, in any simple 
sense: as a crisis of the proper and natural, it disturbs any straightforward sense of what is 
inside and what is outside. The uncanny has to do with a strangeness of framing and borders, 
an experience of liminality. …Above all, the uncanny is intimately entwined in language, with 
how we conceive and represent what is happening within ourselves, to ourselves, to the 
world, when uncanny strangeness is at issue.11 
 
What Royle provides here is the provocative grounding for a musical uncanny, within which 
thought itself splits and doubles in its desire to “know thyself”12 through music. For such is 
the strangeness of the (secret) musical encounter, when music feels incomparably familiar in 
its doubling of sentience. And then, such is the strangeness of the friend (the familiar) of 
Nietzsche’s hermit, who, lost amongst the clamour of his solitude, is strange to himself. 
Where is he in all these hims? Him who? The hermit or the friend? Are they not one and the 
same? He is—they are—profoundly suited for problematizing the labyrinthine identity crisis 
                                                 
11 Royle, The Uncanny, vii, 1–2.   
12 Plato, Phaedrus, 230a. Other dialogues that explore the maxim ‘know thyself’ are Charmides (164d), Laws 
(II, 923a), Protagoras (343d), and Philebus (48c): see The Collected Dialogues of Plato including the Letters, 
ed. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns, Bollingen Series: 71 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
1963). 
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that comes in this ominous crossing of boundaries between music and (my) feeling. To listen 
to music is always to lose a little of oneself in the music. Or did I mean to say “to lose oneself 
in the music”? In problematizing the difference between human sentience—thoughts, 
memories, desires, feelings—and the semblance of such sentience in music, is it less a 
crossing than a vanishing then? Why make such a desirable vanishing morally questionable? 
Where is the error in losing myself? Yet something in me feels reconciled to this self-
forgetting, for in crossing and vanishing, I feel myself to be deep in the river of truth. My 
truth. I am home. In music’s “peculiar air of “otherness,” [its] “strangeness,” “semblance,” 
[and] “illusion”,”13 what is more familiar to me than the self, myself, my secrets and my 
feelings? Annalise Baird writes that the uncanny’s intrinsic “(un)familiarity” is connected  
  
to the self, since it is the self with which we are most familiar. The most important boundary 
of all is the one separating ourselves from the outside world—the self from the non-self—
because it is this boundary which establishes at the deepest level what should and should not 
be familiar. We experience uncanniness or horror when what is outside of this boundary is 
familiar and what is inside this boundary is foreign, thus rendering the boundary obsolete.14  
 
Yet when music speaks to me of myself, I sense no horror in the dissolution of the boundary 
between my inner world and the world of music. I am hardly Cobussen’s nomad, wandering, 
erring, and groping through a spiritual no-man’s-land.15 In my love for this feeling of lost-
ness that music’s transport provides, I know precisely where I am. The spiritual meaning of 
music’s mystery comes in the luminous, radiant rapture of feeling utterly at one with truth, 
not in the dark, foreign outposts of “an alien or monstrous turmoil in the margins of a 
discourse.”16 It is within this unquestionable feeling of belonging within the secret, of 
belonging within this intimate clasp of reciprocity, that compels my leap to the logical 
(anthropocentric) epiphany, authorising my claim upon wisdom and promoting my self-
assured discourse. The meaning of music is (human) feeling. Sentience is within the music 
itself. In the stellar leap to feeling I become Romantic, for the leap to this peculiar truth—to 
knowing, writing and speaking music’s sentient meaning—is the leap of the faithful lover, 
not the unloved exile.  
                                                 
13 Langer, Feeling and Form, 46.  
14 Annalise Baird, “The Abject, the Uncanny, and the Sublime: A Destabilization of Boundaries” (unpublished 
paper, University of Rochester, 2013), 6, pdf, http://writing.rochester.edu/celebrating/2013/Baird.pdf. 
15 Cobussen, Thresholds, 143.  
16 Ibid., 66 (italics added). 
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Yet the leap is not the safe crossing it pretends to be. However superbly critiqued by thinkers 
such as Nietzsche, Jankélévitch and Cobussen, the leap to truth cannot easily be overcome 
without undertaking and surviving a “spiritual ordeal” of sorts.17 What river has Cobussen 
crossed to be able to say so simply, the “secret of all music, perhaps, is to make you believe 
that it possesses some sayable secret”?18 Toward our relation with the world, Camus writes:  
 
The mind’s deepest desire…parallels man’s unconscious feelings in the face of the universe: 
it is an insistence upon familiarity, an appetite for clarity. Understanding the world for a man 
is reducing it to the human, stamping it with his seal. …The truism ‘All thought is 
anthropomorphic’ has no other meaning. …If thought discovered in the shimmering mirrors 
of phenomena eternal relations capable of summing themselves up…in a single principle, 
then would be seen an intellectual joy of which the myth of the blessed would be but a 
ridiculous imitation. That nostalgia for unity, that appetite for the absolute illustrates the 
essential impulse for the human drama.19 
 
Is this true of the leap to musical meaning? Am I sick with longing for the consolation of 
such unoriginal “eternal relations”? Do I disfigure the mystery of music by giving it my own 
face? To see in life this particular semblance, unlimited and omnipresent, rather than the true 
being of things, is not to “see” but to desire; to desire a knowledge of the world that returns 
me to myself. In my desire to know music, I do more than reduce it to this vague category of 
‘the human’; I enlist music to the regime of egocentric thought. In the mirror of music, I see 
myself. As uncanny, the musical encounter is steeped in ironic duplicities. My enduring love 
for music (the love I think it has for me) grazes against the saccharine narcissism of this self-
portrait. And yet something in music mocks my desire, mocks the boundary between music’s 
ontological and affective forces, mocks the space between what music is, and what music 
does. This profound sense of familiarity is leading me astray… 
 
What is required to preserve the mystery? Must all familiarity be relinquished? In the ordeal 
of love’s longing, is it the absolute alienation of the self that is required? To preserve the 
mystery that marks the restless presence of the uncanny, is it safer to privilege the radical 
otherness of the strange, to rush more assuredly toward a speaking of music as an 
                                                 
17 Ramey, The Hermetic Deleuze, 2–3.  
18 Cobussen, Thresholds, 4.  
19 Camus, The Myth of Sisyphus, 15–16. 
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unimaginable existential darkness? For surely it is music’s overwhelming sense of 
strangeness that compels its mystery, with mystery itself being the lure which compels the 
desire to know music’s meaning as sentient. Yet for Freud and Royle, the uncanny entails the 
peculiarities of the strange without abandoning the familiar. That Royle emphasises the 
necessity of the familiar may well be the key to understanding the liminal complexity of 
music’s own secret encounter, an encounter which remains—recurringly, and in defiance to 
its ineffable truth—more familiar than strange:  
 
If psychoanalysis and deconstruction have one thing to teach, it would be about how and why 
we must not simply give ourselves up or over to the uncanny. There has to be an abiding 
attachment to the familiar, even if it is one that requires ceaseless suspicion. There has to be a 
grounding in the rational in order to experience its trembling and break-up. There has to be a 
sense of home and homeliness within and beyond which to think the unhomely.20 
 
Is anthropomorphism the “home” that haunts the human relation to music? In my love for a 
music who speaks to me of myself, and whose love is my love, there is no vanishing, only 
endless homecomings to satisfy this most uncanny nostalgia. In music’s strange semblance of 
the inner life of feeling, in the ‘irrational,’ intuitive belief in music’s sentient truth, in leaping 
to love’s object, this unchecked, undesired self-idolatry paradoxically forms the ground for 
my ‘rational’ thought. My love is a tender trap. I believe in a meaning of life which remains 
anthropomorphically, egocentrically, in pursuit of this secret mystery of me…I am Narcissus.  
 
Such narcissism, then, throws down a curious gauntlet. This sense of familiarity in music 
which brings me home to myself is the strangeness of music. The force of music’s semblance 
which opposes the true being of feeling, and the inextricable conspiracy of the two within the 
musical encounter, is preceded by a tendency far more difficult to purge from my own 
habitus of thought. For Nietzsche most particularly, this problem of anthropomorphism is the 
bogey of all human thought.21 Royle writes, “everywhere in Nietzsche’s texts can we find a 
more or less explicit engagement with uncanniness.”22 Nietzsche, who loves music for its 
semblance of melancholy suffering and ecstatic willing, for its bond with the earthed body of 
life and time…And then, through his inversion and overturning of true being and semblance, 
                                                 
20 Royle, The Uncanny, 25. 
21 George J. Stack, “Nietzsche and Anthropomorphism,” Crítica: Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía 12, 
no. 34 (1980): 41–71, http://www.jstor.org/stable/40104164. 
22 Royle, The Uncanny, 4. 
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everywhere in Nietzsche’s thought is Platonism.23 Plato, who loves music for its semblance 
of the Idea, for its bond with the transcendent psyché of death and eternity... Moreover, 
everywhere in Plato is the anthropomorphism that Nietzsche petitions us to overcome, 
however much he himself is plagued by its inevitability.24 Though Nietzsche accepts this 
ironic inevitability through a “consciously adopted anthropomorphism,”25 Plato is already 
haunting the (Nietzschean) musical uncanny.  
 
In this crossing which is also a vanishing (a vanishing into the feeling of music), I see 
(reluctantly) the epic extent of my own belief in the secret music keeps: in loving my love for 
the hidden message, I am rousing the sleeping giant of my own inner Plato, the imaginary 
double who is the friend for Nietzsche’s hermit, a friend who has not one but two faces.  
 
Music, a Friend for Thought, Speaks a Sorrow 
Music seems to be better at being than at knowing….melancholy is the condition of music—
all music… Music is melancholic in relation to its own desire. To riff, then, on another 
Freudian question: what does music want? Music wants to speak and to speak importantly, 
and that unfulfillable wish is the source of its melancholia. Musical melancholia is an 
epistemic predicament, an attribute of the musical desire to know. …If melancholy is the 
condition of music, then music of any period, place, genre, and style can be considered 
through this lens. 
—Michael P. Steinberg 26 
 
In an early draught of The Birth of Tragedy (1870–71), Nietzsche writes, “My philosophy an 
inverted Platonism: the further removed from true being, the purer, the more beautiful, the 
better it is. Living in Schein as goal.”27 Even before we enter Nietzsche’s world of 
Apollonian shining dream images and ecstatic Dionysiac self-forgetting, the musical uncanny 
looms large through this concept of Schein, the term used to “name that semblance or 
appearance that Platonism distinguishes from true being.”28 Undergirded by the 
anthropomorphic impulse, the nature of music’s semblance is nothing if not uncanny, its 
                                                 
23 John Sallis, Platonic Legacies, SUNY Series in Contemporary Continental Philosophy (Albany, NY: State 
University of New York Press, 2004), 9.  
24 Stack, “Nietzsche and Anthropomorphism,” 41, 44. 
25 Ibid., 41. 
26 Steinberg, “Music and Melancholy,” 289–90.  
27 Sallis, Platonic Legacies, 9. 
28 Ibid. 
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magnetism to the difference of the strange (and the strangeness of difference) not only 
overwhelming the sameness of the familiar (and the familiarity of sameness) but also—and 
paradoxically—siphoning its exiled otherness from familiarity’s great cosmic undercurrents 
of unity.  
 
These, I think, are the uncanny forces that haunt Steinberg’s comparatively bold Freudian 
declaration for an unapologetically humanised music—a music who longs “to speak 
importantly” and whose unfulfilled desire creates for itself a body of sorrow ever weeping, 
feeling and being, with “being” itself taking on uncanny Platonic shadings in the eternalising, 
universalising doctrine that all music is melancholy. While Steinberg defines music as the 
province of subjectivity, where, in such a thesis, is a self-conscious acknowledgement 
regarding the premise of anthropomorphism? How does Steinberg remain safely beyond 
music’s affective force to claim such a truth? And then, how might the imbricated claim for 
music’s inability to speak (thus to know) lie with his own melancholy inscription without the 
caveat of uncanniness? In drawing only on the anthropomorphic unity of music’s true being, 
in conforming to love’s belonging, what becomes of semblance, the aura of mystery, 
strangeness and otherness that also seeks to wear this mask of truth? Finally, why does a 
rational discourse on music’s humanisation feel intuitively strange and ethically unsettling—
and thus counter-intuitive to the preservation of music’s mystery—while the sensed presence 
of sentience within the affective musical encounter becomes an unquestionable affirmation of 
familiarity? Simply put, why does Steinberg’s idea make sense in the moment of my own 
immediate, subjective, listening and playing experience, yet seem absurd when music itself is 
not present, thus becoming an idea temporally removed from feeling? This is, for me, a rather 
striking example of the musical uncanny in action, one whose provocations allow me to 
return, via Deleuze, to Nietzsche’s hermit and the friend of wisdom, to problematise the 
relation between music and my inner self through the liminality of the “strangely familiar,” 
the grounding aporia which marks the uncanny. It is to set in motion a ceaseless rivalry 
between thought and feeling, where music’s duplicitous and narcissistic anthropomorphism 
endlessly, ironically, returns me to myself. It is this moment of becoming double within 
myself, of becoming the friend with two faces, that I suggest constitutes the uncanny musical 
encounter. It is to wonder—as a desiring, thinking self with other inner selves—who thinks 
and who desires: I, myself, me, my “friend” who wears two faces, or music itself? How does 
the friend wear two faces anyway, if Nietzsche speaks only of one? Doesn’t he?  
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However absent music appears to be in the hermit’s parable on the nature of thought, I 
suggest that it superbly narrates the uncanny doubling of myself within myself, endlessly 
looping the uncanny semblance of feeling that dwells in the space between (my) thought and 
music’s being. To make this conceptually difficult crossing, I would rely on Deleuze’s 
reading of the identity of the Greek philosopher in Nietzsche and Philosophy, for it is in this 
reading that semblance begins to show its utterly uncanny nature.  
 
Deleuze’s Reading of the Mask(s) 
Let us first revisit the hermit’s friend as Nietzsche presents him through Zarathustra: 
 
“There is always one too many around me”—thus thinks the hermit. “Always one times 
one—eventually that makes two.” 
I and me are always too deep in conversation: how could one stand that if there were no 
friend? For the hermit the friend is always the third person: the third is the cork that prevents 
the conversation of the two from sinking into the depths. Alas, there are too many depths for 
all hermits, therefore they long so for a friend and his height.29 
 
To this, Deleuze writes: 
 
Philosophos does not mean “wise man” but “friend of wisdom”. But “friend” must be 
interpreted in a strange way: the friend, says Zarathustra, is always a third person in between 
“I” and “me” who pushes me to overcome myself and to be overcome in order to live. …The 
friend of wisdom is the one who appeals to wisdom, but in the way that one appeals to a mask 
without which one would not survive, the one who makes use of wisdom for new, bizarre, and 
dangerous ends… . He wants wisdom to overcome itself and to be overcome.30 
 
Already, the uncanny’s (identity) crisis of the natural is making itself felt through this 
strangely plural sense of a philosopher whose veils and masks give the hermit the height that 
overcomes the abyss of unknowing.31 As “the friend or lover of wisdom,” the philosopher 
“searches for wisdom but does not possess it.”32 The philosopher is not wise himself, but 
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longing to master wisdom, makes for himself the mask of imposture to pretend a claim upon 
wisdom, thus cannily claiming the “thinker” identity: in so doing, the philosopher becomes 
the semblance of wisdom. He is the actor, the method actor, who lives what he seeks to 
perform to perfection in the theatre of life. Here again, semblance must be understood across 
a complex plurality of senses that give it its uncanny nature: burrowing beneath the 
unsettlements of otherness and strangeness, it also shelters the familiarity of the friend. As the 
strangely familiar, semblance infinitely regresses into the warp and weft of inner and outer 
doubling. As Daniel W. Smith writes, the object of wisdom not only takes on the guise of the 
human, but becomes this guise within the self:  
 
For Deleuze, this new definition of the thinker is of decisive importance: with the Greeks, the 
friend becomes a presence internal to thought. The friend is no longer related simply to 
another person, but also to an Entity or Essence, an Idea which constitutes the object of its 
desire (Eros). “I am the friend of Plato,” says the philosopher, “but more so, I am the friend of 
Wisdom, of the True, of the Concept.”33 
 
In this reciprocity of friendship, in becoming human, the Essence (the Idea) becomes the 
eidetic double—the eidolon (the image)—of the “deepest” part of the self, myself.34 For 
Nietzsche, such semblance within the self is forever the trickster loitering in the margins of 
thought, with the mask only lowered in moments of self-absence, as in the cloistered nocturne 
of dreams, where uncanny strangeness prowls and withdraws: “Have you ever seen your 
friend asleep,” asks Nietzsche’s Zarathustra,  
 
and found out how he looks? What is the face of your friend anyway? It is your own face in a 
rough and imperfect mirror. …Were you not shocked that your friend looked like that? O my 
friend, man is something to be overcome. …Your dream should betray to you what your 
friend does while your awake.35 
 
In this way, such friendship is inevitably narcissistic: as the ‘I’ and the ‘eye,’ wisdom not 
only becomes human, but becomes the one human I desire to know (to see) more than all 
others, yet who endlessly eludes my knowing. Cunning and wily, the friend is a trickster, 
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unveiling us to ourselves if only we would have the courage to look more closely into the 
mirror and the dream. Always searching for the consolation of unity, always restless for the 
belonging of the familiar, always creating crowds for company so as not to be alone, our 
“faith in others betrays in what respect we would like to have faith in ourselves. Our longing 
for a friend is our betrayer.”36  
 
Later, in A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari will ask, as if for the first time, “Who is 
this friend of humankind? Is it the philo-sopher as he appears in classical thought, even if he 
is an aborted unity that makes itself felt only through its absence or subjectivity, saying all 
the while, I know nothing, I am nothing?”37 The hermit’s friend—the strange guest whose 
uncanny presence enables survival and whose creation rescues the hermit from the abyss of 
unknowing and un-belonging—is the maker of the thinker: in wearing the mask of wisdom, 
the hermit may perform the theatre of truth, a theatre which is decidedly sacred. Deleuze 
writes that in wearing the “contemplative air of the priest, of the ascetic and religious man 
who dominated the world before he appeared,” this new kind of thinker, knowing nothing and 
being nothing, survives through both his faith in the mythical power of the mask and his 
resilient refusal to remove the mask:  
 
The mask or the trick are laws of nature and therefore something more than mere mask or 
trick. …philosophy itself does not throw off its ascetic mask as it grows up: in a way it must 
believe in this mask, it can only conquer its mask by giving it a new sense which finally 
expresses its true, anti-religious force. We see that the art of interpreting must also be an art of 
piercing masks, of discovering the one that masks himself, why he does it and the point of 
keeping up the mask while it is being reshaped.38  
 
In the compulsion to make the mask, and then in its overcoming, conquering and piercing, 
Deleuze’s metamorphosis appears to articulate two masks, both of which I believe are equally 
present in the uncanny musical encounter, both of which preserve the imposture of reverent 
knowing which underscores the desire to interpret and thus to know: the one I sense to be my 
own inner Plato, which requires piercing for me to “grow up”, and then the other that 
Nietzsche believes will do the piercing. The first, we might tentatively name the mask of true 
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being who is a “despiser of the body,”39 who loves the good, just and true Idea that shines 
through the Apollonian dream image; the second, the mask of “semblance” which loves the 
tragic and ecstatic Dionysian body of feeling and willing. Through the philosophical pursuit 
for wisdom’s friendship, both masks are lovers of music, death and eternity, and both are 
bound to the humanising gesture that overcomes the incertitude of both music and death’s 
mystery. This is what I understand to be the friend with two faces, the uncanny double within 
who affirms and consoles not only my desire to know (and so to speak and to write) music’s 
secret as melancholy feeling, but also my desire to feel music’s melancholy suffering, willing 
and desiring. Moreover, the double within is the force whose willing for immortality 
overcomes the fear of finitude: in the true being and semblance of music’s sentience, I am 
compelled beyond the bounds of finitude. 
 
In this clumsy gesture to grasp the magnitude of music’s affective presence, is it possible to 
suggest that in my love and desire to know music’s mystery, and in losing myself in the 
mirror of feeling, I wear both masks, and wear them at one and the same time?  For in 
presenting two masks, and so two kinds of semblance, Deleuze is speaking of two kinds of 
truth-seeking, both of which, in the case of music, appear to haunt the leap from musical 
experience to anthropocentric meaning.  
 
Towards this self-reflective, ironic framing of a musical uncanny then, the path I necessarily 
seek is one of understanding, rather than overcoming or piercing my human condition to love 
and desire music’s hidden messages, and my tendency to believe, instinctively and 
impossibly, in the being of music’s melancholy desire. Is my enduring feeling that music 
knows some kind of sentient truth conspiring with this inner mask of Plato? But then, is it not 
also, at one and the same time, also consorting with this second mask, the one that transforms 
Plato’s with a more “tragic” veil? However epically outmoded, such Romantic belief in 
music’s sentience remains beholden to the consolations of unity, familiarity and “truth” that 
the anthropomorphic mask provides, a mask that wears the two faces of thought and feeling. 
If, for Cobussen, the “secret of all music…is to make you believe that it possesses some 
sayable secret”, what greater secret is there than the secret of the self? I do not think the secret 
vanishes at all in the solitude and silence of thoughts that come after the moment of music, in 
an atmosphere removed from the immediacy of affective feeling. Thought is the home of 
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speaking and writing those mysteries that the friend of wisdom befriends. In listening to 
music, I cannot release my abiding attachment to the familiar, however suspect. And so I 
cannot abandon the feeling that music is my strangely beautiful and melancholy friend who 
speaks her sorrow “importantly”, however much Cobussen cautions against such belief: 
 
To pretend to conceal is to seduce discourse, to give rise to it and simultaneously lead it 
astray. This is, however, precisely a way of positing otherness, the otherness of music, of 
outwitting interpretative colonizations, and of keeping, preserved from meaning, the pleasure 
of listening ...writing can never be an entrance of meaning to music, an entry by way of the 
nameable; that door is blocked. The meaning of music lies in a keeping-at-a-distance of 
writing, reading, interpreting ...40 
 
What ordeal does Cobussen endure to transcend the belief in music’s human-ness? Is music 
no longer his friend? What spiritual ordeal emancipates him from the lure of the mirror? I see 
that I am not yet free. In my abiding attachment to the two familiar faces of knowing and 
feeling, my ordeal is less a triumphant conquering of the “false” mask of true being, and more 
the reluctant reckoning with an unyielding, restless duplicity. And so, rather than follow 
Deleuze further into his own overturning of Platonism, or pretend to affect the acuity that 
Cobussen possesses, I would stay with this reading of the hermit’s friend, and attempt to 
draw out what I suspect are the duplicitous, unruly and entirely uncanny processes of thought 
that awaken to war uneasily in the presence of music’s secret. In returning once more to 
Platonism then (as Deleuze himself urges),41 let us reroute Deleuze and Guattari’s question, 
“Who is the friend of humankind?” to ask, somewhat rhetorically, “Who is the friend of 
wisdom, if not music?”   
  
Plato: The Friend of Wisdom and the Mask of Apollo 
The Dream of Apollonian Shining 
In the Phaedrus (229e), Socrates speaks of the desire to know himself against his incapacity 
to possess such wisdom: “But for these things I have no leisure at all. The cause of it, my 
friend, is the following. I am not yet capable, in line with the Delphic inscription, to know 
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myself”.42 In reverence to the oracle of the Delphinian—Apollo—and through another 
esoteric message, Socrates believes the pursuit of wisdom to be peculiarly musical. As Pelosi 
writes, in the Phaedo (60d—61b), Socrates confesses that “throughout his life he had 
interpreted the oneiric warning: ‘practice and compose music’…as an invitation to practise 
the ‘greatest music’…that is philosophy.”43 Socrates’ faith in the omen (to guide the 
philosopher toward the true nature of his work) is something of a threshold upon which two 
luminous forces converge: the radiant, visionary nature of the dream, and the glorious 
authority of the sun god Apollo, who presides over the famous oracle at Delphi. Leader of the 
Muses, god of music, art and poetry, the artistic force of Apollo irrupts from nature itself, that 
is, the Sun; Apollo’s “eye must be sunlike, as befits his origin”.44 As the soothsayer god, 
Apollo is, for Nietzsche, “the ‘shining one,’ the deity of light” who “holds sway over the 
beautiful illusion of the inner fantasy world”, reigning over the world of dreams.45 As the 
divine province within which images shine,  the dream world’s glorious Schein is the 
clairvoyant realm of revelatory truth.46 “Here,” writes John Sallis, “the word Schein will need 
to be read in its full range of senses: shine, look, appearance, semblance, illusion.”47 For 
Schein to be, “it must show itself, must shine forth; only insofar as it shines so as to have a 
look can it then become…an appearance of something else that perhaps does not shine 
forth”.48 As the god of divination, healing and purification, and embodying the light of order, 
harmony, reason and moderation,49 Apollo is the friend of man’s endless desire for self-
knowledge, the friend of luminous revelation. In this sense, Socrates’ dream is the nocturnal, 
though equally luminous, double of the Delphic inscription, this other musical divination 
coming not in any journey by foot or in day-lit gazing with eyes wide open, but in the inner 
pilgrimage of his sleeping self, in the visitation of a shining image which guides Socrates 
back to the true nature of his quest for self-knowledge.  
  
Thus in The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche calls upon Apollo to align the abiding attachment 
both philosopher and artist share in their longing to live within the “beautiful illusion of the 
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dream worlds, in the creation of which every man is a consummate artist,” and where “all 
shapes speak to us”.50 This union of philosopher and artist is definitive for the gradual 
realisation of Nietzsche’s Platonic inversion. As Sallis writes so eloquently, in summoning 
Apollo, “Nietzsche would rescue Plato the artist from the Platonic fable of the true world, 
that is, from the history of metaphysics.”51 If Plato wears the mask of the shining god’s 
beauty, truth and artistry, it is most immediately evident through the poetic quality of his own 
dialogues. For Nietzsche, the Platonic dialogue is the province within which “Plato the 
thinker” borrows the voice of “Plato the poet” to speak his truth.52 Through a “mixture of all 
available styles and forms, hovering somewhere between narrative, lyric poetry and drama, 
between prose and poetry,” Plato drives poetry “into new and unknown channels”: for 
Nietzsche, this is “the lifeboat” which saves the “shipwrecked, older poetry and all its 
children,” becoming an “infinitely enhanced Aesopian fable”.53  
 
In rescuing the poet, Nietzsche is unsettling the identity of Plato himself. For the Apollonian 
mask possesses an uncanny quality that disturbs this vision of who the philosopher thinks 
himself to be in this image of the radiant dream-prophet: “The divine Plato…speaks 
ironically of the poet’s creative power, in so far as it is not a conscious insight, and places it 
on a par with the gift of the soothsayer and oneiromancer, since the poet is capable of writing 
only once he is unconscious and all reason has left him.”54 The uncanny nature of the 
thinker—as poetic prophet of the dream world, as idealistic dreamer by day and by night, 
living in semblance—is making itself felt. With a mortal Plato and divine Apollo crossing 
this threshold of a luminous Schein, Plato’s identity is splitting, doubling; he is becoming 
uncanny, becoming the hermit, for whom Schein’s luminous inner presence is this strangely 
beautiful guest of the night.  
 
Already, with this inner medium who communes with higher realities, we are closer to a 
conception of the uncanny nature of thought in the musical encounter. To more thoroughly 
prepare an understanding of music as this prophetic, shining image of truth, I would 
underscore Nietzsche’s pluralist meaning for a luminous Schein.55 Toward the care of the 
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soul, and against the suffering endemic to the body of time and life, both art (music) and 
dreams are like “sagacious” philosophy itself: performing the role of spiritual healer, they are 
mediums through which lovers of wisdom may commune with the object of their desire—
truth. “The higher truth,” writes Nietzsche,  
 
the perfection of those states in contrast to imperfectly comprehensible daily reality, the deep 
awareness of nature healing and helping in sleep and dreams, is at the same time the symbolic 
analogue of the soothsaying powers and of art in general, through which both life is made 
possible and worth living.56 
 
In the shining of dream images, in their outreach to the lover of the dream world, Nietzsche 
insists that all images are images of perfection, both the beautiful and the ugly, the joyous 
and the melancholy, the pleasurable and the painful, for as an illumination—as the strangely 
familiar semblance to reality—their speaking of truth is the message through which we 
interpret life and which enables the creation of the self by the self.57 In this sense, to shine is 
to speak, and so to give the dreamer, the lover of illusion, a measure of self-knowledge. In the 
Apollonian order of beautiful, shining dream images—and in their transfiguration as art and 
music—knowledge and vision are given as one, the ‘I’ and the ‘eye’ becoming synonymous 
with the pursuit and possession of wisdom.58 For Nietzsche, this pursuit is steeped in an ‘I’ 
that is as inescapable as the anthropomorphic ‘eye’ that comes to covet the realm of truth. As 
Richard Kurth writes, the Nietzschean reading of Apollonian wisdom conflates “this visual 
bias with an emphasis on the individual,”59 naming Apollo (after Schopenhauer) “the glorious 
divine image of the principium individuationis, from whose gestures and looks all the delight, 
wisdom and beauty of ‘illusion’ speak to us.”60 Nietzsche insists that such gazing into the 
beautiful perfection of Schein must be a gazing from a distance; one must preserve a certain 
reticence, without transgressing the boundary between such radiant semblance and its original 
model: rather than give oneself over to the affective force of semblance, one must remain 
present to the sensation of Schein’s “shimmering betrayal,” however ephemeral, to grasp both 
its concealment and revelation of truth.61 “[O]ur image of Apollo,” writes Nietzsche,  
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must incorporate the delicate line that the dream image may not overstep, without becoming 
pathological, in which case illusion would deceive us as solid reality; it needs that restraining 
boundary, that freedom from wilder impulses, that sagacious calm of the sculptor god.62 
 
In the careful measure of oneself, in becoming Apollonian, one must become something like 
Schopenhauer’s boatman, 63 who, secure in knowing himself, floats calmly, amidst the 
tempest of human suffering and excess that rages and howls all around him: 
 
Apollo, as an ethical deity, demands moderation from his followers and, in order to maintain 
it, self-knowledge. And thus the admonitions ‘Know thyself’ and ‘Nothing in excess!’ co-
exist with the aesthetic necessity of beauty…64 
 
For Nietzsche, this figure of restraint—who sees clearly, and stands calmly, and so preserves 
a serenity of self amidst and against the decadent world of illusory appearance—this is the 
artistic philosopher, the sleeper awake, the self-possessed thinker who creates his sage-like 
identity through Schein, who creates ideas and images of perfection to believe in. For Sallis, 
shining is the threshold upon which Apollo and Plato simultaneously meet and stand 
opposed, Nietzsche’s goal—to live in Schein, to create a philosophy that is an inverted 
Platonism—coming through this reading of Plato as Apolline artist: 
 
Insofar as perfection is accorded to the image rather than the original, the Apollinian inverts, 
in advance of Platonism, the order of origination that Platonism will bequeath to the history of 
metaphysics…Hence…“the further removed from true being, the purer, the more beautiful the 
better it is. Living in shine as goal”… . And yet, in opposing to the everyday a more perfect 
sphere that would be more representational rather than presentational, the Apollinian turns, in 
advance, in the same direction as Platonism. A certain solidarity remains even if what is 
opposed to the everyday is what is called idea. …what the Apollinian opposes to the everyday 
is the image, not the idea, and this opposition, this evaluation of the image-world over 
everyday actuality Nietzsche attributes to Plato the artist. Thus in a note from 1870–71: “That 
the world of representations is more real than actuality is a belief that Plato, as an artistic 
nature [als Kunstlernatur], set up theoretically.”…By stopping the turn short of the Platonic 
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order of origination, Nietzsche would rescue Plato the artist from the Platonic fable of the true 
world, that is, from the history of metaphysics.65  
 
Stilled by the principle of individuation, detached from his own wildness in knowing that 
wildness belongs to the dark dream of everyday imperfection, beholding shining semblance 
as the sign of true being, Plato becomes the divine artist of shining,66 thus becoming like 
Apollo himself, a friend of the eide, the idea.67 Gazing serenely down at the bodies of 
ordinary men, he sees them for the cave-prisoners they are.68  
 
Toward this conception of the philosopher-artist, perhaps we could also call him “Plato the 
composer,” for this notion—that the shining image reveals an essential idea—is of decisive 
importance to the Socratic image of a philosophy that is the ‘greatest’ music. It is to lead us 
back to Socrates’ dream, the dream where music shines, where it takes the shape of a 
beautiful shimmering illusion of the rational order of logos, the “hidden harmony of all 
things.”69 It is also to lead us back to the inseparable problem of anthropomorphism. In this, 
we are now closer to the question; who is the friend of wisdom, if not music? Though, 
necessarily, it gives rise to another: what consolation is the friend of music, if not the 
consolation of the mask of true being? Ultimately, if it is the consolation of an eternal truth 
that Plato seeks—an almighty, luminous justification to the endless longing for 
transcendental Being against the suffering, melancholy world of time—we might better 
revisit his metaphysics of music through a reading that emphasises the anthropomorphism 
endemic to Platonic thought, to ‘see’ more clearly what both Plato the dream-artist and the 
forces of music are rescued from. Amidst this reading, my overarching aim is to self-
reflexively grasp the ways in which I myself, in the musical encounter, create and submit to 
the beauty of the shining idea, where, through the friend of wisdom who wears the mask of 
Apollo, music becomes the semblance of an ‘I’ with an ‘eye’—the mirror image of a 
luminous, rational soul—satisfying, for a time, the impossibility to “know thyself” (to die, to 
transcend, to possess love’s object) in the time of life.  
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Plato and the Shining of Music 
In keeping with a “rigid” Platonic dualism,70 let us return to the foundational problem of 
essence and appearance, where there are two worlds that divide the soul from the body: one, 
the immortal realm of Perfect Forms, true being, and spiritual freedom (death, eternity and 
the rational soul); the other, the mortal world of incarceration, of semblance and illusion (life, 
time and the body). In both worlds, thought, as Idea, extends “beyond the individual… . 
God’s creation of the soul of the world is said to precede the creation of the body and to be in 
a constant process of thinking about the sensible and intelligible world.”71  
 
For Plato, philosophy is a preparation for the immortality of death through the practice of 
soul-body separation, its purpose to care for and cure the soul against the decadence and 
irrationality of the body of semblance, against melancholy suffering and an unthinkable 
finitude. “To be dead,” writes Dastur, “is precisely what the philosopher prescribes, and, as 
Plato says explicitly: ‘Those who pursue philosophy rightly are practicing how to die, and 
there is no one in the world who is less afraid of death’ (Phaedo, 67e).”72 To pursue 
philosophy “rightly” also means to open the rational soul to that which it responds most 
virtuously. If the practice of philosophy aspires to become the “greatest music,” it is because 
it is the purest music with which the highest part of the soul—the intellect, the nous—
authentically communes,73 ensuring, through its elevation beyond the temporal body of 
sorrow, the transcendence of thought into the “intemporality of the idea.”74 For the 
philosopher—the friend and lover of wisdom, who does not yet possess the wisdom to “know 
thyself”—a good, true and just music thus becomes the friend, consort and confessional with 
which he feels an intimate sense of belonging and longs to remain faithful. If the philosopher 
wears the mask of true being, is it not through this interlocutory “friendship” with a music 
whose solemn apothecary purpose is to heal the melancholy wounds of semblance? For if 
philosophy aspires to know the eternal realm of the unchanging Idea, and if to pursue 
philosophy “rightly” means to open the soul to that which it responds most positively, to 
make a friend of music means to make a friend of death itself, this very relation flowing 
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seamlessly back into a cosmology which is, unsurprisingly, as musical as it is 
anthropomorphic.  
 
The magnitude with which music invokes the Apollonian mask of true being—and so 
becomes Plato’s friend of eternity—is difficult to grasp without registering the profound 
influence of the Pythagorean belief in a perfectly ordered musical cosmos. In this sense, 
earthly human music is the audible mirror to the inaudible, celestial order of the harmony of 
the spheres.75 For the Pythagoreans, both music and cosmos possess a temporal body (in 
music, the materiality of sounding tones; in the cosmos, the physicality of planets, moons, 
suns, and stars) and an invisible, eternal numerical essence which maintains the harmonic 
order of these bodies. As Ronald Bogue writes, the Pythagoreans “found both musical and 
numerical consonance in the movement of the planets, which, they claimed, emitted a 
celestial music as each sphere followed its perfectly proportioned course.”76 In this way, the 
perceptible forms of music and cosmos meet on the Pythagorean threshold of a perfectly 
proportioned system, number being “the generative force of all geometrical and physical 
forms”.77  
 
In the Timaeus, the profound influence of these ideas is energised and crystallised through the 
force of anthropomorphic thought. For Plato, the being of the number—as the eternal, 
abstract Idea made by the Intellect of the Demiurge (the divine Craftsman)—creates and 
sustains the harmonious beauty of a cosmos that is essentially musical via this numerical 
threshold. Bogue writes:   
 
In the Timaeus, the connection between music, mathematics, and cosmology is elaborately 
developed, and the ontological status of the number, which remains uncertain in the 
Pythagoreans, is explicitly identified as ideal. In other dialogues, particularly the Republic, 
the concept of harmony is used to characterise psychological and social order, and philosophy 
itself is seen as a musical activity. As Edward Lippman observes, the entire Platonic 
enterprise may finally be conceived of as a form of music: “The musician creates harmony in 
the pitch and duration of tone and in gesture; man creates harmony in the conduct of his life; 
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the statesman creates harmony in society; the Demiurge creates harmony in the cosmos; the 
philosopher creates the harmony of dialectic and the music of discourse.”78 
 
Let us add however, that if “the entire Platonic enterprise may finally be conceived of as a 
form of music,” the ontological status of music as this numerical ideal unwittingly forgets the 
extent to which Plato’s abiding attachment to the familiar animates his speaking of all 
ontological secrets. More-so than Bogue, though omitting the connection to music, Donald 
Zeyl clearly captures the humanising essence of Platonic thought, writing that the Idea of the 
cosmic order comes into being through the “deliberate intent of Intellect (nous), 
anthropomorphically represented by the figure of the Craftsman,” creating “the model for 
rational souls to understand and to emulate. Such understanding and emulation restores those 
souls to their original state of excellence, a state that was lost in their embodiment.”79 
Platonism then, with its much-critiqued religious overtones, is a project of mimetic doubling 
and a practice of resurrection, for the reclamation of a prior, original and unchanging truth to 
the rational soul of the self.  Platonism is a requiem for the perfect Idea—the perfect 
thought—that sustains all of nature, including the centre of the self and this humanised 
cosmology: thought as a virtuous, pure music, Platonism is the retrieval of a great 
monumental Being, wrested from the shabby little dirge of “life” and thrust into the boughs 
of eternity’s euphoric symphony of harmonia.80  
  
Across Plato’s creationist-harmonic order of musicians, mortals, gods and thinkers, is there 
not, again, some deep confusion on the philosopher’s part regarding his presumed superiority 
to ordinary men: as the philosopher, he thinks himself quite unlike other political, rational 
animals; as The Thinker he distinguishes clearly between the semblance of the temporal 
world and the true being of eternity. Knowingly, reluctantly, the illuminated philosopher 
must continually descend into “the darkness where most people live” to participate in the 
politics of the world of appearances (semblance), the return “necessitated by the thinker’s 
inability to make his permanent home in the realm of the eternal, and to stay for any length of 
time in the light.”81 Dastur writes, 
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[T]here is no discourse about the true being of things, no ontology, except that which sets out 
from the situation of imprisonment within appearances. It is by becoming conscious of the 
limitations of his condition that the thinker is opened up to the unlimited, and is therefore able 
to see shadow as shadow without any longer confusing it with what true reality is. …This 
‘double bind’, this double constraint of human thinking, at the same time transcendence of 
finitude and imprisonment in it, is what is expressed in various ways from one end of 
philosophy to the other, giving its own style to the philosophical statement which, arising 
neither out of scientific positivity nor out of poetic vision, simply gives voice to the tension 
that opposes and divides at one and the same time the finite and the infinite, the mortal and 
the immortal, and remains as such inseparable from the existential attestation of the person by 
whom it is formulated.82 
 
While Dastur captures the thinker’s plight impeccably here, the problems of both music and 
anthropomorphism remain unspoken. Consequently, the idea that the philosopher may not be 
quite so different from those lesser mortals he distinguishes himself from is less apparent. If, 
for Plato, music is philosophy’s aspiration, and if music and philosophy are made to wear the 
mask of true being, these things must have a bearing on what may well be the uncanny nature 
of the philosopher: as someone who bears witness to the simultaneity of existential 
incarceration and freedom (and who longs for its transcendent resolution), and as someone 
who seeks above all to know himself through the shining of Schein, he is also the music-
loving hermit whose inner friend constantly communes with the eide of the cosmos. To hear 
music speak the secret harmony of all things is to hear the secret soul of all things speak, to 
hear the divine Craftsman himself speak, for whoever “creates” wisdom knows wisdom. The 
mournful depths of the abyss become silent in the leap to love.  
 
Are these not the secrets Plato chooses for the mystery of music, with the secret of his own 
soul calling back to him from its great Apollonian height?  Is music not the shining image of 
the one perfect truth he seeks? A shining image of truth because, in the dream of music, what 
is revealed to Plato the artist, through his own love for the familiar—the human, the idea—is 
the true being of the cosmos. The evidence of this is all around him: in the human body that is 
the image of the human soul, in time that is “the moving image of eternity”,83 in the body of 
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earthly sounding music that is the temporal image of an immobile music of eternity… In 
these principle configurations of semblance and true being, in the endless desire to know, 
Plato’s abiding attachment to the familiar drives out the strangeness of music for the most 
utopian of self-portraits: what greater purpose for music than this unveiling of the divine 
within? Everything returns to the anthropological longing to know one’s own soul, 
everything turns on the desire for immortality, for in immortality, one keeps the inner friends 
one creates in life. And although the thinker desires the freedom of immortality, he does not 
desire to be free alone, he is still the creator of inner presences who speak to non-human 
things, he is still a plurality whose interior interlocutions lock out the oblivion of complete 
solitude. Never outside or beyond the self, music is always within him. As the soul of the 
universe and so philosophy’s aspiration, as the friend for thought, as the maker of the mask of 
true being, and in reciprocally wearing this mask of eternity, music is saturated in its human 
identity, especially in the creation of “God” as Nous,84 bringing the philosopher into the 
revelatory space within which, for a time, he transcends the life of the body and ascends to 
the realm of self-knowledge. In the mirror of music, the philosopher knows himself. For a 
time, he dies.   
 
The Ancient Wisdom of Absurdity 
It is here, within this image of the lover of wisdom who follows Apollo’s muse, that 
Nietzsche restores the prolific anthropomorphism endemic to Plato’s ancestry. The ancient 
Greek world is a tragic culture,85 a culture which believes in the necessity of metamorphic 
gods created in man’s own image, and created in response to the peculiarly human wisdom 
that compels the desire for immortality. For the ancients, Homer’s epic universe performs a 
rather different kind of apothecary role than the one of singular truth that Plato will later 
create through the very same dream-inspired images. As Dastur writes, it is in the mourning 
play of Greek Tragedy (“one of the first representations of the fundamentally mortal 
condition of humanity”), that Nietzsche finds 
 
the combination of a consciousness of the horror of a human life destined for death and the 
dream of an Olympian world inhabited by gods. …it is the Greek who is most alert to the 
absurdity of existence…None of the cruelties of nature escape his notice. The Greek finds 
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consolation neither in the idea of a posthumous world nor in the radiant face of the gods. He 
finds it solely in the lie of art which alone succeeds in saving him, since ‘the creation of the 
poet is nothing other than this shining image which nature offers us as a cure after we have 
looked into the abyss’. The truth is that it is human wisdom—in other words, knowledge of 
one’s own mortality—that constitutes this monstrosity which goes against the course of 
nature in plumbing its secret…What goes against nature in human existence is precisely that 
it is not a life that is absolutely alive, but a life that includes in itself a relationship with the 
world of the dead.86 
 
Knowing his true nature, knowing the finitude of death, the ancient Hellene overcomes the 
absurdity of his life through Homer’s epic tales of immortality and metamorphosis, the poetic 
preservation of the gods’ creation the necessary shining through which life’s absurd theatre 
might glower back ruefully, ironically, satirically. Such existential absurdity is precisely what 
the anthropomorphic impulse rages against, what the dream world evacuates, and what Plato 
himself negates in the creation of the Demiurge. In rescuing “Plato the artist”, for whom the 
oracles of Apollo remain a guiding light, Nietzsche is in fact summoning the great 
Apollonian paradox of Platonic thought. Most certainly, “Apollo is the divine incarnation of 
the principle of individuation”,87 who 
 
overcomes the suffering of the individual by means of the luminescent glorification of the 
eternity of the phenomenon; beauty triumphs over the suffering inherent in life; pain is, in a 
certain sense, deluded away from amongst the features of nature.88  
 
Absolutely, this removal from nature’s ordeal through the dream of glorious eternity is 
nothing if not the Platonic consolation. Yet in miming the shining one who is the friend of the 
Demiurge, in favouring the Being of one Creator over the mortal creation of many gods, in 
projecting the essence of a perfect human reason into the musical cosmos, Plato fails to grasp 
the truly ironic nature of his own self-created plurality which, for Nietzsche, is the true nature 
of the solitude-seeking hermit. For flagrantly opposing this overcoming of suffering is the 
ancients’ heroic will to live, the resolutely Apollonian will to remain with the living, to 
endure the ordeal of suffering that Platonism necessarily transcends. “The same impulse,” 
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writes Nietzsche, “that calls art into existence, the complement and apotheosis of existence, 
also created the Olympian world with which the Hellenic ‘will’ held up a transfiguring mirror 
to itself:  
 
Thus the gods provide a justification for the life of man by living it themselves. …It is not 
unworthy of the greatest of all heroes to long for a continuation of life, even as a day labourer. 
The ‘will’, at the Apolline stage, longs so impetuously for life, and Homeric man feels so at 
one with it that even lamentation becomes his song of praise.89  
 
Derailing the Socratic image of a philosopher who desires the soul-body separation of death, 
Apollo’s paradoxical purpose further disturbs a consistent interpretation of the superior 
Platonic aspiration for ideality. With Apollo presiding over this heroic longing for life, the 
status of philosopher, artist and labourer (the ordinary human who lives in the shadows of 
semblance) is levelled. Surely Apollo only exists to show Plato what he himself is; a lover 
and sufferer of life, nature and time, a lover and sufferer of the self and of music, who thus 
wills the idea of eternity so as to continue to live amongst these things, in their utter 
perfection, beyond the bounds of finitude.  
 
The Mask of Apollo: My Shining Friend 
Is this the voice of my own inner Plato, groping madly through dreams of Apollonian images 
to thwart the very real possibility that music itself is somehow meaningless? In believing 
music to possess some “sayable secret” do I not also appeal to a mask that authorises the 
enlightening Idea, that affirms music as familiar and so imminently thinkable, knowable, 
nameable? Consoled by my friend, and sensing the deep mystery of music spoken only to 
me, am I not, in fact, summoning this radiant stranger within, this idealist, whose will I 
forever fail to notice? In losing myself in the poetic “truth” of music, in feeling entirely and 
ecstatically at one with this divine “something”, do I not also—however absurdly—forget the 
well-founded suspicions of my atheistic instincts?  
 
However great I thought the distance between the mutilating forces of essentialism and my 
own ambivalence, I see how it is that I commit this very same gesture toward music’s 
mystery. In loving the feeling of sadness that music doubles, I thought music was privately, 
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lovingly speaking the secret of sadness. I thought music my melancholy friend, yet the friend 
of music—the inner presence who gives music this voice through which to speak, and who 
reciprocally gives me a thought to speak—has conspired against me to conjure this mask of 
“true being.”…“Who is the friend of wisdom, if not music”? Music, big with secrets, mocks 
my desire. Thought leaps to its lover. 
 
Recalling Jankélévitch, however, music does not speak or think or know; these are 
nonsensical claims that he has already demolished with devastating precision. I have 
forgotten the truth of ineffable truth. I meant to preserve the mystery of music, not covet the 
familiar to the degree that all otherness, illusion, and strangeness is annihilated. I need to 
pierce the mask of true being, the mask who sees only the beauty of the idea and the 
permanence of thought. For thought is the problem: in groping through the threshold of 
Schein that simultaneously unites and ruptures the figures of Plato and Apollo, in attempting 
to grasp the sheer multivalence that characterises thought, I realize that in the moment of the 
musical encounter, I am a strange version of Cobussen’s nomad after-all, rapturous rather 
than ruptured, wandering between purely imaginary delusions and rationalised beliefs. 
Between the poetic Apollonian dream image which consumes Platonic logic, and the Platonic 
Idea of Eternity reciprocally inspired by the shining of Apollo, music is drowning in the 
consolations of a philosophy that relentlessly secures the familiarity of anthropomorphic 
thought. The mystery which hinges on the knife edge of a great ineffable truth and the 
absurdity of existence resolves through thought’s cunning to see only itself.   
 
Thought is in need of an intervention. For in loving music’s mystery, surely I seek the 
strangeness of music, for in strangeness is all the otherness, appearance, and semblance that 
opposes thought’s unchecked arrogance. And what is more strange and unsettling to Plato-
the-thinker than this other kind of semblance that opposes true being—the artistic force of 
nature, the corrosive time of life, the otherness of the ecstatic, intoxicated body, the 
incomparable realm of feeling that music awakens, but further, the idea of death without the 
consolation of eternal light; the dark death of a corpse whose home is deep inside the earth 
rather than above in the heavens? For I do not want Nietzsche to think me a “despiser of the 
body”,90 however much a thinking of music compels me to make of my body a stranger. And 
here it is that I make a second blunder in my continuing confusion between affective forces 
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and essential meanings. I say to myself, thinking I am outfoxing thought itself, thinking I am 
overcoming myself, “If music does not think or speak, does it not then feel?” 
 
Nietzsche: The Friend of Feeling and the Mask of Dionysus 
In and of itself, music is not so full of meaning for our inner life, so profoundly moving, that 
it can claim to be a direct language of emotion. Rather, it is its ancient connection to poetry 
that has invested rhythmic movement, loudness and softness of tone, with so much symbolism 
that we now believe music is speaking directly to the inner life and that it comes out of it. 
…No music is in itself deep and full of meaning. It does not speak of the “will” or the “thing 
in itself.” Only in an age that had conquered the entire sphere of inner life for musical 
symbolism could the intellect entertain this idea. The intellect itself has projected this 
meaning into sound…  
—Friedrich Nietzsche91 
  
If Plato is sick with longing to return to the realm of perfection, and if it is the great music of 
philosophy that makes such belonging more familiar, what is it that Nietzsche desires within 
the world of philosophy and music?  Surely to be a stranger to the Platonic definition of 
wisdom and a friend to the kinds of music Socratically despised, to rival the thinkable idea 
with the body’s affective feeling, to be both the artist and the work of art92 rather than the 
thinker Plato prefers, and most forcefully, to violently unveil the uncanny nature of creation, 
that which lies beneath the shroud of the radiant divine? 
 
If Plato is practicing how to die, Nietzsche is practicing how to live.  
 
If Plato calls for the ascetic care and liberation of the immortal soul through an austere 
musical philosophy, Nietzsche petitions the urgent reawakening and excitation of a mortal 
spiritual body through a music that symbolically expresses, to a supreme degree of intensity, 
the entire flux of feeling that is this mortal coil of life’s suffering,93 thus giving something 
altogether new to philosophy—the potency, legitimacy and critical potentiality for a more 
original and archaic sense of living in semblance. Toward the utter strangeness of semblance 
in all its Dionysian intensity, Nietzsche longs for philosophy to love the body through the 
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death of thought, and to know the absurd truth to life through a music that celebrates and 
compels a return to the artistic forces of the earth.  
 
Dionysus, the River of Lethe and the Myth of Er 
That I might be revealed on earth for what I am:  
A god.  
—Euripides, The Bacchae94 
  
Dionysus…god of “wine and intoxication, of ritual madness and ecstatic liberation from 
everyday identity…god of the theatre and impersonation, the theatrical mask being the 
symbol of this transformation of identity.”95 To soothe sadness, to exile thought, to become 
someone other than the self one “knows”….The Dionysian offering of wine “banishes the 
sufferings of wretched mortals,” writes Euripides, “and brings forgetfulness of each day’s 
troubles in sleep. There is no other cure for sorrow…”96 Haunted by the world’s willing, 
striving, suffering and dying, archaic man feels the truth of his life too intensely. He is sick 
with wisdom. He longs to forget. He creates gods to forget, but, most especially, creates one 
god in particular within which the grave burden of humanity is shouldered, sheltered and 
darkly doubled. Not unlike Plato’s practice of soul-body separation, the rite of self-forgetting 
and erasure rehearses a more final forgetting, the masks, mimes, and doublings of Dionysus 
flouting such finality beneath the veil of rebirth and reinvention. 
 
As in life, so too in death, archaic man drinks to forget, to sleep, and to awaken into a new 
life. To return to the living, to play out life’s pantomime in the costume of a new body, the 
souls of the dead must drink from the waters of Lethe, the River of Oblivion, one of the five 
rivers that run through the Underworld.97 Upon drinking, the soul sleeps: upon awakening, it 
lives the destiny written into its new body. In The Republic, the river of Lethe is central to 
Plato’s Myth of Er,98 where the proof of immortality, afterlife, and the soul’s endlessly 
forgotten eternal return to life is inscribed through a figure who is forbidden to forget, and 
who is nothing if not a (pre-)Christomorphic emblem for the disciples of a pre-Christian 
philosophy. Er, a soldier, dies in battle, his body placed upon the funeral pyre, his soul 
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leaving his corpse to cross-over into Hades. There, Er is chosen by the Judges of souls to be 
“a messenger to men about the other world.”99 He is forbidden to choose his new life in the 
way that other souls, both human and creaturely, both just and unjust, are invited to choose a 
body. Denied such metamorphosis, Er is also forbidden to drink the soporific waters of “the 
Forgetful River,”100 so that, memory preserved, he might return to his undecomposed body, 
and reveal to mortal men the secret of the afterlife. Er describes the judicial orders of reward 
and retribution in the afterworld; its glorious, heavenly realm for the good souls, and its 
punishing earthly chasm for the perpetrators of evil. For Socrates, Er’s message is one of 
hope for the lovers of wisdom, a message that confirms both the immortality of the soul, and 
the intimate communion between morality, abstinence and wisdom: “And so…[Er’s] tale was 
preserved from perishing, and, if we remember it, may well preserve us in turn. And we shall 
cross the river of Lethe safely and shall not defile our souls.”101 As Sallis insists, Plato’s 
account of Er’s crossing—this resurrection of a man who bears witness to memory’s endless 
emptying out through the intoxications of Lethe—could not have eluded Nietzsche,102 for 
whom self-forgetting marks the nature of the Dionysian ordeal, becoming the means with 
which to celebrate a Schein that is more “organic” than Apollonian shining, and more 
conscionable than Er’s monotheistic allusions.  
 
The link between Dionysus and Lethe is in no way tenuous when thought through the 
ancients’ common belief that the god of wine, nature and masks also doubles the god of the 
Underworld: “But Hades is the same as Dionysos,” writes Heraclitus, “for whom they rave 
and act like bacchantes.”103 For Nietzsche, this uncanny doubling of Dionysus and Hades, 
their strange complicity as one and the same god, helps confirm nature’s own creative, 
destructive, and regenerative life-force, overwhelming Plato’s luminous, celestial afterworld, 
and rivalling the figure of Christ himself: 
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Dionysus versus the “Crucified”…The god on the cross is a curse on life, a signpost to seek 
redemption from life; Dionysus cut to pieces is a promise of life: it will be eternally reborn 
and return again from destruction.104 
 
We are returning to Nietzsche’s appeal for living in Schein, within which music is central, 
and where a philosophy of the future must not only challenge and overcome Platonic 
idealism, but overcome the annihilating forces of its formidable offspring Christianity, the 
“Platonism for ‘the people’.”105 As Deleuze writes of Nietzsche’s philosophy in general, it is 
an appeal for pluralism, rather than monism: 
 
Pluralism is the properly philosophical way of thinking, the one invented by philosophy; the 
only guarantor of freedom in the concrete spirit, the only principle of a violent atheism. The 
Gods are dead, but they have died from laughing, on hearing one God claim to be the only 
one, “Is not precisely this godliness, that there are gods but no God?”106 
 
For Nietzsche, so taken with the force of Dionysus, this is the god who embodies (rather than 
illuminates) Schein, who cleaves open the wounds of existential pain, and whose shadowy 
strangeness is the more genuine consolation than the ascetic light of familiarity so dear to 
Platonism and Christianity. Necessarily, the tomes and societies of utopian transcendentalism 
remain antithetical to a spirit who embodies the strangeness of uncanny doubling, and who 
affirms the willing for the “eternal return” to the suffering world of semblance. As Royle 
writes, “What is ‘uncanny’ is what does not ‘seem to come in God’s name’. ”107 This is also 
the god whose spirit in music gifts the river of Lethe to the living through music, 
anaesthetising the horrors of absurdity and satisfying the “ardent longing for illusion”108 
through music’s own spiritual crossing from life to death and back again.  
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The Night Spirit of Music: Love’s Body  
Night has come; only now all the songs of lovers awaken. And my soul too is the song of a 
lover. 
—Friedrich Nietzsche109 
 
That Lethe’s destruction of memory is both a blessing (anaesthetizing the truth of life’s 
suffering) and a curse (erasing the memory of a glorious afterlife), is also testimony to the 
Dionysian spirit, who expresses humanity’s dual cruel and gentle nature, the willing of both 
life and death.110 This is the lesson of Euripides’ homage to Dionysus in The Bacchae, where 
the debaucheries of bacchanal fanatics reveal humanity’s grotesque duplicity: lost to bestial 
carnality, compelled to follow love’s desire, acquiescent to the killing instinct, though gentle 
in its creaturely love, the human condition is this ceaseless reckoning with the will, this 
compulsion to drink madly from the vial of life even as it dismembers and destroys this same 
life. As Sallis writes, the doubling of Dionysus is “the return of the repressed in all its 
power”.111 Thus for Nietzsche, it is this Dionysian spirit—this joyous, rebellious, ruthless, 
ecstatic, tragic spirit—that pervades the living, and it is through its symbolic expression as 
music that the radiant veil of Apollo falls away to reveal the uncanny force—“the spirit of 
music”—that lies darkly beneath it. Recall Deleuze and Guattari: “Music is never tragic, 
music is joy. But there are times it necessarily gives us a taste for death… Music has a thirst 
for…destruction, extinction, breakage, dislocation.”112 Figuratively, poetically, existentially, 
Dionysus is the night spirit who awakens the dead within, to trouble the light of reason. 
 
Recalling the Wagnerian-Schopenhauerian grounding of The Birth of Tragedy (where music 
copies an eternally striving will that precedes reason),113 Nietzsche’s return to pre-Socratic 
mythology lends music’s mystery all the more to the problem of language that permeates the 
uncanny. Ever beyond the logocentric order of saying through its mirroring of the poetic 
enigmas of the inner self, the force which compels life communes with the strangely familiar 
forces of music on this threshold of the inexpressible.114 Through music’s hypnotic rhythms, 
the emotional power of tone, the “unified flow of melody and the utterly incomparable world 
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of harmony” comes, for Nietzsche, the glorification of Dionysian suffering and ecstasy, 
where all of (human) nature’s feeling—love, hope, desire, sorrow, vengeance, futility, 
anguish, regret—is symbolically expressed, and uncannily felt.115 In music’s doubling of 
feeling, the rational self is forgotten. With the annihilation of the principium individuationis, 
comes the ecstatic return to primal Oneness. In the restoration to the artistic (creative) forces 
of living, breathing Mother Nature herself, comes a more original, exhilarating, and utterly 
mortuary kind of familiarity and belonging. Only in the mirrors of music, in the symbolic 
expression of the entire life of feeling—the uninhibited, unveiled presence of the body, the 
emotional soul, the heart, which is the will of Nature herself—can the tragic ordeal of 
absurdity be ecstatically overcome: 
 
Only from the spirit of music can we understand delight in the destruction of the individual. 
For only in single instances of such destruction can we clearly see the eternal phenomena of 
Dionysiac art, which expresses the will in its omnipotence, behind the principium 
individuationis, the eternal life that lies beyond the phenomenal world, regardless of all 
destruction.116  
 
This dark stranger within the self, incarnate as “the musical symbol of the will,” is, for 
Deleuze, the affirmation of life, “the affirmative and affirming god”, who asserts “the pains of 
growth rather than reproducing the sufferings of individuation. He is the god who affirms life, 
for whom life must be affirmed, but not justified or redeemed” in the way that the figure of 
Christ provides transcendental justification and redemption.117  Surely, the death of God 
which later compels Nietzsche’s Zarathustra—whom Nietzsche later names “the Dionysiac 
monster”118—is already inscribed in The Birth of Tragedy, however much Nietzsche believes 
that this first work “remains silent about Christianity, it has not identified Christianity.”119 For 
even in this first opposition of an earthly Dionysus and a heavenly Apollo, the younger 
Nietzsche is calling for a belief in music’s reckoning to the inevitable truth of life, demanding 
of philosophy a faith in music’s power to overcome the individual will’s great nemesis death, 
death now understood through the pall of time’s mortality, through the absence of 
otherworldly transcendence, and as a going deep down within an earth that itself wills life 
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into being.120 As the musical spirit of earth’s body—as willing’s uncanny, sonorous double—
the music of Dionysus is, like Apollo’s shining dream image, a necessary illusion: rather than 
opening the self to the stasis of contemplation, and  to an impossible idealism, Dionysian 
music returns humanity to the urgent flux—the “rich and triumphant existence”121—from 
which it comes.  
 
For Nietzsche, it is the medium of the Dionysiac musician that gifts the ancients this wisdom, 
providing solace and healing through “the gospel of world harmony,” and rescuing the 
Hellene from himself.122 “The satyr, the Dionysiac chorist” of Attic tragedy, writes Nietzsche, 
“lives in a world granted existence under the religious sanction of myth and ritual. That 
tragedy begins with him, that the Dionysiac wisdom speaks through him,” provides a great 
“consolation to the Hellene…whose piercing gaze has seen to the core of the terrible 
destruction of world history and nature’s cruelty,”123 and who bears witness to the absurd 
truth to life: in death, there is no divine realm, no afterlife, no beyond. Armed with such truth, 
the melancholy Dionysian is not unlike Hamlet: 
 
[B]oth have truly seen to the essence of things, they have understood, and action repels them; 
for their action can change nothing in the eternal essence of things, they consider it ludicrous 
or shameful that they should be expected to restore order to the chaotic world. Understanding 
kills action, action depends on a veil of illusion—this is what Hamlet teaches us…longing 
passes over the world towards death, beyond the gods themselves… .‘Beyond’, is denied. 
Aware of truth from a single glimpse of it, all man can now see is the horror and absurdity of 
existence… . Here, in this supreme menace to the will, there approaches a redeeming, healing 
enchantress—art. She alone can turn these thoughts of repulsion at the horror and absurdity of 
existence into ideas compatible with life: these are the sublime—the taming of horror through 
art; and comedy—the artistic release from the repellence of the absurd.124 
 
Here lies the apothecary purpose of the ancient choral satyr—the one who wears the mask of 
Dionysian transformation, who performs the dark, magical mirage of tragic music, who 
becomes the darker double of melancholy man against the lie of a culture madly in love with 
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the false medicine of utopian dreams.125 Against such elitist imposture Nietzsche reclaims the 
satyr as 
 
the archetype of man, the expression of his highest and most intense emotions, an inspired 
reveller enraptured by the closeness of his god, a sympathetic companion in whom god’s 
suffering is repeated, the harbinger of wisdom from the very breast of nature…something 
divine and sublime; he must have seemed particularly so to the painfully broken gaze of 
Dionysiac man…the audience of the Attic tragedy discovered itself in the chorus of the 
orchestra…126 
 
Thus, as the friend of Dionysus who doubles the dual nature of mankind, the satyr is equally 
the friend of life and death, and so the friend of the earth: these are the masks that music now 
wears, with the music-lover lost in the crowd of belonging that this semblance of Oneness 
unites. In music’s uncanny doubling of a more primal soul, Dionysiac man communes with 
death, comes closer to knowing the feeling of death without dying, and without condemning 
himself either to the illusions of a higher redemption or to the finality of absolute self-
destruction. In taking the uncanny to its limit, perhaps it is also possible to think that in these 
consolations of ecstatic communion, Dionysian man realizes himself as uncanny: he realizes 
his utter nostalgia for the essence of himself, his inviolable homesickness to “return to an 
inorganic state,” 127 to die, to become absorbed into the greater unifying forces of the earth, 
but to miraculously resurrect himself through the ecstasy that such proximity to death brings:  
in surrendering to the unification of music, in becoming the friend of Dionysus through 
music’s closeness to Dionysian earth, one is absolved to die over and again, to drink from 
music’s Lethe, and to—tragically and ecstatically—eternally return.  
 
Conclusion: A Weeping Song, the Belonging of Death, a Friend for the Spectre 
Beyond the utopian transcendentalism of Platonism, is this other kind of death—this drinking 
of a musical Lethe for the Dionysian forgetting of the self—a more authentic rendering of my 
own longing to know music’s secret? For surely music’s strange familiarity is bound within 
this more primal artistic willing which precedes and persuades the thought that Plato esteems. 
Far better to resurrect this ancient human wisdom, and be the friend of a music of the earth, 
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than to be the wide-eyed follower of this high philosopher who needs a music of the spheres 
and despises the body of life. …better to befriend this Dionysian Zarathustra—who lets me 
live my death through music recurringly, and who, through my own willing, celebrates the 
melancholy joy of earthly belonging and metamorphosis—than the false friend of a Socratic 
recluse who thinks me too low to be a friend of the eide.  
 
As death’s companion, the consolation of music has the epic reach of one particular 
anthropological rite to support it. In all its strangeness, otherness, and semblance of feeling, 
music remains the natural claimant to the rites of the funeral, laying the body to rest, 
returning the corpse to the earth, sending the body down below. Not so that it replaces feeling 
where now there is none, but so as to be the friend of death in a different sense, to bear 
witness to the ordeal of crossing, to restore to the living the poignancy and authority of 
feeling, and to console our proximity to death with the force that most closely mirrors it. As 
the spirit of Dionysus, as the friend of the spectre, all music is, in some sense, a euphoric 
weeping song, a departure and a return, a requiem for the undead, haunted as it is by both the 
memory and forgetting of feeling. And in just the same sense, music remains the natural 
claimant for the life of feeling through the rites of the dance, of every kind of dance, bound as 
it is to the decomposing nature of time’s body, the body who, like music, affirms this more 
organic form of eternity and who goes beyond the categories of good and evil.128  
 
Is there no stranger secret for music than this?   
 
Music—whose doubling of life and death incarnates the immediacy of feeling rather than a 
purely contemplative knowing or speaking, whose world is of the order of mythos rather than 
logos—must accordingly be my body’s lover rather than my “platonic” friend of rational 
thought. The charm of music’s doubling creates strange crossings. But then, through this 
bizarre series of identity crises, through my ensemble of inner others, it becomes a vanishing 
as well as a crossing. Seduced by the music of Lethe, drunk on the mystery of the ineffable, I 
forget Nietzsche’s distinctions.  I lose the boundary between mimesis and metamorphosis, 
between this world and the kingdom of shadows, between real feeling and feeling’s echo, 
between the ontological and the affective. A crossing from shore to shore does not exist. 
There are no longer shores upon which to stand and be still. There is no longer a difference 
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between the world of appearance and its musical illusion as the “symbolic expression” of the 
will: the “illusion of illusion” becomes the true being of feeling.129 In the annihilation of the 
suffering of individuation, in the moment of experience, I believe music and feeling to be one 
and the same thing. In this unmediated, ineffable communion, music lives and dies, it 
becomes organic, biological: more than merely an echo of feeling, it is feeling itself, more 
than a mirror to the self, it is sentience itself. It is a beautiful and necessary lie, this music that 
allows me to live in Schein. In love with its secret, and no good at deception, I am caught 
between the desire to reveal the musical mystery and the cardinal rule of friendship—to keep 
the secret hidden, the secret which music speaks to me alone and is for me alone to feel.  
 
If, for Nietzsche’s ancient man, wisdom is the unadorned awareness of an absurd life, and if 
music’s illusions compel the forgetting of this truth, am I more like this ancient Hellene who 
loves and shudders, rather than the hermit who thinks and speaks (of God) much too much? If 
it is a case of choosing between the ascetic ideal and the artistic will, I choose the mask 
which elevates the lie of art to its “highest affirmative power”: in choosing for myself an 
artistic will, so too do I choose for music an artistic will.130 Thus here again, is the ironic 
anthropomorphic impulse that compels thought’s leap. Though the object of my love 
changes, the desire to overcome absurdity and claim immortality remains the same. I still 
long to see myself in the musical mirror. In the canny exchange of thought for feeling, I am 
still the hermit who remains faithful to the privileged idea, trading one name for another, 
renouncing one kind of human essence for another. In abandoning Plato’s Ideal cosmic 
belonging for an earthly primal Oneness, in the nostalgia for unity, the meaning of music is 
still buried within the order of the familiar. And while it may be enough to name the familiar 
as human, what human looks into a mirror without seeking, narcissistically, to ‘know 
thyself’—as body, mind and/or soul—amidst the strangeness of semblance? Such is the 
absurdity of my shedding one mask for another, for in exchanging thought for feeling I am no 
closer to the truth of music’s mystery. In either instance, Jankélévitch’s “ineffable truth” is 
being fraternised, socialised, and unified. In destroying music’s freedom, have I not simply 
borrowed a more controversial title through this more controversial Dionysian religion? The 
humanisation of music is, in the end, the death of love’s object, the death of mystery. I am 
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still the hermit whose mask of true being refuses to be quiet, even as it attempts to silence 
itself in becoming the mask of semblance. 
 
This is the narcissistic length with which anthropomorphic thought will go. This is the work 
of desire as it leads thought astray, as it sidles in to appropriate, overthrow, and undermine 
the unsayable with saying, as it suffocates the musical mystery with a claustrophobic costume 
that is unrelentingly human. This is the lament devised by my friend with two faces, my 
friend who cannot help but leap to knowing to save me and my others from the abyss of 
unknowing and un-belonging through the masks that remain human. I am the hermit who 
thinks myself a seer of the pantomime of life, yet who is nonetheless addicted to the 
pantomime. I play the narcissistic role of rescuer, redeemer and justifier. I save music from 
the oblivion of incertitude. In artistically willing music’s sentience into being, I rescue 
myself. “Death is big,” writes Rilke,  
 
We belong to it, 
With laughing mouth,  
When we believe ourselves to be in the depths of life,  
It ventures to shed tears 
Deep in us.131 
 
As with death, so too with music; it belongs to us as we belong to it. Or rather, music, like 
life and feeling, belongs to death. And like the spectre in film, music belongs to a death that 
refuses to remain dead. Like the spectre in film, music bears witness to the incertitude of 
existential crossing. Like the spectre in film, music’s uncanny doubling wanders between life 
and death, thought and feeling, the light and the dark. Like the spectre in film, music moves 
between time and eternity. Like death, the meaning of music can never be known; it is 
unthinkable.132 If, as Dastur wonders, death and godliness meet on this threshold of the 
unknowable, music (like the spectre in film) may also be thought as 
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an unthinkable and uncircumscribable ‘object’ over which no mastery is ever possible and 
whose all-powerfulness over us resembles that of a unique god. …knowledge of death is 
absolutely certain knowledge…because it exposes us to the immeasurability of something we 
can never experience. This absolute magnitude of the dimension of the divine borrows 
everything from the absolute magnitude and total impenetrability of death.133 
 
Thus, like death, music keeps its friends close and its secrets closer. Together, music and the 
cinematic spectre join with “divinity and death” as “essentially inseparable.”134 Only in this 
sense—in this realization of the necessity of these existential doublings, and the absurdity of 
a life without music (that is, without the consolation of death’s artistic ‘godliness’)—might 
this process enable an ironic glimpse at the serious self, if for no other reason than to ruefully 
reconcile the impulse to illuminate the secret meaning of musical mystery, to make a friend 
for the self and the spectre, to humanise music to this grave extent, and in so doing, annihilate 
the horrors of eternal solitude.  
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Chapter Three: Rethinking Music’s Utopian Desire through the 
Cinematic Body of Light 
 
Between Heaven and Earth: A Spiritual Nowhere 
 
Utopia is essential for the creative moment. Without it the present is unthinkable, unliveable, 
creatively undoable. …Utopia enables us to live. Not perversity. Not cynicism.  
            —Henri Cartier-Bresson1 
 
Unity, truth and goodness are the same thing, and above them there is nothing. 
         —Marsilio Ficino2  
 
I am—man is—a calling into question of what we are, of individual being where it is—a 
limitless calling into question, or being, insofar as it becomes self-questioning. 
—Georges Bataille3  
 
“How,” asks Cobussen, “after ‘the Death of God,’ to give the still valuable concept of 
spirituality a meaningful interpretation…”.4 More precisely, Cobussen is asking if it is 
possible, in our secularised and “disenchanted” modern world,5 to rethink the spiritual 
meaningfulness of music beyond monotheistic consolations of the transcendental divine. Less 
concerned with “what the spiritual dimension of music might be,” Cobussen speculates on 
“where this spiritual dimension might be situated”: where might the spirituality of music exist 
if not within the secure cosmological boundaries established and preserved by a belief in the 
mystery of ‘God’?6 And who, and then which aspect of the self, might have access or entry to 
such a space that Cobussen will come to call, after Foucault, Barthes and Bataille, “an a-
topia, literally a non-place…”…“a refuge”…“where Western thought breaks down...the non-
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space of spirituality, spirituality as an encounter with the inhuman…a radical otherness 
[which] recognizes and affirms the empty space, left behind after ‘the death of God’ ”?7 
  
How to begin to think this musical atopia that marks an “encounter with the inhuman”, and 
then, how to preserve its integrity in the presence of the cinematic human figure? If music is 
thought to possess a supremely human identity, how might Cobussen’s non-site of spirituality 
allow us to think beyond the limits of the human without crossing over and entering the realm 
of the transcendental divine? This question of the spiritual where, as Cobussen rethinks it, has 
singular influence for how I would seek to present a more elemental, or cosmic, rendering of 
the spiritual bond between music and the cinematic human figure, through the physicality of 
the musical tone and cinematic light, both of which invoke the mode of utopian desire. The 
complexity of such a bond might rival even that of the uncanny’s animistic archaism, as it 
now converges with a decidedly monotheistic construct which, for Royle, remains necessarily 
outside of, or resistant to, the uncanny’s established psychoanalytical framework: 
 
What is ‘uncanny’ is what does not ‘seem to come in God’s name’. …the strangeness of the 
uncanny offers, demands or presupposes a new way of thinking about religion. It is, in fact, 
one of the unstated assumptions of Freud’s essay that the uncanny is to be theorized in non-
religious terms. The experience of the uncanny, as he seeks to theorize it, is not available or 
appropriate to, say, a Jewish or Christian ‘believer’. …With a belief in God or some ‘evil 
Will’ or a variety of divine ‘Beings’, the uncanny does not even rear its eerie head …. 
Tempered by reason, Christian belief is the basis of everything. Such is the condition of what 
is known as the European Enlightenment.8  
 
In response to this distinction, the focus of this chapter shifts from the anthropomorphic to the 
cosmomorphic,9 and from mythological archaism to Christian mysticism. In so doing, I hope 
to enable a pathway to rethink this seemingly clear line between utopian desire and the 
uncanny—between the stable world of religious belief, and the unstable world of uncanny 
strangeness—to continue to develop a sense of both the spiritual complexity of music, and a 
liminal mode of cinematic spirituality that moves ambivalently between pre-Christian 
archaism and Christian mysticism. 
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While Cobussen’s atopia will ultimately open out the possibility of such a (non)space, some 
careful qualifications are needed to establish the conceptual connections that lead into it. This 
elemental bond between the cinematic human figure and music speaks to a sacred 
cosmological belief system, one that is incompatible with the mode of the uncanny. In kind, 
the ontological, affective and symbolic components of this union are, not insignificantly, the 
direct inversion of those intrinsic to the uncanny: as we shall soon see, Gorky’s shadowy, 
archaic spectre has its luminous, sacred other in a figure that we might most appropriately 
call the cinematic body of light. However apparently dialectical, this transformation of 
ontology—from shadow spectre to light spirit—calls up a remarkable convergence between 
archaic polytheism and traditional mysticism that embodies the problem of complexity itself: 
in this chapter, doubling will become entangled with the duality of essentialism, “the 
uncertainties of silence, solitude and darkness”10 that Royle deems the province of the 
uncanny will become imbricated with the mystery of God, the anthropo- substance of our 
primary relation—the cinematic human figure and anthropomorphic musical meaning—will 
begin to slip and fragment through this movement into the vibrational, atmospheric elements 
of the cosmos. In the differences between mystical theology, an archaic Homeric spirit-
reality, and the nomadic sense that Cobussen will theorise through the liminality of a 
postmodern atopia, language also remains a recalcitrant obstacle. Fitting the mould of neither 
a ‘pure’ metaphysics of presence or its deconstructed indeterminacy, the cinematic body of 
light appears to inhabit perhaps the most extreme sense of an unthinkable, unsayable, liminal 
space, one that is somewhere and nowhere, and one which, in claiming the physical elements 
of the cosmos for its bond, disperses the mode of the ineffable across two divergent and 
decisively negative senses of spirituality; one which is inscribed within mystical theology’s 
doctrine of the negative divine, and an ‘other’ which emerges within Cobussen’s nomadic 
spirituality. How do we begin to think the where of the ineffable as a problem that enfolds the 
dual articulations of human and inhuman, place and non-place, space and non-space, a 
somewhere and a nowhere, a something and a nothing, and as both and neither at one and the 
same time?   
 
I wonder if grasping this unfamiliar spiritual crossing is possible only by passing this 
elemental bond through the utopian longing that irrupts in the presence of the ineffable, so 
that we might ask not only how the cinematic human figure moves beyond anthropological 
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boundaries, but also where it moves within an imaginary cosmological cartography. In other 
words, as territorial concepts that characterise this new threshold, how does the difference 
between an atopian nowhere and a utopian elsewhere (or ‘otherworld’) relate to a 
convergence between ‘The Ineffable’ of God and ‘the ineffable’ of a less certain mode of 
spirituality, and how does this manifold transform the ontology of the cinematic human 
figure?  
 
Like the uncanny, the mode of utopian desire unfurls its own strata of indeterminacy, paradox 
and ambiguity, reciprocating a theory of spiritual complexity through a circular return to 
intellectually rigorous questions. However fatiguing, this new mode thus allows us to 
contemplate the innately plural possibilities of the space between musical meaning and the 
cinematic human figure, and to go beyond the consolations of an archaic sensibility that frees 
‘spirituality’ from the institutionalisation of monotheistic faith and the craving for logical 
resolution. In remaining present to the predicament of our own paradoxically post-
religious/post-secular time, I suggest that an uncanny conception of spirituality is but one 
intervention among many possibilities, and to locate further complexities requires a return to 
Christian mysticism, as Cobussen himself does. The reason for this is significant, and cannot 
be evaded: music has long been the province of religion as the medium for spiritual 
atonement and rejuvenation through ritualistic, ecstatic, and meditative practice. A 
postmodern spirituality of cinema cannot consider itself somehow emancipated or removed 
from the millennia of music’s sacred ordination that precedes it without, in some way, 
attending to its ideological obstacles. Thus, how might we begin to think a new sense of this 
cinematic spirituality through the shifting boundaries in musical and mystical discourse, so as 
to, like Cobussen himself, respond empathetically to the ordeal involved in relinquishing the 
consolations of religion? 
 
With these qualifications in place, we might finally ask; where is this other cinematic human 
figure—this cinematic body of light—who would not only challenge the indeterminate 
complexity of the uncanny spectre, but also rival its unquestionable “human-ness”? Once 
more, this question is less the mounting of a challenge against the significance of the archaic 
double, and more an extension of its elemental possibilities for thinking the plurality of 
cinematic spirituality. For in experimental films such as Maya Deren’s The Very Eye of Night 
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(1958),11 and Norman McLaren’s Pas de Deux (1968),12 an ‘other’ spiritual figure does in 
fact exist, a luminous spirit-figure that floats and drifts in Deren’s nocturnal night-sky, a 
radiant, angelic figure who dissolves and morphs in the aether of McLaren’s impenetrable 
abyss. I suggest that, both literally and symbolically, this ethereal figure resists the uncanny 
identity of Gorky’s spectre: in no “disturbingly undead” sense could it join the ranks of 
Hades’ shadows, silhouettes, doubles and spectres for the sake of affirming its archaic 
identity. Rather, just as music is the real presence of sonorous tone, this luminous figure is 
what it presents: it is the real presence of light, imbued with all the symbolism of goodness 
and truth that light historically bears. I wonder whether this radiant figure is precisely the 
presence who would radically disturb, and potentially undermine, the progressive liminalist 
theory of, what we might tentatively call, an archaic-postmodern spiritual sensibility. If the 
“lifedeath”13 or “presence-absence”14 of the uncanny spectre displaces the traditional 
Platonic-Christian stability of the cosmological zones of life and death, how would such a 
figure—a figure whose positive forces of light, hope, goodness, truth, perfection and order—
wield a certain symbolic authority over the liminal significance of the spectre? And how does 
the mysticism of music fortuitously provide an inroad for rethinking this problem? 
 
The Body of Light: An Obstacle for Thought 
What our difficult and threatening times need, more than anything else, is a revolution in 
cosmology: a complete revision of the way educated people have been trained to regard their 
cosmic environment. …What is now demanded is that the ear again be given precedence over 
the usurping eye: that tone, not diagrams or words, be acknowledged again as the truest 
reflection of reality, and hearing honoured as the sense through which we can best learn of its 
nature. …to penetrate the mysteries of music is to prepare for initiation into those fathomless 
mysteries of man and cosmos. 
—Joscelyn Godwin15 
   
What would Godwin make of cinema’s own ‘cosmic’ companion—this visible, luminous 
figure of light—if, for his sacred studies, the mystery between music and cosmos returns to 
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“the ancient discipline of Musica Speculativa”, a practice which conceptualises “music as a 
mirror (Latin: speculum) held up to reality”?16 What significance does the cinematic figure of 
light also have for approaching “those fathomless mysteries between man and cosmos” that 
Godwin believes to be better grasped through the vibrations of musical tone, rather than the 
image regime of the eye? In a time where the utopian attributes of order, balance, goodness, 
beauty, and perfect harmony have become the subject of disillusionment, indifference, 
cynicism and scepticism, this particular figure might play a provocative role in Godwin’s 
“revolution of cosmology”. With its proximity to the mysticism of music itself, this figure of 
light, rendered visible in the films of Deren and McLaren, appears to speak less to an archaic 
mythology, and more to a theosophical cosmology whose Hades has become Hell, and whose 
Arcadia has become Heaven.17 Following Cobussen’s own method, I wonder how this 
figure—with its unsettling convergence between monotheism, music and cinema—might 
move between the reverent quietude of religiosity and a new kind of spiritual restlessness. In 
this sense, I am interested in how this figure summons theology for the sake of rethinking its 
boundaries, obstacles and interstices, and how we might reimagine the mode of utopian 
desire itself through this process. 
 
Let us begin again then with a concrete question: in what sense does this peculiar, luminous 
figure in cinema resurrect the practices and rituals of mysticism? Or, to borrow Philip 
Abbott’s question regarding the equivalence between a perfect society and a perfect body, 
“Do everyday bodies “miraculously turn light and luminous” in utopias?”18 Already, in tune 
with our grounding liminal framework, the boundary between ‘spirit’ and ‘body’ is becoming 
more fluid, especially when placed within the cinematic space. With Deren and McLaren’s 
luminary figures, we have the symbolic endorsement of those ancient, enduring ideals 
peculiar to utopian desire: truth, beauty, goodness, perfection and freedom. As the real 
presence of light, and suspended within the respective cinematic illusions of both celestial 
night-sky and impenetrable abyss, this peculiar cinematic spirit rekindles the magic of a 
figure long known to mysticism as, quite literally, the body of light.19 Central to both Eastern 
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and Western practices, and understood diversely as the subtle body,20 the astral body, the 
radiant body, the body of glory, “the celestial or luciform body, or organon of light, the 
augoeides or astroeides”,21 the body of light is the diaphanous, alchemic aspect of being 
which travels, oneirically and meditatively, beyond the limits of the physical self, becoming 
one with the divine cosmos itself.22  
 
As the astral entity of being, and bound to the order of God, this living conception of the 
aerial spirit, transcribed into the cinematic medium, presents some rather extraordinary 
problems for a singularly uncanny theory invested in the relation between music’s ‘secret’ 
anthropomorphic meanings and the cinematic human figure. Like the archaic definition of the 
undead spectre (psuché), this luminous presence of life is clearly distinguished from the 
eternal soul (psyché).23 Yet in keeping with medieval and Renaissance mystical theology, it is 
the intermediary spirit of the living (rather than the otherworldly spirit of afterlife) which 
flows between the body and the soul, and is able, in a kind of sleeping-awake state, to 
traverse those ordinarily invisible, inaudible planes of origin from this side of life.24 As its 
very name suggests, the body of light is gloriously hybridised, its ontological identity 
suspended in this mystical threshold between the human and the cosmic. Problematically, 
however, it simultaneously creates an impasse between essentialism and liminal thought. 
Resonating so clearly with the practices of mysticism as to be something of a totem figure, 
could the cinematic body of light—possessing the same transcendental aura that surrounds the 
mysterious musical encounter—speak to, or influence, an atopian (rather than utopian) sense 
of cinematic spirituality? Could it speak of a “no-place” rather than the idealised “good 
place” that remains central to mystical theology, thus communicating something other than 
the message of divine harmony, perfect order and transcendence?  
  
In light of the enduring themes of desire and freedom that permeate the concept of spirituality 
itself, it seems appropriate, even necessary, to address such esoteric ambiguity through the 
elemental forces that ground the Christian mystic’s mode of existence. For arguably, as the 
                                                 
20 On the academic significance of the subtle body see Religion and the Subtle Body in Asia and the West: 
Between Mind and Body, ed. Geoffrey Samuel and Jay Johnston, Routledge Studies in Asian Religion and 
Philosophy (London; New York: Routledge, 2013). 
21 G.R. Mead, The Doctrine of the Subtle Body in the Western Tradition (London, UK: John M. Watkins, 1919), 
34, quoted in Behun, “The Body of Light,” 128. 
22 Cobussen, Thresholds, 43–44.  
23 See Cholodenko, “(The) Death (of) the Animator, or: The Felicity of Felix: Part 11,” 10–11. 
24 Joscelyn Godwin, Harmonies of Heaven and Earth: The Spiritual Dimension of Music from Antiquity to the 
Avant-Garde (London: Thames and Hudson, 1987), 25–26, 81–82. 
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visionary embodiment of the mystic’s subtle substance—as a figure somehow emancipated 
from a purely human identity—the cinematic body of light exudes precisely the aura that 
might summon such a desire for absolute freedom; here, for all to see, is the astral body’s 
journey toward an ecstatic, self-annihilating dissolution into the infinite. For theologian W.T. 
Stace, this desire characterises the human condition itself beyond cultures, epochs, histories, 
and most especially, beyond the modern, scientific turn toward a philosophy of naturalism.25 
Stace describes the religious impulse as “the hunger for the impossible, the unattainable, the 
inconceivable—or at least for that which is these things in the world of time”, the “hunger for 
the non-being which yet is”, the desire which “spring[s] from one and the same source, the 
universal religious consciousness of mankind, the universal impulsion of one and the same 
mystical vision.”26 In Stace’s account of this hunger, we encounter the universal belief that 
existence is, in essence, “a fetter”, that the human condition is plagued by the longing for the 
infinite, for a light it can never know or master, for the “ultimate ideal” which is, 
paradoxically, the “hopeless quest.”27 Once more, it is within the ecstatic experience of music 
that one encounters the feeling of a secret message, one which would ultimately locate an 
immense freedom beyond the finitude of the universe: 
 
Religion seeks the light. But it is not a light which can be found at any place or time. It is not 
somewhere. It is the light which is nowhere. …In music, sometimes a man will feel that he 
comes to the edge of breaking out from the prison bars of existence, breaking out from the 
universe altogether. There is a sense that the goal is at hand, that the boundary wall of the 
universe is crumbling and will be breached at the next moment, when the soul will pass out 
free into the infinite. But the goal is not reached. For it is the unspeakable, the impossible, the 
inconceivable, the unattainable. There is only the sense of falling backward into time. The 
goal is only glimpsed, sensed, and then lost.28 
 
With its attention to the feeling of the soul’s release and return through this allusion to 
music’s virtual, kinaesthetic rise and fall, this passage gives substance to where the ecstatic 
musical experience might lead us, its articulation of freedom conjured through the sacred 
language of negation and its inseparable spatial metaphors. Within this, Stace’s universal, 
utopian “goal” is awakened. To go beyond the limits of the human, to become one with the 
                                                 
25 W.T. Stace, Time and Eternity: An Essay in the Philosophy of Religion (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1952), preface, v.  
26 Ibid., 4, 5 and 15. 
27 Ibid., 4–5.  
28 Ibid. 
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infinite light, to know the mystery of God, and to do so in the time of life itself: this is (still) 
the province and office of music, however much it ceaselessly refuses to fulfil this promise.  
 
Bringing music into relation with the cinematic body of light—a figure which clearly 
articulates the vision of such spiritual freedom—it would not be illogical, beneath the banner 
of theology, to interpret their co-presence as the more complete manifestation of the 
transcendental destination described by Stace, thus placating, more completely, the ordeal of 
such longing. Wearing its mysticism on its sleeve, the cinematic body of light resonates with 
music’s own divine purpose for embodying the transcendental crossing that would 
distinguish the order of time from the order of eternity. To be luminous, aerial, vaporous, 
cosmic, means to be free from not only the fetters of corporeal incarceration, but from the 
fetters of an explicitly human identity. And this conception of alchemic transformation has its 
musical counterpart in the mystical ontology of a musical cosmos that centres upon the 
enchanting forces of tone: in the ecstatic musical departure, one returns to the essence of life 
itself, the essence of movement, that is, vibration. Like music, the cinematic body of light is 
this elemental, vibratory presence, an esoteric emblem given to the eye, rather than the ear. 
As such (and perhaps Godwin’s own “revolution of cosmology” might not concede this), it is 
entirely reasonable to suggest that the cinematic body of light naturally acts as another 
mystical conduit through which we might, for a time, imagine our own departure from the 
gravity and decay of our earth-boundedness toward more alpine elevations of pure 
consciousness. 
 
It is here, in this synergy of vibration, that we begin to encounter new obstacles for thought, 
new obstructions for reimagining spiritual identity beyond Christian dogma. For it is 
precisely this cosmomorphic connection that remains potentially catastrophic for a liminal 
mode of existence that would seek a spiritual nowhere for cinema, rather than the stable, 
sacred and good somewhere of divine radiance, and the questions that continue to cascade out 
from this unchartered complex are, in themselves, eccentric and unique. For instance, in 
pairing the body of light’s utopian vision with Cobussen’s atopian “nowhere” of music, does 
this luminous figure in fact undo the unknown that would characterise the musical atopia? 
That is, if this luminous spirit seems so naturally to occupy thought’s vision of the space 
“between heaven and earth” (a space so effortlessly visualised in the films of Deren and 
McLaren), does the cinematic body of light—incarnate in the age of the death of God, yet 
nonetheless mediating the luminous presence of God—suddenly exhume the transcendental 
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divine for our relation to music? So replete with its own measure of divine radiance, this 
peculiar presence seems something of an existential agitator, re-opening the wound of 
music’s celestial, sacred origins, and drawing the relation itself back into a utopian, rather 
than a purely uncanny, sensibility.  
 
Stace underscores the universal belief that human existence is a fetter, and the antithesis of 
spiritual freedom: if humanity seeks to go beyond itself, if humanity seeks to dissolve into all 
that is sublimely infinite and unbounded, I wonder if this cinematic body of light—this 
ineffable vision of the living spirit—viscerally symbolises this hollow pursuit, its alchemic 
transformation extending the definition of human being, life, existence, presence et al beyond 
the limits of the human and into the elements of nature itself, while simultaneously refusing a 
complete and absolute dissolution into the nothingness of religion’s great light through the 
template remains of its human form.  
 
As a figure of mysticism, the cinematic body of light becomes undeniably problematic for 
theorising a liminal spirituality of cinema, one which recognises and enriches, rather than 
mutilates and overwhelms, the conceptual possibilities of Cobussen’s own musical atopia. As 
the unguarded resurgence of religion, I suggest that this bond between musical tone and the 
cinematic body of light is the reawakening of mystical theology’s principle belief in 
origination, and thus, an obstacle for thought that appears to undermine a non-religious, 
postmodern spirituality. That the cinematic body of light shares an ontological similitude to 
the life-force of the musical tone through its vibrational essence, may be, in itself, enough to 
condemn the relation to an essentialist impasse. Readily rescued by theological faith, and 
spun from the vibrational physics of the cosmos itself, here again is the possibility of a 
glorious eternity, the hope for an invisible, inaudible, and ineffable harmony expressed in the 
unifying, originating and complimentary life-forces of light and sound. Sufi teacher Hazrat 
Inayat Khan expresses the inherent dualism of this relation with absolute clarity, placing the 
primacy of sacred tone before the divinity of light: 
 
What we call music in everyday language is only a miniature of that which is behind this all, 
and which has been the source and origin of this nature. …in the realm of music the wise can 
interpret the secret and nature…of the whole universe. …Those who have probed the depth of 
material science as far as modern science can reach, do not deny the fact that the origin of the 
whole creation is in movement, in other words: in vibration. It is this original state of 
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existence of life which is called in the ancient tradition sound, or the word. The first 
manifestation of this sound is therefore audible, the next manifestation visible. In the forms of 
expressions of life, life has expressed itself first as sound, next as light. This is supported by 
the Bible where it is said that first was the word, and then came light. Again, one finds in a 
Sura of the Qur’an: ‘God is the light of the heaven and earth’.  
The nature of the creation is the doubling of one, and it is this doubling aspect which is the 
cause of all duality in life. This doubling aspect represents one positive part, the other part 
being negative; one expressive, the other responsive. Therefore, in the creation of this duality, 
spirit and nature stand face to face. …The human body is a vehicle of the spirit, a finished 
creation which experiences all the different aspects of creation.29 
 
Here then, we cannot take Khan’s sense of “doubling” to reciprocate the liminality intrinsic 
to the mode of the uncanny, archaic double; for Khan, essence and origination are the 
foundations of absolute truth. For the uncanny, the notion of truth itself is undermined and 
unstable. Thus, in pairing cinematic luminosity with musical sonority, this more elemental 
sense of cosmic harmony could well be the most precise articulation of God’s numinous 
universe yet to reveal itself in the sphere of the arts. In seeking a liminal pathway, we could 
ask whether this unique aesthetic bond—a bond which exists concretely in the vibrational air, 
the aether, and the atmosphere—might bear out, yet simultaneously obscure, a difference 
between traditional and postmodern senses of spirituality, between the institutionalised 
definition of the ineffable, unknown mystery of being within which the body of light belongs, 
and the unnameable, a-theological sense which Cobussen carefully unfolds for music.30   
 
Between Stace’s discourse on the nature of religious hope and belief, and Cobussen’s 
divergent musical atopia, in now bringing the two discrete texts into a reciprocal circuit, we 
might begin to work through this intense divergence-convergence in play, this time with ‘the 
ineffable’ more clearly at the fore, and understood, more precisely, as a negative concept (in 
Stace’s religious sense, as “the unspeakable, the impossible, the inconceivable, the 
unattainable”, that which is beyond the order of speaking, thinking, knowing). We must begin 
again with the problem of language so as to work through the difference between ‘The 
Ineffable’ and ‘the ineffable,’ both of which may be approached through the language of 
negation.  
                                                 
29 Khan, The Mysticism of Sound and Music, 16–18. 
30 Cobussen, Thresholds, 48–50. 
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The Language of the Negative Divine  
This is the vision…to endure ambiguity and to make a light shine through it… 
— Shaarei Teshuva (Gates of Repentance)31 
 
Let us try to bring the many ruminations and questions posed thus far into a more cohesive 
speculative framework. Within this more cosmomorphic rather than anthropomorphic 
spiritual bond, does the language of negation, of which both ‘the ineffable’ and ‘The 
Ineffable’ are a part, enclose the liminal potentiality of the cinematic body of light within the 
order of God? And as such, are we attempting to theorise what is essentially a theoretical 
impasse? For to introduce Cobussen’s unnameable atopian spirituality of music to the 
visionary space of cinema, and to attempt to grasp its nowhere-ness in the presence of the 
cinematic body of light, also means to borrow substantially from the traditional lexicon of 
mystical theology to articulate its presence. In particular, it means to borrow from the 
doctrine of silence inscribed within “the negative divine” which, in Stace’s account, is “an 
essential element in the developed religious consciousness of man”:  
 
God is Non-Being, Nothing, Emptiness, the Void, the Abyss. Silence and darkness, used as 
privative terms importing the absence of sound, the absence of light, are also used as 
metaphors of His Non-Being. God is the great silence, the great darkness. …the negative 
divine makes its appearance explicitly in Christianity, Judaism, Hinduism, and Buddhism. 
“God,” says Meister Eckhart “is…a Non-God, a Non-Spirit, a Non-Person, a Non-Form. 
…the still wilderness…the end of all things is the hidden darkness of the eternal Godhead.” 
…For [the numinous] is always, in all religions, ineffable, unutterable, inexpressible in any 
intellectual concepts. The conceptual intellect fails completely to grasp it. For Eckhart God is 
“the nameless Nothing.” Why nameless? Because, as every logician knows, any name, any 
word in any language, except a proper name, stands for a concept or a universal. Hence there 
can be no name where there is no concept. And God is ineffable and nameless because no 
concept can grasp Him.32  
 
Through this sacred language of negation, Stace is once more fortuitously enclosing the 
ephemeral nature of both music and cinema within the certitude of dualism: by giving their 
                                                 
31 Path of Faith: The New Jewish Prayer Book for Synagogue and Home, compiled and trans. Chaim Stern 
(New York: S.P.I. Books, 2003), 6.  
32 Stace, Time and Eternity, 9–11, 24. Quotation sources: W. R. Inge, Christian Mysticism (London: Methuen, 
1899), 160; Rufus Jones, Studies in Mystical Religion (London: Macmillan, 1909), 221. 
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ineffability an original reason, the existence of light and tone is contingent upon those 
primordial conditions of the negative divine that enable their presence to be: darkness and 
silence. It is not illogical to say that music’s presence comes into being from the ‘emptiness’ 
of silence, just as the body of light comes into being from the void of darkness that would 
threaten to engulf it. In its theological transposition, it is the infinite ‘nothingness’ of this 
silence and darkness that would covet the form of eternity—“the end of all things”—against 
the temporal fragility and inevitable decay of tone and light. Each monumental title promised 
to the Ineffable Mystery of God—the absolute, the infinite, silence, darkness, stasis, 
eternity—secures the divine mystery of its elemental counterpart—the ‘something-ness’ of 
sound, light, motion, time, space—through this language of the negative divine. Yet Stace 
complicates this system of classification further: 
 
The logical principle to which this points is that a negative is always also a positive. A hole is 
a positive existence. If something is part of our experience, it is thereby proved to exist, 
whether we choose to call it positive or negative. We may say that darkness is the absence of 
light, but the darkness of night is just as much a positively experienced fact as is the light of 
the day.33  
 
Within this interchange between presence and absence, where a thing can logically become 
its opposite, how would one intervene with such a perfectly balanced system to speak of a 
spirituality free from divine origination? In following Cobussen’s own ruminations closely, I 
contend that a spiritual relation between the musical tone and the cinematic body of light 
must somehow respond to these inscriptions without the accidental reformation of their faith. 
For as we shall continue to see, it is precisely this language of negation that grounds 
Cobussen’s more migratory mode of spiritual becoming, and it is through this language that 
something other than a belief in “an impregnable origin or end called God” is able to be 
articulated.34 At the close of the twentieth century, Willemien Otten shows us this 
convergence from the perspective of theology:  
 
Given especially Derrida’s critique of the Western onto-theological tradition…it is no surprise 
that he, and many others with him…connect the method of negative theology primarily with 
the absence of the divine, expressed most poignantly in the notion of the death of God. In the 
                                                 
33 Stace, Time and Eternity, 56–57.  
34 Cobussen, Thresholds, 78. 
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context of their debate, negative theology can lead quite naturally into a discussion on 
negative anthropology, a topic which has indeed begun to attract attention. After all, when 
God has died and the cosmos is stripped of all numinous qualities, how can humanity sidestep 
the confrontation with its own finitude?  Outside postmodern circles, however, scholars with 
an interest in Christian mysticism have started to focus on the tradition of negative theology 
as well.35 
 
Certainly, Stace’s own treatise on eastern and western religions articulates this focus on 
traditional negative theology. Yet Otten’s disciplinary distinction between negative theology 
and deconstruction highlights a more complex paradox: two very different senses of this 
exactly similar language of negation ground these divergent schools of spiritual thought, both 
of which are very much alive in our own time. It is the simultaneity of these two senses, and 
their refusal to be compartmentalised, which I suggest permeates the spiritual mystery that 
flows between musical tone and the cinematic body of light. There is no easy delineation with 
which to deal with this relation: ‘The Ineffable’ is not exclusively the province of music, 
consigning ‘the ineffable’ to the cinematic body of light, or vice versa; both forms possess 
both senses. Together, the two mediums create this fluid strata of in/Ineffability which resists 
the mastery of the word/Word. Consequently, such simultaneity and cross-over provokes 
those questions that would keep the processes of philosophical thought and anthropological 
desire in their own circular limbo. Could this figure be something of a catalyst for the 
religious hunger Stace describes, something quite like the anthropomorphic essence of music 
embodied within film musicology’s argument for presence? Would it not be some small relief 
to allow McLaren’s cinematic void of darkness, with its manifestation of the negative divine, 
to rescue music from the death of God and all of its ensuing uncertainties: could the 
conjoined presence of a cosmic music and this cosmomorphic body of light—which is the 
vision of an ever-ascending spirit who traverses oneiric spaces between heaven and earth—
realise, again, a dualistic conception of the cosmic whole, thus rescuing the idea of 
‘spirituality’ itself from Cobussen’s radical indeterminacy? With the emptiness intrinsic to 
the negative divine realised through both an impenetrable darkness (from which comes the 
life of the cinematic body of light), and an infinite silence (from which comes the life of the 
musical tone), a language of faithful unknowing would seem to holistically bind the one to 
the other, satiating, to an incomparable degree, the longing to experience such freedom in the 
                                                 
35 Willemien Otten, “In the Shadow of the Divine: Negative Theology and Negative Anthropology in Augustine, 
Pseudo Dionysius and Eriugena,” Heythrop Journal 40, no. 4 (1999): 438, doi:10.1111/1468-2265.00115. 
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time of life.36 That this nothingness is also a presence simply enhances the aura of mystery 
itself.  
 
This, for me, is the tender trap of the language of negation: in searching for the nowhere of 
cinema’s own spiritual atopia, Stace’s religious hunger seems to prowl within its very 
processes. In not fully grasping where the negative divine ends and where a “contemporary 
spirituality”37 begins, perhaps the challenge for thinking this relation is in allowing this 
language of negation to remain the necessary crossing upon which to rethink the spiritual 
where of a cinema replete with music, and to do so with a mindfulness to the lost-ness of 
language itself. Let us finally return then to the questions that surround Cobussen’s atopia, 
with a clearer sense of their ever-amassing obstacles and potential impasses. In focusing on 
the mysticism of music, humanity and cosmos, we might eventually see where the cinematic 
body of light itself is hidden, how the ecstatic forces of religious hunger allow us to reroute 
the question of ontology, and how this reconfiguration ultimately opens out toward a new, 
more complex conception of the cinematic body of light’s spiritual place and purpose.  
 
The Mystic as Ecstatic Wanderer in the Spiritual Nowhere 
He who has come only in part to a freedom of reason cannot feel on earth otherwise than as a 
wanderer—though not as a traveller towards a final goal, for this does not exist. But he does 
want to observe, and keep his eyes open for everything that actually occurs in the world; there 
he must not attach his heart too firmly to any individual thing; there must be something 
wandering within him, which takes its joy in change and transitoriness. 
—Friedrich Nietzsche38  
 
How is Cobussen’s nowhere-ness different from the nothingness and namelessness of 
mysticism’s negative divine? How does Cobussen arrive at his musical atopia that cannot be 
thought or spoken, but is spoken, nonetheless, through a language which also articulates the 
Being of God?39 What kind of message is he seeking in retelling the journey of the mystic, 
whose negative divine is echoed in the ‘new’ spiritual discourse? While Cobussen is seeking 
                                                 
36 Stace, Time and Eternity, 17–18.  
37 Cobussen, Thresholds, 78. 
38 Nietzsche, aphorism 638, in Human, All Too Human, 266.  
39 Eyolf Østrem, “Music and the Ineffable,” in Voicing the Ineffable: Musical Representations of Religious 
Experience, ed. Siglind Bruhn, INTERPLAY: Music in Interdisciplinary Dialogue (Hillsdale, New York: 
Pendragon Press, 2002), 288.  
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a message, he is also, like Hermes, something of a messenger himself, retracing the paths of 
the mystics, but also those of ‘nomads’ such as Nietzsche, Heidegger, Bataille, Derrida, 
Foucault, and Deleuze, each of whom wander through the mysteries of the artworld in search 
of new thoughts and new possibilities for existence beyond language.40 With such guides, he 
would search for a spirituality of music free from the regimes of religion within the very 
spaces that such regimes are inscribed. In the orders of eastern and western mysticism he 
finds intermediary aspects and entities which occupy the space between those poles 
historically reserved for Platonic-Christian thought: found within traditional binary 
oppositions that would ordinarily stabilise the cosmological question of the spiritual where, 
and in response to the death of God, Cobussen’s ‘in-betweens’ pose a series of interventions 
that entirely reconfigure the relation between music, identity and utopian desire.41  
 
Through the speculative work of Godwin especially, Cobussen finds the oneiric 
consciousness of the mystic who, in a kind of sleeping awake, travels beyond his body to the 
luminous astral world, and, going higher still, comes to the angelic realm of Devachan (“deva 
means ‘angel’ or ‘demigod’ in Sanskrit”), the primordial world of magical tones, “Man’s 
original home”.42 He writes of the Romantic composer who is able to summon and translate 
this divine, radiant plane “of sublimest spirituality” for our own mortal, earthly senses, and 
who—like the mystic, the alchemist, the angel, Hermes himself—“acts as some kind of 
messenger or intermediary between these two worlds” of heaven and earth.43 He also finds 
Marsilio Ficino’s luminous spiritus, the “corporeal vapour” which flows between (but again, 
is both and neither) soul and body, the subtle substance through which the mystic practices 
flights of transfiguration and empowerment.44 As Godwin writes, this luminous substance is, 
for Ficino’s medicinal alchemy of the Renaissance, the primary conduit for the apothecary 
benefits of music: if music is uniquely able to improve the melancholy being of the self, it is 
because both music and spiritus are of the air and the aether, “because the medium of sound, 
air, is the most similar to [the spiritus] in substance.”45  
 
                                                 
40 Cobussen, Thresholds, 42–43, 65–73. 
41 Ibid., 41—51. 
42 Ibid., 43–44.  
43 Ibid., 42. 
44 Godwin, Harmonies of Heaven and Earth, 25.  
45 Ibid. 
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Cobussen perceives that such intermediary sites, inscribed within the doctrines of traditional 
mysticism, can in fact be the catalyst for an intervention of thought, if we can first perceive 
the nascent, creative possibilities available within this very concept of the intermediary: in 
using these mystical thresholds to grasp that the spirituality of music exists somewhere 
between their polarities, we are closer to thinking the in-between as a space that evokes both 
a “somewhere” and a “nowhere” at one and the same time. For Cobussen, this “space 
between heaven and earth” is the beginning for thinking the emptiness of atopia, the non-
space of music’s spirituality which, as I hope to show, is precisely what is endangered in the 
presence of both the cinematic body of light and the void of nothingness that surrounds it. 
 
Ultimately, in this question of where the spiritual province of music exists, a question 
discovered through mysticism’s own sacred language of space, Cobussen admits that “the 
paradoxical, disenchanting answer is that it has no place. It seems that the where-question can 
be answered only if we radically give up thinking in fixed locations or nameable places. …To 
conceive of this atopia can be a real stumbling block.”46 This is the obstacle that the spiritual 
atopia of music poses for thought, and to grasp even a glimmer of its nowhere-ness requires a 
relinquishment from the Western contagion for categories, names, definitions, identities, for 
“[i]ts inbetweenness seems to mean ‘both…and’ and ‘neither…nor.’ ”47 Thus the slippery 
enigma of this atopia re-opens the wound of logos—of reasoned thinking, speaking, writing 
and knowing—the wound which the utopian desire for immortal truth seeks to anaesthetize. 
As Cobussen writes, “To have no place (also) means to be unnameable. It (also) means to 
have no place within the categorical and classification systems of Western thinking.”48  
 
Ironically however, if we are attempting to distinguish between two different kinds of 
spirituality (both of which are present within our two co-present mediums) through the 
processes of thinking, speaking and writing, we must reconcile ourselves with one of the 
more difficult crossings between the dialogues of Stace and Cobussen. The concept of the 
threshold—as the space of the in-between—is the catalyst and conduit for Cobussen’s 
thought experiments, its liminal ‘form’ and (non)definition necessarily paradoxical and 
indeterminate. Problematically, as Stace’s treatise proves, the basic notion of paradox is not 
enough to move our immediate enquiry beyond the boundaries of theology’s own discourse. 
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48 Ibid., 48. 
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Earlier we saw that the unnameable cannot be cleanly severed from its monotheistic history, 
the familiarity, consolation and belonging innate to utopian desire’s good place readily 
overshadowing the displacement and dispossession of the atopian no place. Here, in common 
with Cobussen’s radically “unnameable” tradition, Stace will also define the nature and 
pursuit of religious hope as being intrinsically paradoxical, his reverence for Whitehead’s 
treatise clearly invoking the significance of contradiction: 
 
“Religion,” says Whitehead, “is the vision of something which stands beyond, behind, and 
within, the passing flux of immediate things; something which is real, and yet waiting to be 
realized; something which is a remote possibility, and yet the greatest of present facts; 
something that gives meaning to all that passes, and yet alludes apprehension; something 
whose possession is the final good, and yet is beyond all reach; something which is the 
ultimate ideal, and the hopeless quest.”  …These words…are the original sources of religion. 
To the “something” of which they speak are attributed opposite characters which barely avoid 
…the clash of flat contradiction. Each clause is a balance of such contradicting predicates. 
The meaning cannot be less than that paradox and contradiction are of the very essence of that 
“something” itself. …Since God is Nothing, He is therefore not this kind of being nor that 
kind of being. He is neither this, nor that.49 
 
To the accumulating convergences between an old spirituality and a new, of which 
anthropomorphic thought and the language of the negative divine already subsist, we must 
also add this principle of paradox. And again we must ask; what is it that distinguishes 
Cobussen’s thresholds, replete with the presence of an unnameable nowhere, from the 
paradoxical something-ness and Nothingness of God?50 What does it mean to speak of the 
spirituality of music in a ‘new’ sense, and of its ineffability, if the concept of spirituality 
itself, so endowed as the ineffable/Ineffable, is haunted by the memory of a God made in the 
image of man, if (as in the harmony of the spheres) the cosmos itself is ever haunted by the 
divine feeling that music inspires, if music and spirituality are both haunted by a dialogue that 
has long upheld the Platonic-Christian conception of a humanised universe whose existence 
is contingent upon the sonorous tone of the word of God who ‘let there be light’?  
 
                                                 
49 Stace, Time and Eternity, 3, 4, 11. Quotation source: A.N. Whitehead, Science and the Modern World 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1932), 238. 
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Cobussen does not speak explicitly of anthropomorphism as it relates to mysticism’s cosmic 
music. Nonetheless, it quietly underscores his reconciliation to a certain inevitability, or 
perhaps necessity, for ‘groping’ through the problem that anthropocentric thought creates and 
sustains for language. Seeking a discourse that reroutes the stable consolations of religion, 
Cobussen argues for the continued presence of language, rather than its absence, and for 
challenging the gauntlet that the spiritual significance of music, as ineffable, throws down for 
thought: 
 
Although spirituality may involve a sense of the ineffable and the unnameable, and although 
it lacks apt categories, these are not arguments relieving us from the task of bringing it up. 
…poststructuralists and philosophers of language have pointed out the paradox: only through 
language, only through categorical frameworks will we ever be able to catch a glimpse of this 
realm outside or beyond language and its accompanying institutions. To reach the unthinkable 
through thinking, the unspeakable through speech, the space-between through classifications, 
the ineffability of spirituality and music through language—this possible impossibility, this 
paradoxical task, is awaiting us.51     
 
If this language of negation—which includes the ineffable, the unthinkable, the inexpressible, 
the unknowable, the unnameable, the unrepresentable, the intangible, the ungraspable—is 
thought’s medium for articulating the aura of mystery intrinsic to both traditional theology 
and Cobussen’s postmodern spirituality, how else might we grasp a difference, particularly if 
Stace’s traditional mysticism also claims the rights to paradox? Stace perceives the “final 
Mystery” as simultaneously a presence and an absence, positive and negative, against the 
scepticism of pure rationality: 
 
[T]he religious soul must leave behind all things and beings, including itself. From being it 
must pass into Nothing. But in this nothing it must still be. …And God, who is the only food 
which will appease [religious] hunger, is this Being which is Non-Being. Is this a 
contradiction? Yes. But men have always found that, in their search for the Ultimate, 
contradiction and paradox lie all around them. …The rationalizing intellect…will attempt to 
explain away the final Mystery, to logicize it, to reduce it to the categories of “this” and 
“that.” …all attempts to make religion a purely rational, logical, thing are not only shallow 
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but would, if they could succeed, destroy religion. Either God is a Mystery or He is nothing at 
all.52 
 
Stace’s project is thus to defend a conception of the nature of religion that he feels has been 
over-simplified in the wake of scientific rationalism. Thus, the Ineffable aura of Mystery—
present beneath the surface of things, fraught with paradox as it compels religious hunger—
must necessarily remain on high within the firmaments of faith as a form of knowledge. Here, 
one must be careful not to be drawn into a discussion that will only restore the simplistic 
divide between scientific evolution and creationist belief, for ultimately, there is an entirely 
different kind of thought available to us, if we can move beyond this system of either/or, and 
grasp the more useful gestures within the work of the mystic. As Stace writes, intrinsic to 
mystical practice is the necessary act of a movement, of a journey or passage—the ordaining 
of a leaving behind, even of the self—and this is precisely where we might begin to see a 
radical difference in Cobussen’s work, and where we might begin to grasp a new relation 
between spiritual identity, desire and freedom, one that is beyond the orders that enclose 
Stace’s religious hunger, but which does not evacuate or annihilate the significance of their 
memory and metamorphoses. Like Stace, Cobussen will continue to challenge a western 
tendency that violates the unknown-ness of being, yet his work, as one of radical, creative 
experimentation, will focus on the impossibility of a secure province for faith and the 
absence of eternal stasis: his atopia marks the loss of an infinite space that (for Christianity) 
encompasses the end of all things, beyond the time of life, and within the order of God.  
 
In this sense, Cobussen is less interested in an ontology of spirituality than its location and 
purpose: if we are open to the idea that ‘the spiritual,’ like music, is not contingent upon a 
stable definition of God—even one that accounts for the aura of mystery intrinsic to the 
ineffable—we must be ready to release those regimes of thought that would anchor the 
spirituality of music to thinkable, inhabitable spaces such as ‘Heaven.’ Again, Cobussen 
rethinks this idea through the practice of the mystic, and through the ritual of pilgrimage, 
which, for a new spirituality, no longer possesses a sense of purposeful direction, but the 
traces of decentredness, disquietude. Becoming nomadic, the mystic thus embarks upon a 
journey that is marked by itinerant, aimless dispossession rather than goal-oriented travelling: 
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…spirituality seems to open a space that can never be occupied because it is, ‘by definition,’ 
ec-static, not static, un-stable, enduringly moving.  …The mystic is a wanderer, a nomad. 
Spirituality means to leave places, infinitely exploring (inter)territories, always dynamic, 
always on the move. Therefore, spirituality has to be found between places, in the ‘in-
between.’ Like the nomad. Like a nomad. … “The life of a nomad is the intermezzo” 
(Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 380). Following Deleuze and Guattari, spirituality’s nomadism 
might be clearly distinguished from religion’s desire and ability to sedentarize, to establish a 
solid and stable centre. …What is the difference between this ‘traditional mysticism’ of the 
Enlightenment and contemporary spirituality? … where seekers like Labadie are still drawn 
to an impregnable origin or end called God, the current traveller is unable to ground himself 
in such a belief any longer. What remains is an empty place. He no longer rests upon a 
foundation or moves toward a goal. His experience maintains only the form and not the 
content of that bygone mysticism.53 
 
Thus, in serendipitous response to the paradox in Stace’s theology, if there is a clear 
distinction amidst so much terminological cross-over, it is within this idea of the “goal” of the 
traditional mystic, who—through the creation or liberation of the spiritus, through alchemic 
practices such as astral flight,54 through the use of music—‘knows’ that a final, ecstatic 
departure from the body of sorrow is possible. No longer the site of utopia, but still fanned by 
utopian desire, the empty space of atopia—as a nowhere and a nothingness vastly removed 
from God’s traditional negative space—is where the stillness of belief used to be. Now, the 
journey of spirituality still covets the excess, crisis, and pathos of pursuing the unknown 
mystery, but the seeker is refused the desired euphoric resolution: following Michel de 
Certeau, Cobussen perceives that what still remains in contemporary culture is “the 
movement of perpetual departure”,55 though now it can no longer be “sedentarized”, stilled or 
centred with the knowledge of some final resting place above and beyond the 
phenomenological world. We could be even more precise with this, to suggest that such a 
departure can no longer still or centre Stace’s religious hunger, for it is still bound to this 
desire, if we perceive desire itself as a force of flux and turmoil—as the itinerant wanderer 
within us—in the time of life. Where one kind of spirituality claims a paradox that will 
ultimately resolve into certitude, the other’s will remain aporetic, and refuse the security of 
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54 Behun, “The Body of Light,” 129–30. 
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such resolution. One resolves its evocations of incertitude, the other realises that such 
resolution, answering to the muse of imaginary belief, has become nonsensical, absurd.  
 
There are still other sacred crossings, inseparable to this, that Cobussen will forage through to 
rethink the spiritual where. Once more, Cobussen will echo theology for the purpose of 
rerouting its orientation, this time rethinking the ancient connection between the unknown 
(agnōstos) and the mystical rite of ecstasy (ekstasis).56 In his discussion on Georges Bataille, 
Cobussen understands the further difference between the traditional mystic and a spiritual 
nomad such as Bataille as turning on the utilitarian purpose of ecstatic practice. For the 
mystic, Cobussen writes, “ecstasy should finally lead to God”, it is “tied to a purpose”: 
 
 [The mystic’s] not-knowing must eventually simmer down in a serene and eternal knowing. 
Their not-knowing is rather a not-yet-knowing. Mystics are not permanently open to 
undecidability, as they believe in a higher sense. In Bataille’s philosophy, ecstasy is 
meaningless and nowhere can one find a refuge.57 
 
Through precisely this collision between the purposeful rite of ecstasy and the restlessness of 
nomadic wandering, and through this distinction regarding time itself, Cobussen would 
reconfigure music’s role to reflect a very different sense of freedom that comes with such ec-
static wandering. Now, music is no longer the vehicle that would elevate the spiritus into this 
state of “serene and eternal knowing”, its province and office clearly deviating from a 
traditionally stable convergence between the presence of the ineffable, the divine mystery of 
God, and the nature of the Cosmos.58 Bereft of belief, of God, of the goal, we must suppose 
that the spiritus—the conduit for desire itself—also wanders aimlessly without end as 
dispossessed outcast, the strangeness of its newfound freedom causing it to move, like the 
nomad, “to and fro, hither and thither, with neither fixed course nor certain end. Such 
wandering is erring—erring in which one not only roams, roves, and rambles, but also strays, 
deviates, and errs.” 59  
 
Spirituality, music, the spiritus, the ecstatic mystic, the wanderer, the nomad…all now the 
unlikely inhabitants of a spiritual no-man’s-land, decentred from the space between heaven 
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58 Stace, Time and Eternity, 32–40. 
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and earth, now inhabiting this unthinkable, empty place, the space which no longer is, but 
then again, is nonetheless still something, in that it carries the burden of the 
ineffable/Ineffable.  
 
What—or rather where—would the spiritus become in Cobussen’s atopia, and through which 
processes might we then create a new role for the cinematic body of light? Let us prepare a 
slow pathway back to this body through its primary sensory perception of the visible, and the 
utopian component of hope that is symbolically bound to this vision.  
 
A Transcendental Relapse: The Imaginary Cosmological Cartography 
What makes hope such an intense pleasure is the fact that the future, which we dispose of to 
our liking, appears to us at the same time under a multitude of forms, equally attractive and 
equally possible. Even if the most coveted of these becomes realized, it will be necessary to 
give up the others and we will have lost a great deal. The idea of the future, pregnant with an 
infinity of possibilities, is thus more fruitful than the future itself, and this is why we find 
more charm in hope than in possession, in dreams than in reality. 
—Henri Bergson60 
 
If the mystic has ever made use of both music and the body of light for the attainment of 
ecstasy, serenity and truth, what purpose could the spiritus now serve in relation to music? 
Nowhere, yet still somehow between and beyond things that may or may not exist, it would 
seem quite literally lost in the aether, searching amidst a vast atmospheric, vaporous, 
luminous, vibratory, aerial and etherical plane of energy, displaced in the no-man’s-land that 
unsettles and destabilizes the very binary system it derives from, the system which dictates 
the traditional ‘space’ of spirituality.  
 
Following Cobussen, we could say that, as for music and spirituality, so too for the itinerant 
spiritus, this atopia cannot be a safe “third place” that replaces the secure position of the 
oppositions surrounding it; it is still haunted by the co-presence of a body and a soul, haunted 
by the concept of God, so much so, that a postmodern, deconstructive thinking of spirituality 
beyond fixed (cosmological) spatial terms is ever in danger of what we might tentatively call 
an involuntary transcendental relapse: following Bataille’s aspiration to leave the unknown-
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ness of the spiritual unnamed, Cobussen  writes, “[t]he conversion from a non-place into a 
topos and the absorption of the in-between into well-defined categories are processes 
constantly lurking.”61 How might such a relapse transpire, even before we re-introduce the 
cinematic body of light back into this mire of interpolating values, beliefs, and ideals? What 
is it that lurks or remains within us? Or rather, what else lurks within us, other than and in 
addition to the uncanny processes of anthropomorphic thought that readily come to rescue 
thought from incertitude? How might the divine traces of a cosmomorphic music re-assert 
what Bataille calls “the enclosure of the unknown in some form of knowledge once again”?62 
Tentatively, ironically, could we suggest that it is some inner vision of music’s spirituality 
that seeks to settle and secure rational thought? Toward the enduring question of music's 
transcendence of signification, does this notion of a space between heaven and earth not, 
paradoxically, wake up the mind’s (religious and logocentric) eye, and call upon a vast 
gallery of inner cosmological images which would cannily re-determine the spiritual where? 
Does the divine feeling in music involuntarily summon what we might call the mirage of a 
mystical cartography, an imaginary cosmological map, one which may only designate the 
where of heaven and earth through the necessary presence of the air and the aether that 
separates them? 
 
Extending the significance of Cobussen’s atopia and spiritus then, could we suppose that 
these two concepts are obstacles for thought precisely because they would, together, disturb 
and derail thought’s inseparable vision or image of the spiritual where: if this space between 
body and soul, and between heaven and earth, is “the white spot on the map of language, the 
hole of language,” surely it is so because no image comes to rescue thought from the “blank 
interval” that stands in place of our map, from this “non-localizable place” which “haunts 
binary thinking.”63 Without this map, the where of spirituality seems to evaporate upon the 
(non)planes of an aether that, like music, cannot be seen or spoken, cannot be named, and yet 
unlike music, cannot be humanised. Through this more elemental, atmospheric, luminous 
sense that would rupture even the anthropomorphic tendencies that compel both religious 
desire and the uncanny processes of thought, the unsayable secret of music’s meaning now 
thrives amidst the spatial metaphors of this divine cosmos, rather than within the interior 
spaces of the sentient human.  
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As suggested earlier, Cobussen’s speculations seem only remotely related to the problem of 
anthropomorphic thought that the very question of a mystical cosmos—a cosmos created by a 
God whose image is man, a divine cosmos which man longs to feel utterly at one with—
seems to inevitably re-introduce. While, as Otten writes, “the source of all problems 
surrounding theological language [is] the notion of humanity as the image of God”,64 its 
inverse, that God is (anthropomorphically) created in the image of man,65 would seem 
equally entrenched within the processes of cosmomorphism. Placing music within this 
mystical framework, this image of the divine human is also, for our imagination, an image of 
the spiritus, and of the body of light, whose faith has lost its moorings, and whose estranged 
freedom has yet to become joyous.  
 
Through the following summations of Cobussen’s work, I would seek this more joyous 
purpose for contemplating the spirituality of the cinematic body of light, for its wandering, 
and for its own peculiar leaving behind of a self that is no longer certain. If the cinematic 
body of light is now, in some sense, also free of theological certainty, could its movements 
now appear to embody those of perpetual departure, endless unsettlement and dispossession, 
yet in so doing, echo the more empowering sentiments of Nietzsche’s earlier aphorism:  
 
He who has come only in part to a freedom of reason cannot feel on earth otherwise than as a 
wanderer—though not as a traveller towards a final goal, for this does not exist. …there must 
be something wandering within him, which takes its joy in change and transitoriness.66 
 
Conclusion: A Totemic Purpose for the Body of Light 
Let us end where we began, with Cobussen describing his musical atopia as “a non-place”… 
a “refuge…where Western thought breaks down...the non-space of spirituality, spirituality as 
an encounter with the inhuman…a radical otherness [which] recognizes and affirms the 
empty space, left behind after ‘the death of God’.”67  
In attempting to draw out a spiritually-complex connection between the cinematic body of 
light and Cobussen’s approach to the spiritual where of music—and in recognising the 
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inevitable and ironic role that mysticism must play through its vibrational bond between light 
and sound—I have tried to extend these conceptual boundaries beyond the convergence of 
the human and the divine, and beyond a purely archaic spirit-reality of the dead and the 
undead that characterises Gorky’s cinematic kingdom of shadows. Following Cobussen, I 
have sought to contextualise this bond through this alternative cosmological threshold which 
remains, for religious consciousness, above the earth rather than below, resurrecting a 
monotheistic, rather than a polytheistic, system of thought. If there is a figure that would rival 
the imaginary existence of the archaic mortal-divine because of its singular allusion to the 
living spirit of mystical practice, I think it must be this cinematic body of light. With its 
tripartite convergence of the human, the divine and the elemental (luminous) cosmic, this is 
the spirit bound to truth, beauty, perfection and goodness, all of which are symbolically 
rendered through this presence of light, a presence that would simultaneously summon the 
divine light intrinsic to mysticism’s ecstatic music practice. In the presence of music, the 
request this body makes for thought is a request to go, as Cobussen does, further into 
theology rather than before or beyond it, to see if there is something to be salvaged, 
something buried within or beneath its thresholds, something already performing a kind of 
metamorphosis in its migration into this other, more marginalised understanding of 
spirituality.  
 
The films of Deren and McLaren present a cinematic body of light. We might think of this 
figure as the properly modern legacy of the Renaissance spiritus which flows between the 
soul and the living body, and which inhabits the space between heaven and earth. In a 
spiritual sense, this body becomes an obstacle for thought, re-introducing a somewhere to 
ironically re-centre and re-stabilise Cobussen’s atopian nowhere, and for this reason also, we 
cannot evade religion: the symbol of divine radiance shines forth from the darkness 
surrounding it, the language of the negative divine naturally encompassing and defining this 
mystical liminal zone that simultaneously includes, however impossibly or paradoxically, the 
nomadic liminal space of Cobussen’s wandering mystic.  
 
In light of this strange irony, perhaps we could say that The Ineffable (of God) and the 
ineffable (of non-religious unknowing) now mark the crossing between an old spirituality and 
a new; the one that yearns and longs for the infinite bliss of eternity, and the other that 
realises that not only is such utopian idealism untenable in a dystopian world of adversary, 
suffering, madness, and nihilistic decay, but also that this absolute unknowing, within which 
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nothing is secure, requires the unadorned relinquishment of names such as God, Eternity and 
Heaven. Correspondingly, the cosmic threshold between the tone of music and the cinematic 
body of light also marks the crossing between these two distinct modes of spirituality, and 
between two variations of a particular presence that cannot be easily or logically delineated. 
If the cinematic body of light represents an ideal of freedom, it would clearly represent both 
kinds: the one whose definition entails the goal of eternity through the practice of ecstasy and 
rapture, and the other which remains ill-defined, its impossible nowhere ironically sustaining 
the fatigue of thought and language. 
 
As such, Cobussen’s complex work prepares the ground for our own thought experiment, 
providing a plurality of obstacles that would reveal the difficulties afoot in theorising a clear, 
uncomplicated path toward this figure’s spiritual bond with music.  In recognising these 
obstacles, could there be some new purpose for this arguably controversial figure, one which 
would recognise the moral implications of such a convergence? Could we approach the 
problem from a rather different perspective again, focusing more on the dynamic action or 
impetus that generates and impels Cobussen’s own processes?  For when placed in the 
presence of the cinematic body of light, we see that it is not only what and where this 
musical-spiritual atopia is and is not that is significant, but also what it does for thought, and 
what it becomes for us. I suggest that this relation between the cinematic body of light and the 
musical atopia becomes a locus of change which marks the very moment upon which the 
meaning of spirituality itself changes. 
 
In this continual passage between the two kinds of spirituality, where the old is ever within 
the new, and where the ecstasy of belief collapses into the “ec-static” forces of incertitude, 
the two kinds of spirituality surge across the strata of the two mediums. Within this, could we 
wonder whether there is a more memorial purpose at work for this bond, one which would 
allow us to grasp its role as a kind of totem or guardian for the transition from one mode of 
spirituality to another? Let us finish then, by gathering a sense of this purpose through the 
insights and questions that the impetus of Cobussen’s own meditations afford.  
 
Cobussen’s musical atopia unleashes an ungovernable incertitude, one that would see 
uncanny processes (those which cannot be contained by the order of religion) ever 
encroaching on a territory which once clearly belonged to The Ineffable. Thus by its 
inseparable association, the residue of theology already haunts the desire to speak of the 
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spiritual in music. Cobussen’s project is not to defame those belief systems that are 
predicated on principles of conformity, for, as he argues, even a ‘new’ kind of spirituality—
such as the postmodern category of “New Spiritual Music”—is founded on a sense of 
belonging, of naming, and of boundary-making.68 Instead, Cobussen allows the intermediary 
elements within mysticism—the spiritus, the space between heaven and earth—to perform 
their own kind of poetic magic or alchemy, to become, through the language of negation, less 
the mark of theological order and stasis, and more the revelation of a no-man’s-land, a 
disordered, spiritual wasteland within which one becomes a wandering nomad. Left to drift in 
the wake of the death of God, the spiritual in music is still a feeling that compels the 
imagination, but one that is now indeterminately nameless, belonging nowhere, as it learns to 
reconcile itself with the absence, rather than the presence, of the divine, and to live into its 
own creative possibilities. And although this nomadic sense of spirituality still requires the 
legacy which the death of God leaves behind (the language of sacred belief becoming, by 
strange necessity, the medium through which to move music from transcendental truth to 
spiritual ambivalence), it is re-introduced for the purpose of challenging thought’s love for a 
language that turns on the axis of space, a concept which persists in the effort to speak the 
meaningfulness of both cinema and music. Tracing the archive that follows Nietzsche, 
Cobussen can only emancipate the spirituality of music from the centred-ness and stability of 
mysticism’s cosmic structure—the stations of heaven and earth—by redeeming such aporias 
as the unthinkable and nowhere-ness, and offering a sense that reroutes and derails the 
spiritual where of traditional theology.   
 
Placed within the visual space of cinema, Cobussen’s musical atopia remains vulnerable to 
the enclosure of thought’s desire for stable spatial categories, significantly those of heaven 
and earth. Yet to counter this, time itself becomes the ground of possibility for thinking this 
fluctuating convergence between space and non-space, utopia and atopia. Between a time of 
faith and a time of disillusionment, a time of rapture and a time of rupture, a time of the 
mystic’s goal, and a time of the wanderer’s restlessness, the cinematic body of light literally 
illuminates the simultaneity of two supposedly discrete beliefs about time itself, collapsing 
the boundary between two modes of spirituality. 
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With all of these crossings we have now traversed, is it possible to reimagine the cinematic 
body of light, so immersed in its musical counterpart, as the crossing for change because it 
carries its former belief system within it; not as a figure who would endanger us to the 
transcendental relapse with its symbolic goodness, beauty, truth and perfection, but as a 
figure who would summon us to bear witness to our own longing for a belief in perfection, 
our own desire for the preservation of utopian desire itself?  In another way, if the cinematic 
body of light revives the astral spirit of mystical theology, while redeeming a musical atopia 
that is, paradoxically, shaped through the same language, perhaps it is possible—in light of 
the death of God, in light of what Tarkovsky calls the spiritual impotence of modern man69—
to perceive this body as not only the totemic guardian of utopian desire (not so much the 
token remainder of God, but of Stace’s hunger to create and believe in a truth that ‘God’ 
affords), but, more complexly, as Cobussen’s own mystic who, still harbouring the time of 
his old self, creates a new movement of faith out of this utopian-atopian abyss. In the 
continuous burial and exhumation of the musical divine, in the ceaseless closure and 
reopening of utopian desire, this peculiar doubling is ultimately what makes the cinematic 
body of light unique as a symbol of modal plurality: it is utopian, ineffable and uncanny at 
one and the same time, and in this sense, reimagines the extent to which art and modes of 
spirituality commune.  
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Chapter Four: Burlesquing the Spirit in the Cinema of the Absurd(s) 
 
The absurd is what is dissonant or is not heard (cf. Lat. surdus)…a discord or disagreement 
with the understanding, or reason, or with meaning, including the meaning of life.  …the 
absurd designates an actual manifestation of the absence of reason…The absurd, as a 
sensation of the absence of meaning, is also something experienced … In a specific, positive 
way, the three components of the absurd—logical, linguistic, and existential—are at work in 
the French word esprit; “nonsense” refers to a specific form of humour related in English to 
“wit” and in German to Witz (see NONSENSE, WITTICISM). 
       —The Dictionary of Untranslatables1 
 
In what sense might we reimagine the cinema books of Gilles Deleuze as a meditation on 
spiritual, existentialist thought? How might Deleuze’s Kierkegaardian borrowings lead us 
toward the fuller creative conceptualisation of a cinema of the absurd through his cinema of 
faith in the body of time and feeling? In bringing Deleuze’s cinema of faith into relation with 
the affective, theatrical forces of a gestural, jesting cinema of the body, are we able to rethink 
the ideal attitude of the spiritual life beyond the enduring cliché of the ascetic, serious 
(hu)man of faith?  In grasping the absurd through its basic etymological paradox—the 
intertwined seriousness and nonsense of existence—how might Kierkegaard’s ‘theatre of 
repetition’—the serious doctrine of existential despair and faith which performs beneath the 
rhetorical mask of irony and humour—perform as another voice in Deleuze’s ensemble of 
orators of the body?  
 
‘Give me a body then’: Kierkegaardian Borrowings and the Spirit of Immanence  
 
The absurd, or acting by virtue of the absurd, is then to act in faith, with confidence in God.   
—Søren Kierkegaard2   
 
 
                                                 
1 The Dictionary of Untranslatables: A Philosophical Lexicon, ed. Barbara Cassin, trans. Steven Rendall, 
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To believe, not in a different world, but in a link between man and the world, in love or life, 
to believe in this as in the impossible, the unthinkable, which none the less cannot but be 
thought: ‘something possible, otherwise I will suffocate’. It is this belief that makes the 
unthought the specific power of thought, through the absurd, by virtue of the absurd.  
          —Gilles Deleuze3 
      
“ ‘Give me a body then’: this is the formula of philosophical reversal.”4 This is how Deleuze 
begins Chapter 8 “Cinema, body and brain, thought” in Cinema 2. More-often, Deleuze’s 
summons for a body is directly attributable to a very particular ensemble—Spinoza, 
Nietzsche, Bergson, Artaud: these are Deleuze’s body-thinkers, his orators of the body—
believers in the infinite possibilities of the body—who prepare a very particular body for 
thought, one we might call the body of immanence.  Yet what is meant by ‘a body’, and how 
might it relate to the existentialism of Søren Kierkegaard, whose anchoring refrain in Fear 
and Trembling, is this ‘faith, by virtue of the absurd’?5 For what purpose would Deleuze 
borrow this other Kierkegaardian fragment ‘something possible, otherwise I will suffocate’?6 
And how might these, and other fragments such as “the spirit of sacrifice”, the 
“powerlessness” of thought, and an “ethics or faith that makes fools laugh” also be 
attributable to what Deleuze will elsewhere call Kierkegaard’s “theatre of humour and of 
faith”?7 How might Kierkegaard, the Christian existentialist of immanence, also be thought 
as one such orator of the body within the cinema books? 
 
 
 
                                                 
3 Deleuze, Cinema 2, 170.  
4 Ibid., 189. 
5 The primary source for this concept of faith in God, ‘by virtue of the absurd’ is Søren Kierkegaard’s Fear and 
Trembling; unless otherwise noted, all citations are sourced from Fear and Trembling, and, The Sickness unto 
Death, trans., intro and notes Walter Lowrie (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1954). On the 
significance of this phrase within Kierkegaard’s philosophy, see Ricardo Q. Gouvea, “Kierkegaard’s Catch 22: 
The Idea of Faith by Virtue of the Absurd and the Double-Movement of Faith in Fear and Trembling: A Study 
on the Relation Between Faith and Reason” (PhD diss., Westminster Theological Seminary, 1999), Proquest 
Dissertation Publishing (9930622). 
6 This phrase, with slight variations, also appears in Gilles Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, trans. Mark Lester, with 
Charles Stivale, ed. Constantin V. Boundas (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), 318; and Gilles 
Deleuze, Cinema 1: The Movement-Image, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (London: The 
Athlone Press, 1986), 233 n17.  
7 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 8–11.  
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Deleuze’s Orators of the Body: Infinite Bodies and Spiritual Landmines  
What is certain is that believing is no longer believing in another world, or in a transformed 
world. It is only, it is simply believing in the body. …Artaud said the same thing, believe in 
the flesh…Our belief can have no object but ‘the flesh’, we need very special reasons to make 
us believe in the body (‘the Angels do not know, for all true knowledge is obscure…’) We 
must believe in the body…which bears witness to life, in this world as it is. 
          —Gilles Deleuze8  
 
“ ‘Give me a body then’ is first to mount the camera” on a body.9…a body of tiredness and 
waiting, of stasis and paralysis, of action and crisis, of shock and affection, of crystals and 
planes, of dead forces and life forces, of burlesque and banality, of gesture, posture and 
attitude, of the serious and the sublime, of the grotesque and the uncanny, of madness and 
melodrama, of psychics and seers, of dances and dreams, of liquid perception and gaseous 
perception…a body whose theatrical grounding of ‘gesting’ and jesting would, beyond the 
mediation of words, before things are named, communicate its mode of existence affectively, 
authentically, luminously… a body of love and hate, good and evil, falsity and truth…a body 
which opens the kinaesthetic circuit of a reciprocity of feeling, and which calls up and casts 
out the dilutions of impotence, anaesthesia and catatonia that come to claim the absurdity of 
the modern world…10 …a body of energies, vibrations, rhythms, forces, passions, tensions, 
intensities and breakages, rather than a body whose significance is solely contingent upon 
whether it is, or is not, a body of God, a body that God depends upon for order…a body of 
Vertov, Chaplin, Dreyer, Dulac, Buñuel, Welles, Brecht, Bresson, Eisenstein, Rossellini, 
Pasolini, Godard, Resnais, Tarkovsky…a body of Spinoza, Nietzsche, Bergson, Artaud…a 
body of Kierkegaard…all the infinite bodies that cinema gives to thought…this is a 
Deleuzian cinema of the body, of the spirit, of modes of existence, of thought and the 
unthought…a cinematic restoration of faith in the body of time and feeling…a cinema of the 
absurd… 
 
With so many bodies of movement and time, how might we begin to grasp Deleuze’s credo— 
“We must believe in the body”—as the spiritual ground of the cinema books? And what are 
the spiritual landmines that irrupt as we encounter the infinite variations of this body? 
                                                 
8 Deleuze, Cinema 2, 172–73. 
9 Ibid., 189.  
10 For gesting body see Deleuze, Cinema 2, 192–203; for the burlesque body see Cinema 1, 169–77. 
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Following Spinoza, it is what a body can do—or perhaps can no longer do—that matters for 
Deleuze,11 and what it can teach us about ourselves; no longer a body strung-up between time 
and eternity, as with Bazin, but a messenger-body harbouring lessons of time… In 
Rossellini’s neo-realism, Deleuze sees the everyday, banal body as the reservoir of time’s 
tattoos, as a living mausoleum to the hopeless situation it endures, by virtue of gestures and 
attitudes, by virtue of the absurd: 
 
 ‘Give me a body then’ is first to mount the camera on an everyday body. The body is never 
in the present, it contains the before and the after, tiredness and waiting. Tiredness and 
waiting, even despair are attitudes of the body. …This is a time-image, the series of time. The 
daily attitude is what puts the before and after into the body, time into the body, the body as a 
revealer of the deadline.12  
 
If this bears out the qualitative feeling of Bergsonian duration, it also summons the essence of 
a figure that Kierkegaard will call “despairing man”, for whom death will not come, not even 
when we long for death’s reprieve.13 Already, this is a cinema of the absurd, restoring us to 
time’s relation to the horror of an absurd existence, and rerouting the very meaning of 
eternity through these messages engraved upon the body.  Is this not already profoundly 
ironic, if, for an atheistic sensibility, the notion of eternity is, in itself, an impossible concept? 
Is time itself the spiritual landmine that Deleuze hides within his bodies?  
 
Artaud… points to ‘real psychic situations between which trapped thought looks for a subtle 
way out’... . Now this sensory-motor break finds its condition at a higher level and itself 
comes back to a break in the link between man and the world. …For it is not in the name of a 
better or truer world that thought captures the intolerable in this world, but, on the contrary, it 
is because this world is intolerable that it can no longer think a world or think itself. …Man is 
not himself a world other than the one in which he experiences the intolerable and feels 
himself trapped. The spiritual automaton is in the psychic situation of the seer, who sees 
better and further than he can react, that is, think. Which, then, is the subtle way out?14 
 
                                                 
11 Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, 39; Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 256–57. 
12 Deleuze, Cinema 2, 189. 
13 Kierkegaard, The Sickness unto Death, 150–54.  
14 Deleuze, Cinema 2, 169–70. 
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In passages such as this, the body’s wounds of time—replete with sensory-motor ruptures and 
derailments—flow amidst the enigmatic resurrection of psychics, seers, spiritual automatons, 
and subtle exits: how are we to reconcile these potent allusions to sacred thought that seep 
into the cracks of this philosophical inversion? What is their role amidst this fragmentation 
between humanity and world?  Tiredness and waiting…despair …The broken link between 
self and world…the incapacity to think or to act in an intolerable world…for Camus, the 
grim realization of the time of the body inevitably compels the feeling of the absurd:  
 
[D]uring every day of an illustrious life, time carries us. …[Man] belongs to time and, by the 
horror that seizes him, he recognizes his worst enemy. …The revolt of the flesh is the absurd. 
…The absurd is born of this confrontation between the human need and the unreasonable 
silence of the world.15  
 
On the surface, the strident atheism of Camus’s absurd provides something of a preparation 
for Deleuze’s own message for a cinema of faith in the body. Camus would take up the 
suspension of possibility, passion, imagination and hope to ask when, or if, the act of suicide 
is justifiable in the moment of meaninglessness. Conceptually, The Myth of Sisyphus (1942) 
shares a natural empathy with the neo-realist mode of absurdity. One need only think of the 
child Edmund in Rossellini’s Germany Year Zero (1948), and the harrowing descent of 
circumstances which lead to his incomprehensible suicide.16 In the final excruciating scene of 
his ‘death-walk,’ Edmund’s body becomes the essence of the sensory-motor breakdown. 
Here, the everyday banal body of Deleuze’s time-image may certainly evoke qualities that 
empathise with Camus, and certainly Sartre. Edmund is condemned to be free. Edmund 
commits patricide. Edmund, as seer, encounters the unreasonable silence and hostility of an 
intolerable world. In the existential crisis that follows, is it Edmund, or Edmund’s body, who 
chooses to die? “Not that the body thinks,” writes Deleuze, “but, obstinate and stubborn, it 
forces us to think, and forces us to think what is concealed from thought, life.”17 Yet in this 
moment of absolute despair, how can Edmund, as despairing man(child), learn to think what 
his “non-thinking body” is capable of against this final, irredeemable act of self-annihilation? 
“Something possible,” as Kierkegaard’s hero pleads, “or else I will suffocate…” Is there a 
subtle way out for Edmund, rather than this final exit, a way to eclipse the sensory-motor 
                                                 
15 Camus, The Myth of Sisyphus, 12, 26. 
16 Germany Year Zero, in Roberto Rossellini’s War Trilogy, dir. Roberto Rossellini (1948; New York: Criterion 
Collection, 2010), Blu-ray.  
17 Deleuze, Cinema 2, 189.  
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collapse and restore the possibility of life? With so many spiritual landmines that permeate 
the cinema books, is it so strange to suggest that Deleuze’s cinema of faith relies not only 
upon his canonised orators of the body, but also upon the esoteric borrowings of 
Kierkegaard, for whom despair is the “spiritual paralysis” that seizes one in the wake of 
evil’s “stupefying, snake-like eye”?18 Edmund’s dislocated rhythms have broken with 
Bergson’s sensory-motor schema; he is Deleuze’s seer of an unbearable truth. As the poster 
child of modernity’s absurd post-war world, does he recapitulate the tenets of what 
Kierkegaard will call “the sickness unto death”, his actions capturing precisely the true 
paradox that Kierkegaard discovers between despair and faith? Here then, let us take a 
lengthy detour into Kierkegaard’s thought to locate the crossing between the absurd body in 
neo-realism, and the originally theological doctrine of despair. 
 
Kierkegaard: Despair and the Spirit of Immanence 
Death is not the last phase of the sickness, but death is continually the last. To be delivered 
from this sickness by death is an impossibility, for the sickness and its torment…and death 
consist in not being able to die. This is the situation in despair. 
        —Søren Kierkegaard19  
 
The Sickness unto Death begins as a burlesque.  Beneath the guise of his pseudonymous 
storyteller, Anti-Climacus, Kierkegaard rewrites the biblical scripture, “ “This sickness is not 
unto death” (John 11:4),” to capture the irony of such ‘death’ within the context of the 
Christian eternal life.20 With Kierkegaard, the utopian ideal of an end to the suffering of the 
theological body is abolished; now, as the unthinkable truth to both the finite and the infinite 
world, despair becomes, ironically and paradoxically, the force that would compel the 
possibility of spiritual freedom in this life, rather than the afterlife. Guided by an ever-
increasing hostility toward Christianity’s complacency, conformity and corruption, such 
questions of authentic selfhood speak, for Kierkegaard, to the most serious of spiritual 
problems. Thus, still framed in the Christian setting, but as the satirical counterpoint to an age 
in decline, his peculiar conception of a sickness unto death—despair—is the universal 
                                                 
18 Kierkegaard, Volume 1 A-E, Søren Kierkegaard's Journals and Papers (1967), 38. For further discussion on 
“spiritual paralysis”, see John J. Davenport, “Selfhood and ‘Spirit’,” in The Oxford Handbook of Kierkegaard, 
ed. John Lippitt and George Pattison (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 247.  
19 Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 154. For the existential significance of Kierkegaardian irony (including its 
liminal and ineffable significance), see K. Brian Söderquist, “Irony,” in The Oxford Handbook of Kierkegaard, 
344–64. 
20 Kierkegaard, The Sickness unto Death, 144 (italics added).  
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ground of individual experience, refusing to distinguish between modes of faith, the lack of 
faith, or the imposture of faith. Yet, while despair’s indwelling disquietude—the “anxious 
dread of an unknown something”—marks the absurdity of the human situation as this 
universal state,21 its dreadful paradox eludes the “natural man”, the one who neither loves nor 
believes in God.22 Certain of despair’s finitude, there is no end to what the natural man thinks 
only concerns our “earthly and temporal suffering: want, sickness, wretchedness, affliction, 
adversities, torments, mental sufferings, sorrow, grief.”23 For the ‘heathen,’ all sufferings end 
in death, in the way that the righteous Christian thinks that in death, his suffering too will 
end, with his soul set free. Yet there is a qualitative difference between the two, for the 
Christian who studies despair to “think dauntlessly of everything earthly and worldly, 
including death”, learns that the “truly dreadful” is that undying despair which shudders 
eternally in the spirit: thus, despair is not exclusively confined to the finite world.24  
 
Kierkegaard condemns the “vulgar”, simplistic view of despair as being “content with 
appearances” in its inability to know the difference between truth and falsity: in the moment 
of absurdity, when one thinks or knows oneself to be in an unusual state of mania or 
melancholia, despair hides itself beneath the mask of the rare, rather than the universal, 
beneath transitory disorder rather than permanent affliction.25  More-over, the vulgar attitude 
supposes this fleeting glimpse into oblivion to be bound to the finitude of time, that despair 
will either move through us in the passage of life itself, or it will end with our death, however 
melancholic or mad we become.  
 
Against this “gloomy” and “depressing” superficial view, Kierkegaard sees a latent, uplifting 
pedagogical purpose, for despair “seeks to shed light upon something that ordinarily is left in 
obscurity.”26 The object of illumination is, certainly, the need for a passion of faith to quell 
the existential crisis. Yet also within this is a need to rethink the nature of selfhood,27 so as to 
open out the possibility for becoming: despair illuminates the possibility for a transformation 
of thought regarding the immanent presence of eternity in time.28 The vulgar interpretation 
                                                 
21 Kierkegaard, The Sickness unto Death, 155. 
22 Ibid., 145.  
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid., 155–56. 
26 Ibid., 155. 
27 Davenport, “Selfhood and ‘Spirit’,” 233.   
28 Kierkegaard, The Sickness unto Death, 156–57. 
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makes the sickness something finite, and so preserves a boundary between the soul and the 
body. For Kierkegaard, and echoing the tradition of Renaissance mysticism, this sickness is a 
problem of the spirit, of the subtle substance that mediates the infinite soul and the finite 
body. Reminiscent of the melancholy spiritus of Marsilio Ficino, Kierkegaard’s spirit is the 
ethereal element which flows between body and soul, and so between time and eternity.29 In 
participating in the infinite, the spirit relates not only to time, but equally to the eternal. So 
too then, does despair.  
 
For the natural man who lives more in his body than in his soul, eternity exists within him, 
yet it only appears as the fleeting glimpse of a harrowing oblivion in the most extreme 
existential circumstances, those dire situations which would provoke the unthinkable longing 
for the finite end: “when the danger is so great that death has become one’s hope, despair is 
the disconsolateness of not being able to die.”30 Here again, despair is “this agonizing 
contradiction, this sickness in the self, everlastingly to die, to die and yet not to die, to die the 
death. For dying means that it is all over, but dying the death means to live the experience of 
death”.31 And while Kierkegaard’s despairing man longs for an unattainable death by virtue 
of death’s absence, he squanders the possibility of life because, in the absence of faith, his 
authentic self remains unknown to him:  
 
Ah, so much is said of human want and misery…but only that man’s life is wasted 
who…never became eternally and decisively conscious of himself as spirit, as self, or… 
received an impression of the fact that there is a God, and that he, he himself, his self, exists 
before this God, which gain of infinity is never attained except through despair.32  
 
There are then, two distinct modes of thought within which despair plays out its divine 
comedy. While the Christian comes to know the sickness unto death to be that despair which 
death itself cannot resolve, the atheist remains oblivious to the pedagogical possibility 
intrinsic to this truth, unable to realize that it is this unthinkable eternal despair that is the 
ground of a self not yet constituted; “the self…is the ground of despair.”33 Yet nor must the 
Christian assume he is a constituted self. In condemning the prolific pretender who lives 
                                                 
29 Kierkegaard, The Sickness unto Death, 157–58. 
30 Ibid., 151. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid., 159–60. 
33 Ibid., 151.  
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beneath the false mask of devotion to evade the grim truth of his existence, Kierkegaard 
argues that the only remedy for despair is its positive polarity, the passion of faith in God, 
which may only be acquired once one attains the state of spirit. Seeking the “light” of 
despair’s pedagogy of truth, one must no longer regard oneself as a transcendental soul that 
momentarily dwells in the body, or as a temporal body whose soul dwells in the mind: either 
way, one must learn to become spirit, to become the synthesis of the spiritual and the 
physical, so that the self may emerge in its authentic form: 
 
Man is spirit. But what is spirit? Spirit is the self. But what is the self? …Man is a synthesis 
of the infinite and the finite, of the temporal and the eternal, of freedom and necessity…A 
synthesis is a relation between two factors. So regarded, man is not yet a self.34 
 
In another way, natural man, as despairing man, is, ironically, not yet a self, not merely 
because he neither loves nor has faith in God, but because he believes despair to belong 
solely to the movements of time. In the same sense, the Christian who privileges the eternal is 
also in need of reparation: thinking himself too much a soul and not quite a body, he must 
learn to think the spiritual possibilities of the sensuous form: “the movements of faith must 
constantly be made by virtue of the absurd, yet in such a way, be it observed, that one does 
not lose the finite but gains it in every inch.”35  
 
Ultimately, in this reciprocal circuit, “despair of infinitude is due to the lack of finitude”, just 
as “despair of finitude is due to the lack of infinitude.”36 This reciprocity forms the order of a 
spectrum Kierkegaard calls the “forms of sickness”, upon which despairing man’s diverse 
incarnations proliferate against the ‘fear and trembling’ of self-knowing. On one end of the 
scale, we find the delusional, “sensuous” man who unconsciously lives the lie of happiness 
rather than the truth of absurdity; on the other end, we are offered the contentment of the 
believer who accepts calmly and quietly that he despairs, and for whom everything is 
possible in this life through the movements of faith. At times infinitely comic, at others 
tragically ironic, the forms comprise Kierkegaard’s strata of qualitative differences in kind; 
articulating their respective potency or impotency, each reveals the extent to which a life is 
                                                 
34 Kierkegaard, The Sickness unto Death, 146.   
35 Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 48. 
36 Kierkegaard, The Sickness unto Death, 163–68. 
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(or is not) able to live into the threshold of faith and despair, so as to become the free spirit of 
immanence: 
 
The self is composed of infinity and finiteness. …The self is freedom. But freedom is the 
dialectical element in the terms possibility and necessity. …The more consciousness; the 
more self; the more consciousness, the more will, and the more will the more self. …a self, 
every instant it exists, is in process of becoming, for the self (potentially) does not actually 
exist, it is only that which it is to become. …The self is reflection, and imagination is 
reflection, it is the counterfeit presentment of the self, which is the possibility of the self. 
Imagination is the possibility of all reflection, and the intensity of this medium is the 
possibility of the intensity of the self.37 
 
What is absurdity’s lesson, if possibility itself “is the only saving remedy” without which one 
cannot breath?38 If, for Kierkegaard, it is only through faith in God that all things become 
possible,39 the message of despair is one of dire irony. We are sick, yet we do not know it. 
We are not yet living an authentic spiritual life, and fail to grasp the measure of this. In 
becoming a spirit who is a self, we would learn to be dauntless in the face of death, we would 
learn to choose a life that accepts the burden of “the paradox of faith”,40 and live into the 
possibility of an authentic self.  Through lessons that would practice the art of choice as a 
matter of freedom, in learning to choose authentically, the true Christian comes to understand 
that, to believe, by virtue of the absurd, means to “risk at every moment the freedom of 
choosing.”41 One must be ready to lose everything to have it returned, however impossible 
and unthinkable this remains for reason. The Christian has, in his reach, the possibility of 
attaining authentic selfhood, and in so doing, become Kierkegaard’s “knight of faith”, that 
rarest and highest individual who makes the leap of faith. In leaping, writes Bogue, “the 
future is genuinely open”.42 The knight of faith believes unwaveringly, without pause or 
doubt, that in surrendering the finite to the infinite, that which he sacrifices will absolutely be 
returned to him—not in the afterlife, but in this world of time—and by virtue of the absurd, 
by virtue of that which human reason simply cannot fathom.43 This is what Kierkegaard calls 
                                                 
37 Kierkegaard, The Sickness unto Death, 162–164. 
38 Ibid., 172. 
39 Ibid., 172. 
40 Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 80–82.  
41 Ronald Bogue, Deleuze on Cinema (New York; London: Routledge, 2003), 180.  
42 Ronald Bogue, “To Choose to Choose,” in Afterimages of Gilles Deleuze’s Film Philosophy, ed. D.N. 
Rodowick (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2010), 119, ebrary Proquest eBook Central. 
43 Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 49.  
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the practice of repetition, the movement of repeating for the creation of the future (rather than 
recollecting or representing the past) that becomes central to Deleuze.44 Most significantly, 
this ordeal of acquiring an authentic self, of attaining faith, is incommensurate with rational 
knowledge, for the order of reason is simply unable to dialogue with the “irrational” 
intellectual impenetrability of the absurd.45 Thus, in the leap of faith, the sacrifice is two-fold: 
not only must we surrender the finite—such as the body, life, or a loved one—but we must 
also surrender the infinite which, in Kierkegaard’s sense, is the faculty of reason that desires  
knowledge, wisdom, truth. While we may know that we suffer, we may only believe in the 
absurd. And while this absolute difference describes the historical drama between philosophy 
and religion, it is also what makes the knight of faith virtually non-existent.  
 
Here then, is the ironic dilemma within the doctrine of despair: how are we to make the 
movements of faith if even Johannes de Silentio—Kierkegaard’s poet-narrator in Fear and 
Trembling—with all his love for God, cannot make the leap?46  
 
Kierkegaard’s Stages on Life’s Way 
[H]e learns to imitate the other men, noting how they manage to live, and so he too lives after 
a sort. In Christendom he too is a Christian, goes to church every Sunday, hears and 
understands the parson, yea they understand one another; he dies; the parson introduces him 
into eternity for the price of $10—but a self he was not, and a self he did not become. 
         —Søren Kierkegaard47 
 
Toward the attainment of faith on the plane of immanence, Kierkegaard presents a series of 
stages, each animating a fork in the road of choice: either one’s choice is influenced by the 
vulgar sense of despair that would see authenticity compromised in some way, or one 
chooses, with quiet humility, the way of authentic selfhood. As Arjen Kleinherenbrink writes, 
the Kierkegaardian path to a life of authenticity is “a matter of purging our motives for acting 
of all contingency and temporal displacement. Only a relation of each present to an absolute 
can serve as sufficient ground to grant authenticity to our existence. Kierkegaard identifies 
four modes of acting that must be avoided if such a relation to the absolute is to be 
                                                 
44 Bogue, “To Choose to Choose,” 115–32. 
45 Richard McCombs, The Paradoxical Rationality of Søren Kierkegaard, Indiana Series in the Philosophy of 
Religion (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013), 2–4. 
46 Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 47.  
47 Kierkegaard, The Sickness unto Death, 186.  
174 
 
attained.”48 In the nostalgic mode of recollection, we “long for the restoration of a contingent 
past… Recollection is…a mode of living that stops life dead in its tracks by “an undoing of 
movement and a reversal of [life’s] course.” ”49 In the opposing mode of hope, we are 
prisoners of utopia, acting “on an envisioned future that may never become reality.”50 In the 
contingent mode of the aesthetic, we risk living too much in the privacy of undisclosed 
“desires and sentiments”, choosing sensory or imaginary experience over our relation with 
others, leading to a possible denial toward social participation.51 The fourth contingent mode 
of existence to be expunged is the ethical, which Kierkegaard defines as “undisclosed” and 
“universal”:52 here, we act in consonance with approved communal orders, yet in securing 
our place in the fold, we may lose our individuality to social conformity, becoming a “limb of 
a larger body.”53 Though the modes of recollection, hope, the aesthetic and the ethical still 
possess the possibility to “inspire noble and beautiful actions,” they are perilous for their 
underlying motives, where, as Kleinherenbrink continues, we risk “the surrender of one’s 
life” not to faith, but to falsehood: “Aesthetically, to worldly distractions; ethically, to social 
conformity; in recollection, to dreams of a past; in hope; to longing for a future.”54  
 
Through “the passion of faith”,55 the knight of faith lives in the mode that extinguishes these 
other four modes of contingency and temporal displacement. By evacuating the inauthenticity 
implicit to these modes, and by practicing the movements of faith—those acts of choice 
particular to each stage—this final immersion into the religious mode ensures the remedy of 
authentic selfhood against the falsity of the world. This is not as straightforward as it may 
appear however, for on the level of knighthood, there is not one kind of knight, but two; the 
true knight who practices the movements of faith without fanfare or accolade, and the false 
knight of “infinite resignation” who is endlessly seduced by the façade of appearance, and 
who demands an attentive audience so that he may perform his role of ‘true’ Christian in 
Christendom.56 This is the role that Johannes, Kierkegaard’s narrator, is given, playing it to 
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54 Ibid., 
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perfection through a didactic, flamboyant rhetoric. While Johannes imagines the true knight 
as the ideal emblem of quiet humility and contentment (he paints the portrait of a tax 
collector no less: “I clasp my hands and say half loud, “Good Lord, is this the man? Is it 
really he? Why, he looks like a tax collector!”57), he understands himself—his incapacity to 
live into the true mode of repetition—ironically: he sees a “manikin” of imposture,58 one who 
longs for faith but is unable to make the leap required to have the finite returned absurdly to 
him, regardless of his love for God, due to his choice to remain in the infinite realm of 
philosophical thought, through the practice of soul-body separation. Johannes lives this to the 
extreme:  
 
For the act of resignation faith is not required, for what I gain by resignation is my eternal 
consciousness, and this is a purely philosophical movement which I dare say I am able to 
make if it is required, and which I can train myself to make, for whenever any finiteness 
would get the mastery over me, I starve myself until I can make the movement, for my eternal 
consciousness is my love of God, and for me this is higher than everything. …This movement 
I make by myself, and what I gain is myself in my eternal consciousness, in blissful 
agreement with my love for the Eternal Being. …But a paradoxical and humble courage is 
required to grasp the whole of the temporal by virtue of the absurd, and this is the courage of 
faith.59 
 
Within this unsettling refusal to live into the body through the act of fasting for God, the 
divide between the true and the false also expresses the difference between the quiet solitude 
of humility and the decadence of egoistic pride, for “he who loves God without faith reflects 
upon himself, he who loves God believingly reflects upon God.”60 Johannes is unable to 
attain the true. He cannot attain it, because in his love for God, and his practice of 
contemplation, Johannes lives too much in his soul than his body, the balance between the 
two ever evading him. Loving God, but unable to leap to Him, Johannes longs to learn the 
movements of faith: 
 
[F]or the movements of faith must constantly be made by virtue of the absurd. ...if I knew 
there was such a knight of faith, I would make a pilgrimage to him on foot… I would not let 
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go of him for an instant, every moment I would watch to see how he managed to make the 
movements, I would regard myself as secured for life, and would divide my time between 
looking at him and practicing the exercises myself, and thus would spend all my time 
admiring him. 61  
 
Ironically, while the false knight would spend his life as a mimic, the true knight is never a 
teacher but only a witness to his dreadful responsibility of faith: this is the difference between 
the mode of earnest repetition and the false “punchinello’s” private theatre.62 This is also a 
way to grasp the knight of infinite resignation as existing in the ironic mode of existence.63 
Where the true knight lives in solitude “without connections or pretensions”, the false knight 
is “sectarian”, a manikin who would unite with other elite manikins, and who would “leap 
away from the narrow path of the paradox and become a tragic hero at a cheap price.”64 In 
striving to affect the authentic posture of the true, in bolstering himself with the noisy 
company of other like-minded puppets, the false knight endlessly falls prey to the temptations 
of false honour.65 And while the knight of faith lives within the faith and guidance of his own 
instruction, the very idea of such unadorned quietude without earthly reward causes false 
knights to “leap aside”, for “they cannot bear the martyrdom of being uncomprehended, and 
instead they choose the worldly admiration of their proficiency.”66 Though the knight of 
infinite resignation surrenders the finite to the infinite for the love of God, he cannot risk the 
sacrifice of his intellect, however impossibly and unthinkably it might be returned to him in 
this life, by virtue of the absurd.  Ultimately, between the leap of faith and the falsity of 
imposture, the overarching problem of choice harbours the irony of surrender: we must be 
careful not to surrender our life to the modes of contingency and temporal displacement 
which may irrupt within the false mode of faith, yet be willing to surrender entirely to the true 
spiritual mode. Unable to sacrifice the intellect to have it impossibly returned, “the ironic 
self” of Johannes is not yet a self, a spirit, and so he is not yet a body with the infinite 
freedom of possibility for the future.67  
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No doubt, at every turn, these are irreconcilable thoughts for the sceptic, the non-believer, the 
materialist or the naturalist to embrace: however poetic or romantic the leap’s aspiration, it 
comes to the postmodern reader in the wake of two major adversaries; the Nietzschean death 
of God, and the simultaneous, ironic realisation of religion’s continuing indifference to this 
death. Caught between the two, and in seeking a crossing between Kierkegaard’s 
existentialism and Deleuze’s cinema of the body, is postmodernity’s great challenge to 
reconcile ourselves with the (Heideggerian) problem of thought that Deleuze readily invokes 
in Cinema 2, the possibility that we ourselves are still not yet thinking?: “ ‘Man can think in 
the sense that he possesses the possibility to do so. This possibility alone, however, is no 
guarantee to us that we are capable of thinking.’ ”68 …For in attempting to grasp a connection 
between the anthropological purpose of the cinematic human figure and an ethos of 
spirituality, the task is not so much to engage with the question of whether God does or does 
not exist, but to attempt to grasp Kierkegaard’s spirit of immanence through Deleuze’s eyes, 
in light of an unusual spiritual atheism that appears to permeate the cinema books.  Deleuze is 
advancing a theory for cinema’s purpose through the possibility of unity: “Whether we are 
Christians or atheists, in our universal schizophrenia, we need reasons to believe in this 
world. It is a whole transformation of belief.”69 Coming before cinema, Kierkegaard is 
already seeking to reunite humanity with its true self against an endemic falsity:  between the 
Christian whose love for God has yet to ascend to the level of absurd faith, and the atheist 
who neither loves nor believes, where despair “views every man in the aspect of the highest 
demand made upon him, that he be spirit”,70 Kierkegaard’s wry assessment of humanity’s 
situation stands not only on the absurdity of faith’s leap, but on the foundational problem of 
an absence of faith. Similarly, for Deleuze’s perception of post-war Europe, absence not only 
comes to form the ground of religiously-emancipated conceptions of both existentialism 
(Sartre) and the absurd (Camus), but is central to the ethos of the time-image. Thus, the link 
between Kierkegaard’s spirit of immanence and Deleuze’s cinema of faith is central to the 
possibility of thinking the unthought—life, the body—beyond a purely atheistic reading.  
 
As we shall now see, Kierkegaard’s philosophy of choice, given through the modes of 
existence, has a definitive presence in the cinema books, yet in contemplating the 
pedagogical possibilities of Deleuze’s credo of faith, the relation between despair and 
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authenticity gives rise to a stranger question: is it Deleuze’s position that (the image of) the 
body in cinema possesses the power to make of us knights of faith because, like us, it too is 
not yet a self?  
 
Kierkegaard’s Presence in the Cinema Books 
What cinema advances is not the power of thought but its ‘impower’, and thought has never 
had any other problem. …this difficulty of being, this powerlessness at the heart of thought. 
…a cinema of Christian inspiration was not content to apply these conceptions but revealed 
them as the highest theme of the film, in Dreyer, Bresson, or Rohmer: the identity of thought 
with choice as determination of the indeterminable. 
          —Gilles Deleuze71 
 
Now, let us stay with Kierkegaard’s spirit of immanence, to see how it emerges in the cinema 
books. We saw that for Kierkegaard, a new image of faith is required, one which bears 
witness to an age of religious falsity and the “triviality” of its theological enterprise.72 In The 
Sickness unto Death, he creates despairing man, who is everyman, every life who fears not 
only death, but the possibility of the true self. In Fear and Trembling, he creates the knight of 
faith, the devout man of quietude who gazes at the infinite possibilities within life, of which 
love, death, and despair are a part: opposing the preposterous Christian poser whose salvation 
is purchased at the church door, the knight is the true self of authenticity, choice, and spiritual 
freedom. Between the two, Kierkegaard distinguishes between the real and the possible, a 
relation that becomes critical for Deleuze. Kierkegaard sees that one of the more pressing 
problems within this poetic image of the true Christian (the created model of possibility) that 
testifies to the disillusioning false (the real situation of existence) is the more complex 
difference between a love for God, and the ordeal involved in nurturing authentic faith in 
God, a distinction which allows him to propose a new philosophy or practice that pursues a 
love for life in the body of time, rather than the desire for death in the soul of eternity. For 
Deleuze and Guattari, Kierkegaard’s knight is the necessary “conceptual persona”73 who 
performs the role of spiritual exemplar and guide, so as to restore the possibility of an ideal 
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mode for faith in a world of complacency, a world which naturally includes the philosopher. 
Their problem however, as scholars continue to note,74 is that Kierkegaard does not go far 
enough; he needs to perform an “empiricist conversion” for the concept of faith, one which 
allows immanence its absolute freedom from a necessary being named God. This does not, 
however, prevent Deleuze from drawing deeply from Kierkegaard to establish an existential 
grounding for Cinema 1: 
 
A fascinating idea was developed from Pascal to Kierkegaard: the alternative is not between 
terms but between the modes of existence of the one who chooses. There are choices that can 
only be made on condition that one persuades oneself that one has no choice, sometimes by 
virtue of a moral necessity (good, right), sometimes by virtue of a physical necessity (the state 
of things, the situation), sometimes by virtue of a psychological necessity (the desire that one 
has for something). The spiritual choice is made between the mode of existence of him who 
chooses on the condition of not knowing it, and the mode of existence of him who knows that 
it is a matter of choosing. It is as if there was a choice of choice or non-choice. If I am 
conscious of choice, there are therefore already choices I can no longer make, and modes of 
existence that I can no longer follow—all those I followed on the condition of persuading 
myself that ‘there was no choice’. …the spiritual alternative is elsewhere, it is between the 
mode of existence of him who ‘wagers’ that God exists and the mode of existence of him who 
wagers for non-existence or who does not want to wager. …choice as spiritual determination 
has no other object than itself: I choose to choose, and by that I exclude all choice made on 
the mode of not having the choice. This was…to be the essential point of what Kierkegaard 
calls ‘alternative’, and Sartre ‘choice’, in the atheist version which he puts forward.75 
 
In Cinema 2, as if to provide the necessary bookend to this possibility of choosing choice 
itself, Deleuze recapitulates the same message, rendering cinema as something of an ark for 
the plurality of existential modes, where the spectrum of diversity and difference reenergizes 
those irresolvable questions that envelop absurdity and despair: 
 
Now when the problem concerns existential determinations…we see clearly that choice is 
increasingly identified with living thought, and with an unfathomable decision. Choice no 
longer concerns a particular term, but the mode of existence of the one who chooses. This was 
already the sense of Pascal’s wager: the problem was not that of choosing between the 
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existence or non-existence of God, but between the mode of existence of the one who 
believes in God, and the mode of existence of the one who does not. …Kierkegaard drew all 
the consequences of this: choice being posed between choice and non-choice (and all their 
variants) sends us back to an absolute relation with the outside, beyond the inward 
psychological consciousness, but equally beyond the relative external world, and finds that it 
alone is capable of restoring the world and the ego to us. …The formidable man of good or 
the devout man (he for whom there is no question of choosing), the uncertain or indifferent 
(he who does not know how to, or is unable to choose), the terrible man of evil (he who 
chooses a first time, but can then no longer choose, can no longer repeat his own choice), 
finally the man of choice or belief (he who chooses choice or reiterates it): this is a cinema of 
modes of existence, of confrontation of these modes, and of their relation to an outside on 
which both the world and the ego depend. This point of the outside, is it grace, or chance?76 
 
That nowhere in these two elaborate ruminations on the relation between thought and the 
variants of choice do we find a clear correlation between the body—as a force of movement 
in time, gesture and pose—and its mode of existence—as the chance or determination of the 
inner movement of choice and attitude—diminishes the possibility of bringing Kierkegaard 
easily into the fold of Deleuze’s body-thinkers. Across the vast spectrum of literature 
invested in a Deleuzian cinema of the body, the tendency is, more-often and understandably 
so, to carefully evade or omit those bodies of religion—those more esoteric modes which 
seem to wander the pages itinerantly as though lost themselves—so as to remain faithful to 
the legacy which prepares a more organic, desiring, machinic body for thought: Spinoza, 
Nietzsche, Bergson, Artaud… Deleuze’s canonised orators of the body are the “flesh”77 of 
the rich archive which continues to progress the seemingly infinite possibilities of a 
Deleuzian body of immanence. In concert, a mass consensus repeats Deleuze’s credo; the 
body is no longer the creation of God but of nature, no longer the body of sorrow that would 
sully the pursuit for absolute, eternal truth, but the catalyst for grasping the time of life and 
the forces of feeling: 
 
The body is no longer the obstacle that separates thought from itself, that which it has to 
overcome to reach thinking. It is on the contrary that which it plunges into or must plunge 
into, in order to reach the unthought, that is life. …To think is to learn what a non-thinking 
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body is capable of, its capacity, its postures. It is through the body (and no longer through the 
intermediary of the body) that cinema forms its alliance with the spirit, with thought.78   
   
The idea that thought is the crossing upon which a ‘cinema of modes of existence’ meets a 
cinema of faith is beguiling for its atheistic sensibilities. With the body so affirmed as that 
which thought “plunges into”, this invocation of spirit is, for Cooper, neither a matter of soul 
nor afterlife, for Deleuze’s esprit “harnesses the dual sense of mind and spirit,” his “spiritual 
automaton…connected purely to the power of thinking”.79 Robert Sinnerbrink calls this 
cinema’s “ethico-existential imperative”, “a cinematic ethics of immanent conversion” which 
would “diagnose, respond to, and perhaps overcome” the nihilism endemic to the capitalist 
dystopia of “scepticism, lack of conviction, brutality and violence.”80 As a pedagogy for such 
dire modern straits—as a practice for the restoration of faith—a Deleuzian practice of film-
philosophy more-often affirms the province of thought rather than spirit, resolved to 
questions of time rather than eternity, and to choices of life, death and limbo on the plane of 
immanence, rather than esoteric ruminations of death, liminality and afterlife on the plane of 
transcendence.   
 
Is it here that we begin to sense the quiet convergence between a cinema of the body and a 
cinema of modes of existence, the culmination of which returns its peculiar pedagogy to 
Kierkegaard’s own lessons?  For if it is the body that thought must “plunge into” to grasp the 
unthought of life, death, love, choice, freedom and possibility, is it not equally because, in the 
ethos and pathos of the lives of these bodies, it is both movement and time that we ourselves 
“plunge into”; movement-bodies that would create one kind of shock for thought’s subtle 
spirit, and time-bodies that would create another kinaesthetic-reflection circuit, one whose 
fragments and ruptures lead back to a “deeper memory” than that of any former present, “a 
memory of the world directly exploring time, reaching in the past that which conceals itself 
from memory.”81 If the cinema of belief is, as Lisa Trahair writes, the “secular corollary to 
Søren Kierkegaard’s religious belief as a leap of faith”, then it is so in one very peculiar, and 
relatively untouched, sense.82 As we are beginning to see, Kierkegaard’s leap of faith has 
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everything to do with desiring and nurturing the time of the self, 83 through the edification of 
the spirit who lives in the time of this world through the body of feeling. This, I hope to 
argue, is the most profoundly provocative reason for searching out and restoring a 
Kierkegaardian body of faith in time to Deleuze’s ‘orators of the body’: following Deleuze’s 
Kierkegaardian borrowings—the modes of existence, his ‘faith, by virtue of the absurd’, the 
possible  (there are still more to come)—are we able to enfold this more complex spiritual 
contour within the organic action bodies of Spinoza, Nietzsche, Artaud and Bergson, all of 
which return to the not yet of possibility? Soon enough, we will become intimately 
acquainted with Kierkegaard’s actual body as the conduit and catalyst for spiritual thought. 
For now, we must continue to trace the reasons for its obscuration through more recognisable 
paths. 
 
The Subtle Way Out and the Spiritual Automaton: Esoteric Landmines for Atheistic Thought 
Admittedly, if one comes to know Deleuze through his established orators of the body, the 
connection to Kierkegaard is difficult to reconcile, particularly in an age floundering in 
spiritual disillusionment, scepticism, cynicism, cliché and de-sacralisation. At times, Deleuze 
would seem to reroute philosophically dangerous terms such as faith and spirit, choosing 
their more secular exchanges of belief and thought, a gesture that fits well with his image as 
naturalist philosopher and radical atheist.84 Yet he is not quite so transparent or forthcoming 
with those other esoteric borrowings evocative of Christian mysticism introduced earlier, 
such as the subtle way out.85 Traditionally, in the history of ideas, the subtle way out is not 
the way of the atheist, but the alchemist; it is the way of the subtle or astral body—the 
diaphanous body of glory and light—whose practice generates a “profound feeling of 
freedom” , whose power is “exempt even from the law of karma, from the law of cause and 
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effect”, and whose process of transformation opens the possibility to choose and to act freely 
in the gross world through the gross body.86 This is precisely the spirit that Kierkegaard 
summons for thought. When Deleuze speaks of the affective potency of cinematic movement, 
it is as if he too directly summons the mysticism of Ficino, for whom the vibration of music’s 
primordial tone naturally heals the melancholy spiritus:  
 
It is only when movement becomes automatic that the artistic essence of the image is realized: 
producing a shock to thought, communicating vibrations to the cortex, touching the nervous 
and cerebral system directly. …Automatic movement gives rise to a spiritual automaton in us, 
which reacts in turn to movement.87 
 
In his treatise on self-preservation and well-being through musical practice, Ficino thinks 
“scholars must be particularly careful, since they lead a sedentary existence, are prone to 
melancholy, and are always using up their spiritus through the exercise of the imagination.”88 
Does this not have an uncanny resonance with Deleuze’s enigmatic allusions for cinema’s 
apothecary charms?  For Joshua Ramey, the connection between the mystic’s subtle body and 
the spiritual automaton—“a kind of golem that can transmit the spiritual sense of the world 
directly to the brain, bypassing ordinary physical and psychic capacity”—clearly reveals the 
pedagogical purpose of Deleuze’s time-image: in the catharsis of film’s visionary experience, 
cinema may “render a glorious or astral body, a subtle body” in the spiritually dormant 
spectator: this is the subtle way out, the “spiritual alternative” as Kierkegaard will say, the 
way of the spirit’s freedom, of thought’s choice.89  
 
For Ficino, the subtle way out is the way of the spiritus—the possibility of edification, 
transformation and self-empowerment achieved through the practice of music. In kind, 
Deleuze alludes to the luminary vibrations of cinema as the shock that would similarly re-
awaken the spiritual automaton and reenergise thought. For ‘to give’ a body, has another 
sense for Deleuze, one which captures the subtle body in its essence: “there is another pole to 
the body, another cinema-body-thought-link”, the “ceremonial body” which cinema imposes 
                                                 
86 Behun, “The Body of Light,” 129. For the connection between Deleuze and Guattari’s BwO and the subtle 
body, also see “Durée: The Aesthetics of Desire-Time,” in Angels of Desire, 136–62; and Johnston, “Subtle 
Subjects and Ethics,” 239–48.  
87 Deleuze, Cinema 2, 156. 
88 Godwin, Harmonies of Heaven and Earth, 25. 
89 Ramey, The Hermetic Deleuze, 151; Deleuze, Cinema 1, 114–16. 
184 
 
upon the banal everyday body of despair.90 “Sometimes,” writes Deleuze, “this cinema of the 
body mounts a ceremony, takes on an initiatory and liturgical aspect, and attempts to summon 
all the metallic and liquid powers of a sacred body…”91 No longer simply following the 
everyday body, cinema prepares, by virtue of the medium itself, visionary images of bodies 
that become “gracious and glorious”, bodies which equally become “grotesque” in the 
Carnivalesque masquerade that cinematic transfiguration naturally imposes through its forces 
of light and shadow.92 When, in the early stages of Cinema 1, Deleuze conjures the non-
organic life of German Weimar silent cinema—the somnambulists, zombies, and golems of 
Lang and Murnau—it is to suggest the pedagogical possibility—the existential, cosmological 
message—of Expressionism’s (Kantian) dynamic sublime: this is the discovery of an 
indwelling luminous feeling of goodness against supernatural forces of darkness.93 Here, the 
full spectrum of cinema’s intensities of luminosity, darkness, shadow and chiaroscuro—all 
“shimmering, glistening, scintillation, sparkling, a halo effect, fluorescence, 
phosphorescence”—are drawn into the sublime, which enables the rediscovery of the wrath 
of God and the infinite in the spirit of evil: 
 
In the dynamic sublime, it is intensity which is raised to such a power that it dazzles or 
annihilates our organic being, strikes terror into it, but arouses a thinking faculty by which we 
feel superior to that which annihilates us, to discover in us a supra-organic spirit which 
dominates the whole inorganic life of things: then we lose our fear, knowing that our spiritual 
‘destination’ is truly invincible. …[the sublime] unleashes in our soul a non-psychological life 
of the spirit…which is the divine part in us, the spiritual relationship in which we are alone 
with God as light.94 
 
That Deleuze acts simply as passive messenger of such divine symbolism is possible. Yet 
throughout his cinema books, the ambiguity that surrounds such sacred borrowings opens 
toward something more, a kind of methodological mystery. How do we interpret such 
sublime incantations for a spirituality that is no longer purely connected to thought, but 
something beyond thought, something that acts upon the spiritual automaton to awaken us to 
the new, to restore us beyond our own somnambulism and anaesthesia, to shock us into 
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thinking and feeling, to arouse the body “which has been preserved and lives on in the holy 
shroud or the mummy’s bandages, and which bears witness to life, in this world as it is”?95 
Or rather, how do we begin to think a crossing between the Christian and the atheist, thought 
and spirit, belief and knowledge? In the later chapters of Cinema 2, Deleuze brings the 
essence of these earlier ruminations into the enclave of Artaud’s “cinema of cruelty”, where 
the disparate ideals of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche appear as ruins amidst Pasolini’s own crisis 
of faith:   
 
Kierkegaard says, ‘the profound movements of the soul disarm psychology’, precisely 
because they do not come from within. …Thought finds itself taken over by an exteriority of 
a ‘belief’, outside any interiority of a mode of knowledge. Was this Pasolini’s way of still 
being Catholic? Was it on the contrary his way of being a radical atheist? Has he not, like 
Nietzsche, torn belief from every faith in order to give it back to rigorous thought?96  
 
Taken altogether, such reconfigurations of faith are only a few of the spiritual landmines, 
lacunas, shadows and crossings that permeate the cinema books. Across the movement-image 
and the time-image, amidst the gestural cast of mystics, psychics and seers, it is obscure 
allusions such as these—proclamations of bodies who would summon the vestiges of both an 
alluring archaism and a Christian mysticism—that remain curiously opaque against the more 
prolific readings of Deleuze’s cinema as the “immanent conversion of faith”, 97 as a cinema 
that chooses the attitude of the atheist rather than the Christian, of ethical thought rather than 
spiritual thought.  
 
Amidst this eclectic wilderness of spiritual bodies, it is not surprising that for certain film 
scholars, Deleuze’s striking religious innuendoes—for a “Catholic quality” in cinema, for the 
ambiguous resurrection of Kierkegaard’s sacred existentialism especially—are deeply 
problematic, the implicit “theological leap” becoming the unsettling obstacle for cinema’s 
pedagogical possibilities.98 Perhaps this is indicative of Kleinherenbrink’s reflection that a 
finer acknowledgement and appreciation of Deleuze’s Kierkegaardian influence remains 
ephemeral at best, however much “Deleuze consistently works with and through Kierkegaard 
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whenever he arrives at questions of the good life or of the best mode of existence.”99  Surely, 
such a lacuna reveals a natural disinclination to provoke the precarious crossing between 
Christianity and atheism. This however, is a conservative estimation of the problem in 
relation to the fragment “Give me a body then”, and the problem of immanence that it courts 
so dangerously: ensnared in differences between a false and true Christian faith, between 
Kierkegaardian faith and Deleuzian belief, between Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, between faith 
and knowledge, between despair and absurdity, between thought and spirit, between physical 
bodies and spiritual bodies, the fragment itself seems to have lost one of its more provocative 
contours for thinking cinema’s ability to reanimate and reimagine the possibilities of a body 
of immanence. Remaining variously beholden to the duration of Bergson, the ‘doing’ of 
Spinoza, the disorganisation of Artaud, and the earthy affirmation of Nietzsche, Deleuze’s 
body of immanence is yet to be thought as the borrowing and transfiguration of a 
Kierkegaardian spirit of immanence, a body that lives into the time of the self so as to become 
a subtle body “in this world, as it is”.100 
 
The Body of Absence: Not Yet a Body, Not Yet a Self 
If the fragment “Give me a body then” is, as Deleuze writes, the philosophical reversal for the 
modern age, it is equally a testament to both the academy’s theological emancipation and 
modern philosophy’s confrontation with existence through the problem of immanence: as 
Ramey writes, where medieval conceptions of immanence and transcendence forge possible 
relations between God and creation, Spinoza (the “Christ of Philosophy” for Deleuze and 
Guattari) would notoriously identify God with nature, collapsing the distinction between God 
and creation, and annihilating the idea of God as transcendent.101 For Deleuze and Guattari, 
immanence is “the burning issue of all modern philosophy…It is not immediately clear why 
immanence is so dangerous, but it is. It engulfs sages and gods.”102 Ramey continues:  
 
The achievement of Spinoza was that, rather than eliminate perfection, infinite power, or even 
eternity from the philosophical lexicon, Spinoza presented these divine dimensions as aspects 
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of nature understood as one infinite substance: deus sive natura. For Deleuze, Spinoza’s 
inclusion or implication of divine perfections within (and as) the contours of the world 
constitutes a solution to the problem of modern philosophy: how to think the reality of the 
infinite as immanent to the perspective of a finite mind, and how to think finitude as an aspect 
of nature viewed as absolute substance. …transcendence has been completely absorbed into 
immanence. The essential modern problem, for Deleuze, is not that there is no longer a God 
to believe in, but that the world has taken on the attributes of God and, mutatis mutandis, the 
world has become uncanny, vertiginous.103  
 
Thus, for Deleuze, modern philosophy’s efforts to think immanence as this infinite possibility 
continuously succumbs to the same temptation as theology, “the temptation to make 
immanence immanent to something else”, be it “God, humanity, or a transcendental ego”, 
meaning, in particular, the “miniature transcendences” of scepticism, humanism, Descartes’ 
cogito, Kant’s  transcendental subject and Husserl’s phenomenological consciousness.104 
Deleuze and Guattari would search for a new possibility for immanence, one which is free 
from such imperatives, finalities, and ultimatums. With Kierkegaard, they still find a man of 
transcendental faith, yet one who will “constantly recharge immanence”, and who is 
“concerned no longer with the transcendent existence of God but only with the infinite 
immanent possibilities brought by the one who believes that God exists.”105 As we have seen,  
Kierkegaard’s philosophy of choice is directly invoked in the cinema books, yet the 
possibility of a Kierkegaardian body that opposes a traditional theological body of sorrow 
still remains obscure, especially in the presence of more contemporary bodies which appear 
to make a more decisive break from religious thought. 
 
The Body without Organs 
We must believe in a sense of life renewed by the theatre, a sense of life in which man 
fearlessly makes himself master of what does not yet exist, and brings into being.  
      —Antonin Artaud106 
 
Artaud never understood powerlessness to think as a simple inferiority which would strike us 
in relation to thought. It is part of thought, so that we should make our way of thinking from 
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it, without claiming to be restoring an all-powerful thought. We should rather make use of this 
powerlessness to believe in life, and to discover the identity of thought and life… 
          —Gilles Deleuze107 
 
God becomes an invisible vanishing point, a powerless thought. 
        —Søren Kierkegaard108 
 
If the “embodied anti-theology” 109 of Artaud’s body without organs (BwO) remains a 
principle figure for Deleuze and Guattari, it is so for its declaration of war against the 
organisation of the body’s organs, for its perverse desires, disorders, destabilisations and 
derailments of experimentation against the judgement of God and the order of the theological 
system.110 “The BwO,” writes Judith Poxon, “is process, flux, function, as opposed to the 
static identity of the theological body, the body-as-organism.”111 For Deleuze and Guattari, 
the BwO “is the field of immanence of desire”, not only gesturing to the “dreary parade of 
sucked-dry, catatonicized, vitrified, sewn-up bodies” of paranoia, hypochondria, 
schizophrenia, drugs (the “experimental schizo”) and masochism, but also those melancholy-
free bodies “full of gaiety, ecstasy and dance.”112 In this sense, Artaud’s BwO is intensely 
Dionysian, a mass of creation and destruction, and equally the measure of Spinoza’s question, 
what can a body do?113 If the order of God—the order of existence as divine creation—
depends on the existence of the body, if “God must depend upon the body”,114 then the BwO 
is, for Deleuze, nothing short of the Antichrist, to which Spinoza’s Ethics is the “great book”:  
with Guattari, he writes, Spinoza’s “attributes are types or genuses of BwO’s…The modes 
are everything that comes to pass: waves and vibrations, migrations, thresholds and gradients, 
intensities produced in a given type of substance starting from a given matrix.”115  The BwO 
is the experimental disintegration of the theological body, upon which we moderns are 
already “scurrying like a vermin, groping like a blind person, or running like a lunatic: desert 
traveler and nomad of the steppes. On it we sleep, live our waking lives, fight—fight and are 
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fought—seek our place, experience untold happiness and fabulous defeats; on it we penetrate 
and are penetrated; on it we love. ….To be done with the judgement of God…”116 More-over, 
if a core distinction between the theological body and the BwO is one of being and becoming, 
it is so because the BwO is “not at all a notion or a concept but a practice, a set of practices”: 
it is a body one makes or creates for oneself through a process of emptying out all of the 
orders imposed upon it (“The BwO is what remains when you take everything away”); it is an 
unruly and unholy experimentation with one’s limits and desires, its final realization never 
entirely acquired or reached (“you are forever attaining it: it is a limit.”).117 Ironically 
however, like the spiritual automaton, the BwO cannot entirely escape its alliance with a 
more mystical past. For William Behun, Deleuze and Guattari’s conception of the BwO 
resurrects the body of light’s alchemistic mode of freedom and choice through its 
emancipation from fixed determinations, as it prepares a pathway for becoming a radical 
force of political, social and artistic change: 
 
The spiritual body or the body of light is watery, mercurial, protean. It has not been fixed; it is 
still volatile, open to all possibilities—nothing can limit it. …the possibilities of action 
become limitless. Potentialities, intensities and flows are allowed to take their own courses 
without being predetermined by physical, moral, or karmic law. …The BwO is a way of 
experiencing the world that is not determined in advance by any system of lawfulness. It is a 
body of freedom, free even from the determination of the dichotomy between freedom and 
determinism. …The world is no longer experienced as a lawfully determined system, as a 
cosmos, but rather as a chaos of possibility liberated from the construction of laws 
systematically imposed by capital and its allied systems of power. …The making of the BwO 
is an act that transforms our way of engaging and living in a world.118 
 
Against the infinite possibilities immanent to this potent figuration of a body of freedom, it is 
little wonder that a Kierkegaardian body of immanence, steeped in the ordinations of divine 
love, remains occluded from view: against so much perversity, chaos, intervention and 
euphoria, the modesty and quietude of authentic self-knowing is, admittedly, comparatively 
unsensational.  
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That Deleuze’s summons for a body invites the affirmation of an atheistic sensibility is, 
inevitably, the measure of the field that follows in his wake. In the age of the Nietzschean 
death of God, and amidst the throng of a naturalist atheism that Deleuzian film-philosophy 
celebrates, it is unsurprising that Kierkegaard’s existentialism is yet to be brought into the 
fold of the secular work that continues to “plunge into” a Deleuzian body of immanence.119 
As Ramey argues so eloquently, is this not almost certainly because Deleuze himself is yet to 
be thought beyond the identity of a “stridently naturalistic” and “strictly materialist 
philosopher”, that he is yet to be appreciated as the unlikely herald of hermetic truth, as 
uncanny messenger of “secrets of immanence”, as a philosopher whose practice is grounded 
in the “spiritual ordeal” of seeking out original thought?120 These are indeed heady 
sentiments. If the creation of a cinema of faith in the body is just such an ordeal, could 
Kierkegaard be one such secret that lies within, rather than in opposition to, the 
proclamations made by Deleuze’s more renowned orators of the body? And is this perhaps 
the canny wager of a philosopher who studies the ruins of representation, who gauges a mass 
habitus of secularised western thought that would, like a faulty divining rod, guide our 
earnestly intended philosophical reflection on the practices of faith toward a false, rather than 
true, problem?121 To believe, or not to believe; to choose time, or to choose eternity; the body 
or the soul; presence or absence; life or death: Kierkegaard’s aim is to educate us away from 
such simplistic dichotomies. In kind, Deleuze chooses to believe in cinema as a pedagogy, to 
believe in the movement and time of the body of feeling—not as a concept, but as a 
practice—for the simple reason that in cinema, it is the feeling of movement and the feeling 
of time, that a true cinema restores to us. With Deleuze, we see that cinema is not unlike 
Kierkegaard himself as it recharges immanence. And what Ramey says of Kierkegaard’s 
influence, we could say of cinema: it “reenergize[s] the gesture of exposing the mind to a 
series of essentially unsolvable questions: Who am I in the face of an unknown God? Where 
am I in a decentred world? What am I in the face of my obscure material potencies?”122   
 
How might we think Kierkegaard without thinking religion? Or rather, how do we catch a 
glimpse of Kierkegaard’s faith through Deleuze’s eyes? For as Ramey reminds us, the 
properly modern problem for Deleuze is “not how to distinguish the religious as opposed to 
                                                 
119 Kleinherenbrink, “Art as Authentic Life,” 98–99, 104; Baugh, “Private Thinkers, Untimely Thoughts,” 314. 
120 Ramey, The Hermetic Deleuze, 1–9. 
121 Deleuze, Bergsonism, 15. 
122 Ramey, The Hermetic Deleuze, 14. 
191 
 
the irreligious, the pious from the impious, but rather to discern the effects of different 
practices of belief.”123 If we require messengers and lessons for a life of freedom, perhaps it 
becomes a matter of burrowing into age-old spiritual orders, rather than eliminating or 
evading them, so as to reimagine and create the world anew: if it is a matter of forging 
strange relations between traditionally incommensurate thought-systems and unusual 
pairings, a matter of drawing out connections beneath, through and across the surface of 
things, it is no less a process and practice of alchemic transfiguration, one that no longer 
moves between the real and the represented, but between the real and the possible. 
 
Presence and Absence in the Cinema of Spiritual Paralysis 
The modern fact is that we no longer believe in this world. We do not even believe in the 
events which happen to us, love, death, as if they only half concerned us. It is not we who 
make cinema; it is the world who looks to us like a bad film. …What is in play is no longer 
the real and the imaginary, but the true and the false. 
—Gilles Deleuze124  
 
That an irreconcilable divide arcs between the orders of orthodox religion and Deleuze’s 
celebrated credo for a violent atheism is clear. The cinema books are taken to be a testament 
to this while recognising the sheer difficulty of the medium’s ethical challenge: “Restoring 
our belief in the world, restoring our reason…It is doubtful if cinema is sufficient for this; but 
if the world has become a bad cinema, in which we no longer believe, surely a true cinema 
can contribute to giving us back reasons to believe in the world and in vanished bodies?”125  
As we are also beginning to see, the cinema books equally reveal Deleuze’s captivation with 
certain mystical practices, and for advancing philosophical riddles and aporias through such 
esoteric borrowings. That so much is left unclarified by Deleuze himself means that certain 
crossings and connections remain ambiguous, unstable; between Christian and atheist, belief 
and knowledge, spiritus and thought. Yet we must continue to remind ourselves that 
Deleuze’s immanent conversion is not so much the overturning of a Christianity that would 
divide the transcendental, eternal soul from the immanent body of time, however much this is 
a natural consequence of the field that follows in his wake. Deleuze is a radical atheist, this is 
indisputable. Even so, this does not prevent him from drawing deeply from those complex 
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philosophies of existence that are inordinately spiritual, and which pursue a unique and 
progressive pathway toward a new conception of the free spirit. Nietzsche rumbles beneath 
all of this, of course, the irony of cinema’s “special relationship with belief” inviting Deleuze 
to take an equally ironic stance on modernity’s inability to relinquish the habitus of religious 
thought: “Cinema seems wholly within Nietzsche’s formula: ‘How we are still pious.’ ”126  
 
Is Deleuze’s summons for a body then intensely ironic? Does it court diverse avatars, 
schisms, transformations and mutations of existential desire at one and the same time? What 
is the promise innate to Kierkegaard’s sacred practice of thought, if not its own 
transcendental overturning? In the cinema books, the most direct qualification of a difference 
between Christian and Kierkegaardian faith appears in Cinema 1, where Deleuze takes up a 
very particular crossing that emerges within the folds of philosophy, religion and cinema. 
Troubling the ephemeral convergence between faith and knowledge, Deleuze simultaneously 
distinguishes between Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, through the notion of restoration that 
binds the acting body to the cinema of faith: 
 
This extreme moralism which is opposed to morality, this faith which is opposed to religion, 
is a strange way of thinking. It has nothing to do with Nietzsche but has much to do with 
Pascal and Kierkegaard, with Jansenism and Reformism…It weaves a whole set of relations 
of great value between philosophy and the cinema. …in philosophy, as in the cinema, in 
Pascal as in Bresson, in Kierkegaard as in Dreyer, the true choice, that which consists in 
choosing choice, is supposed to restore everything to us. It will enable us to rediscover 
everything, in the spirit of sacrifice…Kierkegaard said that true choice means that by 
abandoning the bride, she is restored to us by that very act: and that by sacrificing his son, 
Abraham rediscovers him through that very act.127  
 
If this spirit of sacrifice, and this strange faith which would oppose religion, has “nothing to 
do with Nietzsche,” it equally has nothing to do with the death of God or the melancholic 
mourning for a lost divine realm. As Paola Marrati reinforces, “our problem is not the 
absence of God but instead our absence from this world.”128 With Daniel Barber, we can take 
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this striking distinction further to suggest that this loss is intimately connected with the 
imagination: 
  
To imagine is to make the world; to call for a different imagination, or to imagine differently, 
is to make a different world. We should, in virtue of these claims, interpret Nietzsche’s 
proclamation as having less to do with God’s existence than with the world produced by the 
imagination of God’s existence. It is a proclamation that concerns theology, but it is just as 
much one that concerns what is at stake in making a world. …God’s death, as well as God’s 
life, stands or falls on the power of the imagination.129 
 
Barber’s relation between spirituality and imagination is provocative for its finer allusions to 
a man-made world bereft of self-presence, a problem that, for Simon O’Sullivan also, 
inevitably returns to human acts of creation. Following Deleuze and Guattari, O’Sullivan 
perceives art as a dynamic encounter with the unrecognisable, rather than the passive act of 
recognition, an encounter where we are “forced to thought”, and where, through the process 
of rupture and affirmation, and in the presence of this possibility of something new, our 
habitual mode of acting and thinking is overwhelmed. True art, though rare, opens us to the 
possibility of becoming inventors of life’s new possibilities, of becoming the rogue trader of 
mad thoughts and courageous choices that remain unsanctioned by the orders of habitus and 
which annihilate the ruins of representation. In this sense, O’Sullivan understands Deleuze 
and Guattari’s own work to bear witness to such transformation:  
 
Art, in breaking one world and creating another brings these two moments of rupture and 
affirmation into conjunction. …Deleuze and Guattari’s writing can itself be positioned as an 
experiment in thinking differently, ‘beyond’ representation…[offering] us a ‘new image of 
thought’, one in which process and becoming, invention and creativity, are privileged over 
stasis, identity and recognition.130 
  
Taken altogether, the interrelated problems of an absence from the self, the spirit of sacrifice, 
the imagination’s creation of the world, and this possibility of the new all resonate deeply 
with a Kierkegaardian philosophy. In the cinema books, they are also the co-ordinates of 
Deleuze’s credo for a restoration of faith. As Marrati already explains, the most pressing 
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issue for Deleuze is our own absence of self from the world. Ultimately then, cinema’s 
anthropological, theological and political stakes for hoping and imagining a world inevitably 
return to the ancient problem of presence and absence, and the critical need for rethinking the 
institutionalised, unassailable meanings attributed to this binary. For Deleuze, the cinematic 
encounter offers the possibility to relinquish thought’s ‘rational’ leap to transcendental 
enclosures, to renegotiate the problem of presence entirely, and to rethink the leap of 
imagining beyond rationality itself: “The question is no longer: does cinema give us the 
illusion of the world? But: how does cinema restore our belief in the world?”131 Thus, if, as 
Barber writes, Nietzsche’s “theopolitical proclamation…concerns both God and the task of 
making the world, but…always and only…by way of the imagination”,132 it is, for Deleuze, 
the imagination’s mode of thought, aimed toward the creation of an unknown future, rather 
than memory’s mode of recognition, recollection and representation, that a true cinema 
would invoke, moving us away from a cosmology of origination grounded in the binary of 
presence and absence. We will soon see that, for Deleuze, this act of creative intervention 
which leads into the credo for a cinematic restoration of faith, has deep ties with both the 
Kierkegaardian mode of repetition and the Nietzschean mode of eternal return. Towards this, 
let us continue to retrace the steps that lead into the possibility of thought’s transformation, 
where the ontology of the cinematic human figure will converge with the ethos and pathos 
that marks its mode. 
 
Towards Deleuze’s reconfiguration of the real and the represented, we see that the illusion of 
a threshold between the traditional placements of presence and absence—through this figure 
that exists between time and eternity, body and soul, between this world and another—can no 
longer be thought strictly in terms of its anthropological “utilitarian purpose” as Bazin 
understands it: for Deleuze, presence and absence no longer speak to cinema’s conjurations 
of divine immortalisation against our inevitable, unthinkable death; the problem can no 
longer be grasped by deconstructing the polarities of reality and representation. In the wake 
of so much disillusionment, anaesthesia, spiritual paralysis and psychological catatonia, it is 
no longer possible to theorise the significance of the archaic double or spectre as it relates to 
a memory of the world and the consolations of immortal desire, however counter-intuitive 
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this seems. The problem, Deleuze and Guattari say with a clear gesture to Kierkegaard’s 
knight of faith, has changed:  
 
[O]n the new plane [of immanence], it is possible that the problem now concerns the one who 
believes in the world, and not even in the existence of the world, but in its possibilities of 
movements and intensities, so as once again to give birth to new modes of existence, closer to 
animals and rocks. It may be that believing in this world, in this life, becomes our most difficult 
task, or the task of a mode of existence still to be discovered on our plane of immanence today. 
This is the empiricist conversion (we have so many reasons not to be believe in the human world; 
we have lost the world, worse than a fiancée or a god). The problem has indeed changed.133 
 
If, for Deleuze, cinema bears witness to a world of sleepers-awake, of driftwood souls lost to 
the world and to themselves, it is not only a matter of living with ghosts, but of how we have 
become ghosts ourselves. In Italian neo-realism’s “empty or deserted spaces” (the any-space-
whatever) Deleuze sees bodies, like Edmund’s, “suffering less from the absence of another 
than from their absence from themselves…this space refers back to the lost gaze of the being 
who is absent from the world as much as from himself… ”.134 In this sense, cinema must 
reckon with an endemic spiritual impotence that cakes a world stricken by nihilism, a world 
consumed by an utter disintegration of self-presence: “Order has collapsed, as much in the 
states of the world that were supposed to reproduce it as in the essences or Ideas that were 
supposed to inspire it. The world has become crumbs and chaos. …It is no longer a matter of 
saying, to create is to remember—but rather, to remember is to create…”135   
 
In its simplest distillation, this means that for both cinema and philosophy, it is no longer the 
absurdity of death that the affective circuit of the cinematic body and philosophical thought 
must respond to, but the absurdity of life. If the image-body “affects the visible with a 
fundamental disturbance and the world with a suspension, which contradicts all natural 
perception”, if this encounter possesses the power to shock thought out of its disenchantment 
and catatonia, it is not least because of a peculiar charm intrinsic to the body that cinema 
naturally prepares for thought, a body that can no longer be thought as the lesser other to the 
real theatre body: 
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We have to go back to a very old problem, which already brought theatre and cinema into 
opposition. Those who deeply loved the theatre objected that cinema always lacked 
something, presence, the presence of bodies which remained the prerogative of theatre: 
cinema only showed us waves and dancing corpuscles with which it simulated bodies. When 
André Bazin takes up the problem, he looks for a sense in which there is a different mode of 
presence, a cinematographic one, which rivals that of theatre and may even outdo it with 
different methods. But if cinema does not give us the presence of the body and cannot give us 
it, this is perhaps also because it sets itself a different objective; it spreads an ‘experimental 
night’ or a white space over us; it works with ‘dancing seeds’ and a ‘luminous dust’…the 
object of cinema is not to reconstitute a presence of bodies, in perception and action, but to 
carry out a primordial genesis of bodies… . The problem is not that of a presence of bodies, 
but that of a belief which is capable of restoring the world and the body to us on the basis of 
what signifies their absence.136 
 
Here again, we see that for Deleuze, absence no longer designates the sense of existential loss 
or lack that grounds Bazin’s ontology of the image. Though still embalmed in its luminous 
mould, the body is no longer given as the immortalised resurrection of its model that would 
defy the ontological divide between presence and absence; now, the body becomes the locus 
for bearing witness to self-absence, for testifying to the absence of feeling and imagination, 
for becoming the ‘seer’ who is suddenly awakened to this lacuna that drifts between the inner 
self and the outer world. If it is a body of absence, it is so in the sense that it is a body bereft 
of belief in the possibility of time, a body of the time-image—the archetypal image of the 
absent modern attitude itself. Following Rossellini again, Deleuze finds such absence to be 
the essence of the everyday, dystopian, post-war reality, the banal body of despair becoming 
the “seer who finds himself struck with something intolerable in the world, and confronted by 
something unthinkable in thought.” 137  
 
Far worse than Kierkegaard’s knight of infinite resignation and natural despairing man—
both of which are already bereft of faith—the problem of absence has indeed changed, and in 
more than one sense. This particular body of absence is no longer a universal concept that 
stands for all bodies (and as such all bodies in all cinemas and all movements, as it does for 
film musicology’s argument for presence): as the broken spirit explicit to post-war survival in 
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a capitalist asylum, it is peculiar to a moment in history, its attitudes, gestures and postures of 
authentic sensory-motor breakdown ushering in the most serious contour of a cinema of the 
absurd. For Deleuze, the suspension of sentience—passion, hope, imagination and feeling—
that comes with the body’s rupture can no longer be thought in technological terms: this 
absence of inwardness—consciousness, sentience—is not down to a theft performed by the 
cinematic medium, but the loss of possibility in life itself.  
 
For Kierkegaard, the question of living a life of true possibility, rather than simply surviving 
its absurdity before dying, already involves crossings between ontology and ethos, 
knowledge and pathos, despair and faith. More-over, possibility itself turns on the balance 
between passion and imagination, where “all existential problems are passionate problems, 
for when existence is interpenetrated with reflection it generates passion.”138 In Fear and 
Trembling, the universality of his credo is more pronounced: “Faith is a miracle, and yet no 
man is excluded from it; for that in which all human life is unified is passion, and faith is a 
passion.”139 Surely, this appeal for a unity of humanity has an uncanny resonance with 
Deleuze’s own credo, and with the (Eurocentric) universality implicit to its restoration 
against an endemic lack of passion. “Whether we are Christians or atheists….”140 When 
Deleuze calls upon Rossellini, it is precisely to counter the impotence of a western world 
bereft of passion and imagination, and to challenge absurdity and despair with an 
anthropological imperative: “the less human the world is, the more it is the artist’s duty to 
believe and produce belief in a relation between man and the world, because the world is 
made by men.”141 For Deleuze, both Kierkegaard and Nietzsche are just such artists. 
Passionately and dramatically, both provide lessons for practicing a meaningful life in an age 
steeped in the sewers of impotence, their works acting as testaments to what Kierkegaard 
despairs as the ironic mask of an “exanimate body”, a body whose underlying faithlessness 
realizes a kind of tragic comedy: 
 
Our age reminds one vividly of the dissolution of the Greek city-state: everything goes on as 
usual, and yet there is no longer anyone who believes in it. The invisible spiritual bond which 
gives it validity no longer exists, and so the whole age is at once comic and tragic—tragic 
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because it is perishing, comic because it goes on. For it is always the imperishable which 
sustains the perishable, the spiritual which sustains the corporal; [if] an exanimate body could 
for a little while continue to perform its customary functions, it would in the same way be 
comic and tragic.142  
 
With Deleuze, the exanimate tragic comedy of the man-made world has eclipsed even this, 
becoming the worst kind of cliché, the ‘bad film’ of the living dead who is dead inside; with 
no presence to life or love, the world remains the scene of an endemic spiritual paralysis, 
hung in the simulacrum limbo of a copy of a copy of a copy… For Kierkegaard, “possibility 
is the only power to save. ...the only saving remedy; given a possibility, and with that, the 
desperate man breathes once more, he revives again; for without possibility man cannot, as it 
were, draw breath.”143 If Deleuze charges the true artist with the role of curing the real and 
curating the possible, it is not because the artist is somehow blissfully beyond or removed 
from the existential crisis of freedom and authenticity. It is because the true artist already 
feels the deadbolt of time, still hopes to feel enough to think, and to dread the possibility of a 
life without creativity’s breath. Beyond the simplistic categories of “Christian” and “atheist”, 
it is already the artist who practices the pain of living authentically, seeking out imagination 
and passion beneath the rubble of religion, as Deleuze himself does. It is already the artist 
who must, in Kierkegaard’s words, practice the movements of faith, by virtue of the absurd, 
so as to become a spirit of immanence. 
 
In this dire sense, with the loss of self-presence and the endless effort to reclaim its power, 
Deleuze’s immanent conversion of faith is, as Marrati will say, “more profound and more 
significant than conventional rifts between religion and atheism or than debates on 
secularization or, conversely, on the return of the religious. …The true modern problem is 
thus the problem of a faith that can make the world liveable and thinkable once again”.144  
Within this, the critical differences between Christian orthodoxy and Kierkegaardian 
immanence, between Nietzsche and Kierkegaard, between Kierkegaardian faith and 
Deleuzian belief, between the ‘stock’ orators of the body and an unheard orator, are the ropes 
that bind the fragment, “Give me a body then”. If these crossings are not complicated enough, 
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we must also attempt to think between ontology and ethos through the conduit of the acting 
body.  
 
For Joe Hughes, the enigma of faith that haunts Deleuze’s acting body simply cannot be 
resolved by studying Cinema 2 alone, but by turning to his greater oeuvre.145 Following 
Deleuze and Guattari, and aimed precisely toward a cinema of faith in the body, Hughes 
repeats that in the case of a cinematic restoration of immanence, this difference regarding the 
nature or purpose of belief is less a matter of a theology that arises in the contexts of 
historical fact, narrative, theme and directorial inclination, than one of anthropology. Yet 
here, the concept of faith loses all sense of sensual pathos and passion, in finding its broader 
synthesis between ethos and truth: 
 
[I]n Cinema 2, the concept that names the link between man and the world, is faith. … 
[However, to] believe or not to believe says nothing about the existence or non-existence of 
God…It does not imply a hidden, secret, or (un)known relation with the divine or a channel to 
transcendence. It is strictly anthropological. The idea of God’s existence results in one 
possibility of life; the idea of his non-existence results in another. …The concept of faith, 
then, seems to signify the way in which an Idea—in this case, that of God—determines a 
mode of existence and might even open up ‘infinite immanent possibilities’ of life. To give 
the concept of faith its broadest possible extension, we could say that it describes our 
‘relationship to truth’.146 
   
Undoubtedly, this striking distinction allows Hughes to see Kierkegaard’s concept of faith 
through Deleuze’s eyes, whereby the concepts of immanence, possibility and modes of 
existence undergo an empiricist transfiguration which Hughes argues ultimately has more to 
do with Hume, Spinoza and Bergson, than Pascal or Kierkegaard.147 Yet within this image of 
faith, too much of the anthropological is left out: the force of imagination, the leap, the 
passion that compels the leap, the absurd that ever accompanies this faith, a theatrical 
rhetoric of humour and irony that would restore a sense of mad fable to the quest for truth; all 
of these vital components that encircle the desire for an ideal mode of existence, the very 
components that allow us to think a Kierkegaardian body beyond the theological body of 
sorrow, remain occluded from view. As we will later see, with Deleuze, the concept of 
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leaping becomes far more sophisticated than is often acknowledged, taking on an explicitly 
theatrical, burlesque significance in relation to Kierkegaard’s ‘faith, by virtue of the absurd.’ 
Admittedly, this is in no way obvious in the cinema books. And given the serious nature of 
Hughes’ enquiry, such omissions are entirely appropriate. However, in his opening discourse 
on Deleuze’s ‘deduction’ of the body in Cinema 1—Deleuze’s critique of Bergson’s ‘image-
body’ in relation to the cinematic image of the body—Hughes’ desire to “make sense” of 
Deleuze’s cinema of faith nonetheless conjures an image of subjectivity and possibility 
which, once more, recalls that of Kierkegaard’s immanence, and as it does, summons the 
pedagogical crossing between ontology and ethos. The catalyst for his quandary is one of 
Deleuze’s more alchemically esoteric readings of the Bergsonian body as image.  
 
Bergson’s Gaseous Body as the ‘not yet’: A Crossing between Ontology and Ethics 
But in reality the body is changing form at every moment; or rather, there is no form, since 
form is immobile and the reality is movement. What is real is the continual change of form: 
form is only a snapshot view of transition. 
—Henri Bergson148  
 
A thought is a force in motion, an action, energy which changes. 
—Eugenio Barba149 
 
I look only at the movements. 
        —Søren Kierkegaard150 
 
What we must do is reach the photographic or cinematic threshold…When Kierkegaard adopts 
the marvellous motto, “I look only at the movements,” he is acting astonishingly like a precursor 
of the cinema… 
         —Deleuze and Guattari151 
 
For Deleuze, Bergson’s body—as one image among others participating in movement’s vast 
circuit of reciprocity—is “ahead of its time”, existing as “a gaseous state” on the plane of 
immanence, where “universal variation…undulation…rippling” constitutes “the universe as 
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cinema itself, a metacinema” of image, movement, matter and light.152 Bergson writes, “You 
may say that my body is matter, or that it is an image…My body, an object destined to move 
other objects, is, then, a center of action; it cannot give birth to a representation.”153 With 
Deleuze, Bergson’s body of action becomes, for cinema, the participatory sensory-motor 
circuit of subjectivity immersed in the “cosmic eddying of movement-images”,154 through the 
avatars of the perception-image, affection-image and action-image. No longer beholden to a 
preordained determinism, be it the laws of destiny, karma, or God’s will, the body of action is 
a “centre of indetermination”,155 a force which is able to choose to take action in the world, a 
presence that feels utterly ‘at one’ with its place in the world, and which, participating 
sensorily in the world, feels a sense of unity, connection, purpose and meaningfulness: even 
in moments of discord and disharmony, it is able to choose, even if the choice is to do 
nothing. For Deleuze, this body, with its avatars of perception, affection and action, is the link 
between humanity and the world, it is the nucleus of ourselves as “living matter or centres of 
indetermination”.156 As Hughes writes, Bergson’s body is the threshold between subjectivity 
and the plane of immanence, the hyphen, or interval, between the self and the world of 
movement and time. If the pure quality of affection is the locus of Bergson’s duration (the 
time of the self), it is so because affection is the feeling of time. For Bergson, real time is not 
the time of clocks and measures, chronology and science. Real time is the indivisible, 
immeasurable flow which is itself consciousness, the infinitely expanding site of the virtual 
world that we ourselves are becoming through every moment. Duration is the fluid concertina 
through which the rhythms of consciousness flow, “the continuous progress of the past which 
gnaws into the future and which swells as it advances.”157 As the sensed, felt time of the inner 
reality, duration is the ether of subjectivity itself, the virtual sensual-haptic “form of the 
formless”158 that saturates memories, perceptions, sensations, emotions, contemplations, 
imaginings, dreams and desires—all immeasurably flowing forms, all with their own peculiar 
expansions and contractions, prolongations and protractions, accelerations and decelerations. 
In Bergsonism, Deleuze summarises duration as “essentially memory, consciousness and 
freedom. It is consciousness and freedom because it is primarily memory.”159 Thus, in the 
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cinema, as the threshold between perception and action, the affection-image is the pure 
quality of duration. More-over, it is the conduit through which the relation between ontology 
and ethos also channels the two principle senses of the acting body:  
 
[The action-image] is the second material aspect of subjectivity. And, just as perception 
relates movement to ‘bodies’ (nouns), that is to rigid objects which will serve as moving 
bodies or as things moved, action relates movement to ‘acts’ (verbs) which will be the design 
for an assumed end or result. …There is an in-between. Affection is what occupies the 
interval… . It surges in the centre of indetermination, that is to say in the subject, between a 
perception which is troubling in certain respects and a hesitant action.160 
 
More-over, the interval of affection within Bergsonian duration is the state or quality which 
simultaneously precedes, prepares and harbours the sensory-motor breakage of Deleuze’s 
“crisis of the action-image”, the mode which manifests neo-realism’s time-image, the 
testament to modernity’s spiritual inertia and paralysis.  If subjectivity may be thought in 
terms of perception, action and affection, then affection, as the interval of the movement-
image that gives way to fragmentation and suspension, may certainly be thought as the 
threshold upon which a Kierkegaardian despair also stands, its own caesura of possibility, 
and of action, disclosing the nature of the sensory motor breakdown. This means that in the 
absence of hope, imagination, passion and faith, the mode of sensorial subjectivity that now 
confronts the absurdity of existence in the time-image can no longer be thought as entirely 
Bergsonian. As Hughes argues, if there is a “central difference between Deleuze and 
Bergson” it is that “in Bergson the subject becomes active too quickly.”161 It is at this point 
that Hughes begins his own meditation on the anthropological, rather than theological, 
significance of Deleuze’s cinema of faith, intent to “secularize belief fully”, by submitting 
“this link between ‘truth’ and ‘modes of existence’ to an empiricist conversion. God is no 
longer the truth. Truth is knowledge understood as the production of a rule for the future.”162  
 
Why work so hard to demand an image of Deleuze as radical atheist when his work clearly 
demonstrates a more provocative image of spiritual atheism? Why not follow his allusions 
and aporias all the way into the Kierkegaardian maze that coils through all the subtle, 
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glorious bodies of perception, affection and action to grasp a deeper legacy for the time of the 
self, one that comes before Bergson? The gaseous body that Deleuze registers is, I suggest, 
another thread that quietly binds a Kierkegaardian cinema of the absurd to a Deleuzian 
cinema of restoration of faith in the body. Here, I am not so concerned with nuancing 
Bergson’s own project regarding morality, faith, authenticity, subjectivity and religion, for, 
however marginally, Bergson already enjoys a presence in speculative theories on a 
Deleuzian spirituality of cinema. As Michael Goddard shows, the creative evolution of 
Bergson’s élan vital (the vital impulse) readily provides a pathway to think the crystalline 
time-image encounter “as an existential practice of subjectivation”, a process which returns 
once more to the mystic’s practice of becoming-active, which is again, as with Behun and 
Ramey, directly connected to Deleuze and Guattari’s BwO/body of light on the plane of 
immanence.163 Toward the obscurities of Kierkegaard then, let us go further into Deleuze’s 
gaseous body, to see how Hughes’ own insight toward a tension between ontology and ethics 
moves beyond a singular conception of action.   
 
In his second commentary on Bergson, Deleuze repeats the gesture of Bergson’s own 
meditation upon his self-perception of his body in Matter and Memory.164 As Deleuze’s 
reflection unfolds, his immersion into a Bergsonian self-perception becomes something of an 
uncanny reimagining, a thought experiment in relation to his own body, as if this figure, once 
known to him, now vanishes into the enigmatic lacuna of a protean meta-self:  
 
My body is an image…My eye, my brain, are images, part of my body. How could my brain 
contain images since it is one image among others? …how could images be in my 
consciousness since I am myself image, that is, movement? And can I even, at this level, 
speak of ‘ego’, of eye, of brain and of body? It is rather a gaseous state. Me, my body, are 
rather a set of molecules and atoms, which are constantly renewed. Can I even speak of 
atoms?165 
 
 For Deleuze’s perception, this gaseous body is the state that precedes the acting body. More-
over, it is a perception of the self that is free from external conditions that might restrain, 
order, or diminish the power of its indeterminacy. As the condition of possibility itself, the 
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image of ‘my body’ is yet to solidify, to fossilise, to become a concrete something that 
bridges the space between my inner self and the world. For Hughes, Deleuze’s curious mode 
of self-reflection suggests that the body is, ironically, strangely absent from itself, in that it is 
“not yet the fully constituted body. It is an unconstituted, ‘gaseous’ body” that is “not yet our 
body.”166 With this emphatic allusion to yet another avatar of an indefinable body of absence 
which nonetheless exudes an ephemeral presence, Hughes’ notion of the ‘not yet’ restores, 
rather serendipitously, the Deleuzian-Kierkegaardian intersection of possibility through this 
body that appears as the substance of the spiritus, giving rise to the simultaneous senses of an 
acting body that would fluidly collapse the boundary between the ontological and the ethical. 
 
The ‘not yet’ has a definite presence in Deleuze’s oeuvre. In What is Philosophy?, Deleuze 
and Guattari offer an anecdote that directly invokes its role in relation to the real and the 
possible. In the sudden encounter with a “frightened face”, the affective shock of its presence 
penetrates our otherwise serene world, opening out a new possibility for the world itself: 
neither subject nor object, this other presence exists as an expression, an affective image of “a 
possible world; the possibility of a frightening world. This possible world is not real, or not 
yet, but it exists nonetheless: it is an expressed that exists only in its expression—the face… . 
The other is a possible world as it exists in a face that expresses it and takes shape in a 
language that gives it a reality.”167 In this context, Deleuze’s ‘not yet’ gaseous state in 
Cinema 1 evokes just such a world, one that may well be frightening for the freedom it 
affords. And while this yet-to-be-constituted body—suspended in its very peculiar kind of 
corporeal absence—has all the traces of the affection body that comes before the body of 
action, it simultaneously covets the subtle body of mysticism; in both senses, it is a body 
which is genuinely open to future possibilities of choice. Now gaseous, Deleuze becomes, for 
himself, a vision of the subtle body, the body without organs, the body of freedom whose 
possibilities lay immanently before him, undetermined by virtue of the ‘not yet’: is this not, 
in some sense, also to invoke a faith, by virtue of the absurd? In the encounter with his own 
body through this ‘Bergsonian’ lens, Deleuze conjures something intangible and opaque, an 
unknown possibility which is yet to be able to be spoken, something which further aligns it 
with the mercurial nature of the body of light: like cinema does for the body, Deleuze 
“spreads an ‘experimental night’ or a white space” over himself; he works with ‘dancing 
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seeds’ and a ‘luminous dust’ ” to become the possible that cinema already unfurls as it moves 
between new ontological and ethical configurations.  
 
Hughes’ insight toward the ‘not yet’ gaseous state of Deleuze’s Bergsonian body thus opens 
toward the possibility of a Kierkegaardian body, one which is not yet a spirit of immanence, 
not yet an image of authentic selfhood. In this sense, we are no longer in the realm of an 
acting body which is cut off from, or indifferent to, its inseparable existential attitude. Nor are 
we any longer in the territory of a purely empirical or naturalist reading of either the 
Bergsonian body where image=matter=movement=light, Artaud’s BwO, or Spinoza’s 
question, ‘what can a body do?’ We are entering a stranger territory which, for Ramey, forms 
the ground of the ‘hermetic’ Deleuze, a territory of secrets and messages, masks and 
dramaturgs, concealments and disguises, enigmas, mysteries and esoteric wanderings. We are 
in the territory of images and ideas that rumble beneath the surface of things, rather than 
those that exist immediately before us, a territory which now allows Kierkegaard and 
Nietzsche to converge in a properly uncanny sense. In Difference and Repetition, Deleuze 
discovers an entirely original mode of thought in the tomes of both, a mode he calls the 
‘theatre of repetition’, which consciously requires its masks and costumes for the safe 
passage of a new thought: “Repetition is truly that which disguises itself in constituting itself, 
that which constitutes itself only by disguising itself.”168 As Ramey attests, the mode of 
repetition, as the mode of disguise, goes beyond the dualism of reality and representation, and 
in so doing, creates the realm of possibility that once more invokes the ‘not yet’: 
 
Throughout Difference and Repetition, Deleuze argues that the birth of thought takes place 
within the uncanny and the unrecognizable, in the sensible and the affective…the unthinkable 
or indiscernible—that which must but cannot be thought… . In some sense the enigmatic and 
the uncanny is the condition of each idea… . What matters then, in an idea, is not its ability to 
represent reality, but the range of experimental possibility it opens onto.169 
 
Following Ramey, I suggest that the fragment which grounds Deleuze’s cinema—“Give me a 
body, then”—harbours this very same sense of secrecy and enigma, this peculiar sense of the 
‘not yet’ as it engulfs the threshold within which all liminal modes (such as the uncanny and 
the absurd) become for the experimental possibility of thought. As just such an enigma—one 
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which must but cannot be thought—could the meaning of this message now become a matter 
of ‘scriptural’ interpretation (and thus, perfectly suited to dramatization)? Perhaps the 
fragment is something of a cipher, only appearing to privilege the bodies of Bergson, 
Spinoza, Nietzsche, Artaud? What if one were to read it more as a petition of longing rather 
than a resolute or even defiant declaration?  What if it denotes both at one and the same time? 
Would it not then appear as a kind of grotesque quandary which conceals and covets ‘a body’ 
which is ‘not yet’ given beneath the body that already exists? Becoming both religious and 
non-religious at one and the same time, would it proclaim the death of God with one mouth, 
while simultaneously revealing God’s immanent restoration with another?  For, finally, and 
without further diversion, it is Kierkegaard who, in his Journals, makes this morbid request 
for the possibility of a body in the effort to cure his own peculiar suffering: 
 
[W]ith respect to being human, what I lack is the animal-attribute. … Suffering frightful 
anguish, frequently to the point of the impotence of death—my spirit at such a time is strong 
and I forget all that in the world of ideas. But then I am upbraided for only wanting to be a 
thinker and for not being like other men…Give me a body, or if you had given me that when I 
was twenty years old, I would not have been this way. But you are envious, and this is the 
suffering the more highly endowed person, spiritually-intellectually, has to suffer…170  
 
In this manifold address to anguish, the impotence of death, the spirit, the thinker—the 
sufferer who bears the exile of prejudice because of such ‘animal’ absence—and the ironic 
request for a body, we find all the traces of Kierkegaard’s meditation on despair, a meditation 
that openly summons the spirit of immanence, which requires the preparation of faith through 
the body of time and feeling.  For Camus, Kierkegaard’s remedy for despair—the leap of 
faith which entails a “sacrifice of the intellect” —is an act of self-sabotage, nothing short of 
philosophical and intellectual suicide.171 Camus thinks that Kierkegaard fails to grasp a more 
pressing lesson, committing despair to the very same category of escapism that grounds the 
orthodox religious attitude.172 Thus, for Camus, there is little difference between 
Kierkegaard’s longing for a body, and those thinkers Nietzsche condemns as despisers of the 
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body, those high-priest philosophers who practice the rational movements of the eternal Idea 
to escape the morally corruptible movements of time’s finite, irrational body of sorrow: 
 
The important thing…is not to be cured, but to live with one’s ailments. Kierkegaard wants to 
be cured. To be cured is his frenzied wish and it runs throughout his whole journal. The entire 
effort of his intelligence is to escape the antinomy of the human condition. …how can one fail 
to read in his works the signs of an almost intentional mutilation of the soul to balance the 
mutilation accepted in regard to the absurd? It is the leitmotif of the Journal. ‘What I lacked 
was the animal which also belongs to human destiny… . But give me a body then.’… 
‘Oh!…what I lack, basically, is a body and the physical conditions of existence.’173 
 
Here, the fundamental divide between Kierkegaard’s despair and Camus’s absurd almost 
certainly summons the divining rod of the habitus of thought: here, it is but a quick step back 
to the overly simplistic difference between the Christian and the atheist. The possibility of a 
Christian desire for a body of time, however, or the atheistic desire for a spiritual life, 
continually requires the practice for a new movement of thought, one that no longer follows 
the privileging of one category over a subverted other, but moves across, through and 
between categories. For Kierkegaard, it is the body of both the Christian and the atheist 
which invokes the spirit of immanence, in the very same way that Deleuze’s cinematic body 
invokes its legacy of spiritual borrowings; the subtle body, the spiritual automaton, the 
gaseous body, the BwO, the spirit of sacrifice, the possible of immanence, ‘faith, by virtue of 
the absurd’. That Camus’s polemic confirms Kierkegaard as the originating source of our 
primary fragment simply reinforces the precise connection to a Deleuzian cinema of faith in 
the body of time and feeling. 
 
In this regard, Kierkegaard’s own request—‘Give me a body, then’—is something of a 
summons to those who would still regard themselves as too much a soul or mind, be they 
Christian or atheist. Reciprocally, is it also the remarkable inversion of (the Christian’s 
perception) of the atheist’s dilemma, the shared expression of a universally human despair 
that would cultivate the myth of immortality and the very concept of eternity: in Kierkegaard, 
it is time, rather than eternity, that is not quite, or not yet, in his body, and so he is not yet a 
spirit that would dread despair in the threshold of time and eternity. Cinema, for Deleuze, is 
precisely the medium which would, as a natural consequence of the absurdity of modernity, 
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and the crisis of the action-image which opens into the creation of the time-image, put time 
back into the body. 
 
This is the extent with which Deleuze’s philosophical reversal, “Give me a body, then” is of a 
peculiarly Kierkegaardian nature: as a plea of longing, it does not discount the organic bodies 
of Spinoza, Nietzsche, Artaud or Bergson, but somehow seems to hover within them, in the 
same way that the possible exists within the real. Does this further exacerbate the tension 
between philosophical and religious thought? For in calling up the threshold of the spirit, 
Kierkegaard’s longing for a body troubles not only the Christian-atheist divide, but also the 
long-held hierarchy between The Thinker and the everyday man. Coming before  Dionysian 
destruction, Kierkegaard’s irony would also rethink the figure of the pious Platonist, that self-
appointed superior to the everyday man so loathed by Nietzsche; yet Kierkegaard would 
seem to ‘play’ with this image of the philosopher, rather than demolish it as Nietzsche does, 
for he understands the irony of his own position, and how he himself cannot entirely escape 
its order.174 While he speaks of himself as the sacred thinker of “melancholy, reflection and 
piety”,175 the object of his longing nonetheless challenges this image of a lofty lover of 
wisdom who wants nothing more than to be done with the body and escape its incarceration, 
and for whom the body is, in Deleuze words, the “obstacle” for thought.176  Again 
Kierkegaard works toward a more liminal position between the everyday man and the high-
priest philosopher, his proof for the eternal ‘in man’ ultimately resting upon Socrates’ own 
existential longing: 
  
Socrates proved the immortality of the soul from the fact that the sickness of the soul (sin) 
does not consume it as sickness of the body consumes the body. So also we can demonstrate 
the eternal in man from that fact that despair cannot consume his self, that this is precisely the 
torment of contradiction in despair. If there were nothing eternal in a man, he could not 
despair; but if despair could consume his self, there would still be no despair.177 
. 
With this subtle staging of Socratic immanence, Kierkegaard would, simultaneously and 
paradoxically, seem to absorb and overturn the Socratic attitude, by moving between an 
image of Socratic ignorance as a form of infinite resignation, and an image of despair as the 
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ground of the spirit of immanence.178 In this reconfiguration, if “man is regarded as soul”179 
in traditional Christian thought, the hierarchy that would enthrone the philosopher-Christian 
as the archetype of soul, thus demoting the natural-everyday man as archetype of body, also 
becomes displaced with Kierkegaard’s desire; toward the attainment of spirit, the everyday-
body must learn to make the movements of the infinite, while the thinker-soul must learn to 
make the movements of the finite. Once more, the lack that Kierkegaard feels comes through 
keenly; already practicing the movements of eternity, he longs to learn the movements of 
time, to put time back into his body, so that he might become a spirit. “Give me a body then” 
is Kierkegaard’s own desire to reconcile himself to the body of absence, which Deleuze 
reciprocates as the great lesson of cinema for our self-absence: to be on the precipice of the 
gaseous body, the subtle body, the BwO, to become a centre of indetermination…this is the 
body that cinema automatically prepares for thought.  
 
As Hughes suggests, Cinema 2 never completely reveals “how we get from a state of 
permanent crisis back to the sphere of action” through a cinema of faith,180 much less, might 
we add, how we might locate the pedagogical crossing between a Kierkegaardian body and a 
cinema of faith: why does Deleuze leave us to grope through the lacunas and landmines of 
the spiritual wasteland he prepares, which absolutely exceeds the singularity of neo-realism’s 
despairing man? “For his part,” Deleuze writes,  
 
Rohmer takes up the Kierkegaardian stages ‘on the path of life’: the aesthetic stage in La 
Collectionneuse, the ethical stage in Beau marriage, for example, and the religious stage in 
My Night at Maud’s… . In Dreyer, in Bresson, and in Rohmer, in three different ways, this is 
a cinema of the spirit which does not fail to be more concrete, more fascinating and more 
amusing than any other (cf. Dreyer’s comic aspect).181 
 
Here, with Bresson, Dreyer and Rohmer, would Deleuze invoke the space between the 
movement-image and the time-image as the threshold of the absurd—its dual tragic and 
comical irony, its magnetism for burlesquing the serious spiritual posture—so as to locate this 
cinema of the spirit that restores Kierkegaard? We must continue to attempt to grasp the 
Kierkegaardian spirit in the way Deleuze does; not as tomes of logic but as plays of affect; 
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not as the rational exposition of ideas but as their sophisticated dramatization; as the 
burlesquing of faith through the body of gesture, shock and sudden revelation, rather than its 
impotent justification; as the craft of the sacred fool who, like the madman-jester, and like the 
theatrical body of burlesque, lives on as the herald of freedom and truth.182  
 
Ultimately, if there is any chance of glimpsing Kierkegaard as Punchinello dramaturg, we 
must remove him from the realm of the serious that he is so often left to languish in,183 for we 
are trying to look through Deleuze’s eyes, and not, as Bazin would say, through “the spiritual 
dust and grime” of our own,184  and we need a secure, unbiased grasp of the Kierkegaardian 
spirit to do so, the spirit of quietude and integrity who lives into the freedom of true choice, 
whose ethos affirms such immanent forces as movement, time, possibility, becoming, 
intensity, and imagination, and who believes in the merits of a burlesque method of thought.  
As contemporary film-philosophy already acknowledges, if these various aspects have a deep 
resonance with Deleuze, both in and beyond the cinema books, it is hardly co-incidental, 
however absent, antithetical or under-appreciated it appears to remain in broader 
philosophical circles.185 Following the pathway established by those scholars already openly 
invested in the more serious Kierkegaardian pulse of a Deleuzian cinema of faith,186 I further 
suggest that this existential grounding requires the balance of the absurd’s more theatrical, 
burlesque forces of gesture, jest, irony, and humour; through this more comprehensive circuit, 
we might glimpse the possibility of a more complete cinema of the absurd, wherein 
Deleuze’s immanent conversion of faith becomes the mask that would, ironically and 
paradoxically, perform the spirit of Kierkegaard himself. To this, let us recall the foundation 
for thinking the unthought: it is no longer the existence or non-existence of God that matters, 
but the possibilities of life that become available when one invokes the full thrust of creative 
imagination and passion, thus allowing us to move beyond a purely serious conception of the 
spiritual attitude and into the breach of the absurd proper. 
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Toward this cinematic burlesquing of the spirit then, let us trace the Kierkegaardian-
Nietzschean theatre of repetition in Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition, to finally see how 
such a theatre performs beneath the threshold of Deleuze’s cinema books. As we go, the 
philosophical inversion “Give me a body, then” will continue to perform its incarnations of 
the absurd, as if in its own protean, gaseous state of possibility.  
 
Kierkegaard and Nietzsche: Leaping and Dancing in the Theatre of 
Repetition 
Is it a matter of leaping, as Kierkegaard believes? Or is it rather a matter of dancing, as 
Nietzsche thinks? …Is the movement in the sphere of the mind, or in the entrails of the earth 
which knows neither God nor self? 
          —Gilles Deleuze187 
   
A man’s ethos is his daimon. 
          —Heraclitus188 
 
In Difference and Repetition, Deleuze takes up the remarkable difference between Nietzsche 
and Kierkegaard’s philosophies of repetition through the grounding practice of dramaturgy 
that masks their philosophies of existence. Repetition here means precisely not what it pre-
supposes etymologically: reimagining the Latin repetere (re-back, petere-seek), repetition is 
no longer the reflection, echo, mirror, mirage or copy of an unchanging, original essence. As 
Deleuze says, “Reflections and echoes, doubles and souls do not belong to the domain of 
semblance or equivalence”.189 Repetition is not another term for the “representation” which 
languishes within the metaphysics of presence. Rather, Nietzsche and Kierkegaard “make 
something new of repetition itself”, opposing it to all forms of generality (laws of nature, 
morality, habit and memory),190 and charging it with the theatrical atmosphere of irony, 
satire, lyricism and humour that would parry with the most serious of philosophical 
adversaries: the irresolvable paradox between the meaningfulness and absurdity of existence 
in the world of time and feeling,191 and the ethos of a spirit of immanence that would 
                                                 
187 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 10–11. 
188 Heraclitus quoted in Peters, Greek Philosophical Terms; see ethos, 66. 
189 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 1. 
190 Ibid., 6–7.  
191 Ramey, The Hermetic Deleuze, 14. 
212 
 
challenge and even overcome the forces of nihilism. In this new mode of repetition, time is 
no longer the image of eternity, nor is the body the image of the soul. In kind, mortal feeling 
is no longer the nemesis of divine thought, with the forgetting or finding of God and the self 
becoming the measure of authenticity: in repetition, what one “is” in this world now becomes 
the work of a spirit that would act for itself if only it could first think for itself.  
 
Framing both forms of repetition as forces that would act on thought by burlesquing the 
traditional meaning of representation, Deleuze finds striking differences between the two. In 
Nietzsche, repetition is the spirit of an ecstatic Dionysian willing of the eternal return, “the 
amor fati of metamorphosis”192 which overcomes the absurdity of existence; in Kierkegaard, 
it is the meditative act of repeating, where, as we have seen, all that one surrenders to God 
(love, life, the intellect) is returned through faith, by virtue of the absurd. Where Nietzsche 
grounds “the repetition of eternal return on both the death of God and the dissolution of the 
self”, Kierkegaard “dreams of an alliance between a God and a self rediscovered.”193 In each 
instance, writes Ramey, both seek to animate a mode of thought which becomes equal to “the 
inhuman events that befall it”,194 one whose potent force is oriented toward the future. By 
going beyond representation, by opposing the laws of nature, morality, habit, and memory, 
and as the act of the ethos of the spirit, repetition creates a new relation between the future’s 
two pathways of eternity and death: while Kierkegaard will make repetition the task of 
freedom and true choice in this life through the contemplation and confrontation with 
despair’s undying presence (death’s deathlessness), Nietzsche’s eternal return unleashes its 
macabre game of loss and salvation, annihilation and rebirth, making repetition the freedom 
of a euphoric will which creates and destroys its life over and over again.195 Where one’s 
repetition occurs only once, the other repeats infinitely, and in The Logic of Sense, Deleuze 
crystallises this essential difference: 
 
The Nietzschean repetition has nothing to do with the Kierkegaardian repetition; or, more 
generally, repetition in the eternal return has nothing to do with the Christian repetition. For 
what the Christian repetition brings back, it brings back once, and only once: the wealth of 
Job and the child of Abraham, the resurrected body and the recovered self. There is a 
                                                 
192 Ramey, The Hermetic Deleuze, 129. 
193 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 11. 
194 Ramey, The Hermetic Deleuze, 129. 
195 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 6. 
213 
 
difference in nature between what returns “once and for all” and what returns for each and 
every time, or for an infinite number of times. 196 
 
Is this formulation of repetition not already the prelude for Deleuze’s own existential credo in 
Cinema 2, whereby his constant appeal for a restoration of faith in the body of time and 
feeling, a restoration aimed toward the future, takes on the conceptual contours of a spirit of 
repetition?   
 
Both repetition and restoration invoke a faith in the finite world, giving us another sense for 
thinking the metamorphosis of the fragment “Give me a body then”, its meaning now going 
beyond Ficino’s spiritus, Artaud’s BwO and Bergson’s gaseous body, without exorcising or 
dispensing with them, and now sliding between repeating and returning. Deleuze desires the 
power of a true cinema to restore faith in the body and the world, in love and life, to restore 
reason itself, by virtue of the absurd, “Whether we are Christians or atheists…”197 … Is it to 
be the repetition of Kierkegaard’s once and for all, or the eternal return of Nietzsche’s infinite 
number of times? When Deleuze writes on the surrealist cinema of Luis Buñuel, it is precisely 
to demonstrate how cinema collapses the boundary between these two creative forms of 
repetition for the future, against the more querulous presence of a “bad” or simplistic form of 
repetition of the past: 
  
[I]n Buñuel…entropy was replaced by the cycle or the eternal return. Now, the eternal return 
failed to be as catastrophic as entropy, just as the cycle failed to be as degrading in all its 
parts, but none the less they extract a spiritual power of repetition, which poses in a new way 
the question of a possible salvation. The good man, the saintly man, are imprisoned in the 
cycle, no less than the thug and the evildoer. But is not repetition capable of breaking out of 
its own cycle and of ‘leaping’ beyond good and evil? It is repetition which ruins and degrades 
us, but it is repetition which can save us and allow us to escape from the other repetition. 
Kierkegaard had already opposed a fettering, degrading repetition of the past to a repetition of 
faith, directed towards the future, which restored everything to us in a power which was not 
that of the Good but of the absurd…in The Exterminating Angel, the law of bad repetition 
keeps the guests in the room whose boundaries cannot be crossed, while good repetition 
seems to abolish the limits and open them on to the world. …The repetition of the past is 
possible materially, but spiritually impossible, in the name of Time: on the contrary, the 
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repetition of faith, directed toward the future, seems to be materially impossible, but 
spiritually possible, because it consists in beginning everything again, in ascending the path 
which is imprisoned by the cycle, by virtue of a creative instant of time. Are there thus two 
repetitions which confront each other, like a death impulse and a life impulse? Buñuel leaves 
us in a state of the greatest uncertainty, beginning with the distinction or the confusion of two 
repetitions.198 
 
This correlation between a philosophy of repetition and a cinema of restoration is not even 
the most provocative aspect of Deleuze’s ruminations here. In securing this first crossing 
between Nietzsche and Kierkegaard, Deleuze discovers another “thought-cinema-body” link, 
one which holds the key to grasping Deleuze’s cinema of faith as a cinema of the absurd, one 
which harbours a conception of spirituality which exceeds spirituality’s traditionally serious 
image. For Deleuze, the affective reach of philosophy’s pedagogical purpose—its possibility 
to affect change in the world—needs to come through a mode of communication that would 
confront the ascetic charade of the ‘false’ thinker: for both Nietzsche and Kierkegaard, the 
antithesis of an authentic life is precisely this crude play of poses and egos. Through Deleuze, 
we see that the remedy for such imposture becomes, ironically and appropriately, a matter of 
engaging the practice of a timeless theatre, one whose irony is both tragic and comic, and 
penetrates the serious drama of life via the method of burlesque.  
 
Requiring a mode which would withstand and even revel in the dire excess of their themes—
God, existence, morality, truth, ignorance—both Nietzsche and Kierkegaard create the ideal 
tragi-comedy setting within which the drama of existence plays itself out, inventing “an 
incredible equivalent of theatre within philosophy, thereby founding simultaneously this 
theatre of the future and a new philosophy.”199 In Nietzsche and Kierkegaard, it becomes a 
matter of miming the mimicker, of creating new masks and disguises, messengers and 
secrets, where the truth is created against the tricksy façade of false knowledge. In this, 
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Deleuze finds “a Testament as well as a Theatre”, a philosophy conceived “entirely for the 
stage,” whose knights and heroes perform the dark humour and painful irony of the most 
serious existence.200  “O you roguish fools,” rages Zarathustra, “all of you, you jesters! …you 
strange higher men, how well I like you now since you have become gay again. …a little 
brave nonsense, some divine service and ass festival, some old gay fool of a Zarathustra, a 
roaring wind that blows your souls bright.”201 From the pen of the dramaturg rather than the 
ascetic intellectual, comes not merely a philosophy but a theatre of repetition, where 
storytellers and characters perform their parts, communicating the vast minutiae of morality’s 
quandaries through dynamic gestures, cautionary tales, songs, riddles, postures, parables, 
acrobatics, dances, poetry, and proclamations. “It happened that a fire broke out backstage in 
a theatre,” writes Kierkegaard, “The clown came out to inform the public. They thought it 
was just a jest and applauded. He repeated his warning, they shouted even louder. So I think 
the world will come to an end amid general applause from all the wits who believe that it is a 
joke.”202  
 
For Deleuze, this is a true theatre whose satire would bear witness to the false charade of 
‘real life,’ one which leaps in tune with Mozart’s music (Kierkegaard), and dances to the 
unleashed ritornellos of the earth (Nietzsche).203 Opposing the cool rhetorician of logical 
persuasion, the playwright of repetition reciprocates the pathos intrinsic to the circumstance 
through messengers who would illuminate those absurd crossings between the self, God, and 
the world: in Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling, the sacred fool whispers his truth to himself 
(God is found!); in Nietzsche’s Thus Spoke Zarathustra, the madman screams it to the world 
(God is dead!).  
 
For Deleuze, Kierkegaard is “a thinker who lives the problem of masks, who experiences the 
inner emptiness of masks and seeks to fill it” through the catharsis of his “theatre of humour 
and of faith”, where the existential drama of leaping plays out.204 Here, leaping is given as an 
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inward, imperceptible movement, which “opposes spiritual movement [with] logical 
movement”, where enlightenment’s ‘truth’ (knowledge)  is overwhelmed by passion 
(faith).205 For Nietzsche, repetition is still “a matter of filling the inner emptiness of masks 
within a theatrical space”,206 though now it is in the form of a willing spirit: “The eternal 
return says: whatever you will, will it in such a manner that you also will its eternal 
return.”207 Here, repetition becomes the “theatre of unbelief”, with Zarathustra’s “irony and 
black humour” becoming at times “a comic opera about terrible things”, whose ecstatic, self-
annihilating movements of Dionysian dancing “already” participate in Artaud’s modern 
theatre of cruelty.208 While the joke of Christian leaping resides quietly within the solitude of 
a self yet to come, the laughter of anti-theological dancing rejoices wildly in the bellow and 
ecstasy of a true spirit of freedom.  
 
“Theatre is real movement”,209 declares Deleuze, and so the real movement of thought must 
be grasped through those distinct movements peculiar to repetition’s drama, and one must be 
careful not to confuse them (“leaping is not dancing”).210 Both philosophies seek “to put 
metaphysics in motion, in action”, to create an affective force within the philosophical work 
that affects or shocks thought directly.211 Through this creation of a new physical theatre for 
thought, Deleuze grasps their untimely significance: “it is a question of making movement 
itself a work…of inventing vibrations, rotations, whirlings, gravitations, dances or leaps 
which directly touch the mind. This is the idea of a man of the theatre, the idea of a director 
before his time.”212 This is a philosophy which thinks like the body acts, and which performs 
the waves, vibrations, migrations, thresholds and intensities of Spinoza’s ethics, Artaud’s 
body without organs, and Bergsonian duration. One does not simply think the leap or the 
dance; one feels it as a kind of kinaesthetic reciprocity through the passion of its possibilities: 
like the infinite movements in cinema’s gesting bodies—the gest being “the essence of 
theatre”213—it is a shock to thought, as Deleuze says in Cinema 2.  
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Beneath the tragic and comical irony of storytelling, both Nietzsche and Kierkegaard script a 
possibility for existence which would be free from both the tyranny of melancholic absurdity 
and the traditional image of the religious body of sorrow:  this is their common ground. It is 
precisely the art of theatre which allows philosophical repetition to prepare the possibility for 
a metamorphosis of thought, passing beneath or beyond the radar of the rational, “concealing 
ideas within animals, pseudonyms, fables, and myths.”214 Through Deleuze, we understand 
that the philosophical theatre of repetition becomes the art of disguise par excellence: 
appearing as illuminati, fools and madmen come leaping and dancing in the hope that such 
movements might inspire the forceful (re)awakening of our own original, creative thought 
amidst a great pedagogy of feeling; through the pathos of movement, we might learn to grasp 
what we have forgotten to become, learn to harness what exists quietly and dreadfully 
beneath the suffocating layers of our own emperor’s new clothes, learn to become absurd in 
the most theatrical, rather than philosophical, sense.  
 
This, Deleuze seems to say, is the power of cinema, to restore the possibility of repetition 
through the creation of a body of immanence which would outstrip the false theatre and bad 
cinema of reality. In this sense, theatre itself—this spiritual theatre of the absurd—is the 
crossing between the philosophical pursuit for faith, and the Deleuzian cinema of faith.  If the 
ethos and pathos of a theatre of repetition prophecies a theatre, philosophy, and cinema of the 
future, it is through this stable of heroes, knights, fools and madmen, figures who may only 
exist as distant objects of scientific enquiry in the comparatively conservative mode of 
enlightened ‘knowledge’.  Deleuze thus suggests that however significant the essential 
message of a philosophy of objective reason, it may never achieve quite the same revelatory 
impact as this theatrical absurd that performs the world it creates. In kind, could we 
followingly suggest that a cinema of faith—of the absurd, of repetition as restoration—cannot 
procure its remedy through a wholly serious cinema of tragic irony (such as neo-realism) 
alone, without the existential clown? With Paolo Santarcangeli, we could say,  
 
Here then, is the utility, the justification of the clown, of the madman, of the madman who 
clowns, all institutionally exempt from punishment, a poenis soluti. “The social function of 
the satire of clowns who jeeringly accompanied conquerors and kings is undeniable,” 
remarked Roger Caillois. And vice versa all dictatorships, especially the stupidest ones, had at 
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their head at the beginning, leaders who did not know how to laugh at themselves; moral, 
religious and spiritual dictatorships included. For the comic view of the world frees man of 
the terrifying presence of the “demonic,” of religio, the bonds connecting his with the divine, 
and makes him forget the perils, the weight, the severity of existence.215    
 
Here, we might immediately recall Chaplin’s The Great Dictator (1940), which not only 
bears witness to, but burlesques the sheer madness of the world made by men.216 Historically, 
this has ever been the role of the artistic madman and the sacred fool. Across the spectrum of 
the arts, the figure of the clown attests to a world gone mad with the imposture of 
representation, and humanity’s own self-righteous pomp and circumstance. Gazing deeply 
into the soul of its culture to conspire with its demonic delirium, it is the clown who uses his 
body to radically undermine the serious nature of absurdity, becoming all manner of 
grotesque hybrid forms, becoming part-human part-vegetable, monster, god, animal, and/or 
machine. This is the burlesque body of Chaplin, of Harold Lloyd, of Buster Keaton, all 
tricksy “heralds of truth”, architects of the free spirit, inventors of new forms of body-satire 
who conjure new links between the spirit of the self and the world: crafting the laughter of 
the existential shock through the metamorphic properties of the plastic, theatrical body, the 
slapstick clown illuminates all manner of cautionary fates, impossible predicaments, and 
unbearable circumstances proper to the absurd machine world of modernity.217 These are the 
figures who are sired from the very same ancestry that both Kierkegaard and Nietzsche come. 
As Santarcangeli writes, however prolific its incarnation, the clown ultimately performs the 
role of harlequin sentry who would defend, counsel, puppeteer and purge the dire diseases of 
the soul through the force of laughter:  
 
The clown…is by turns creator and destroyer, a strange being who grants and who refuses, 
duper and duped according to the situation. …He knows neither Good nor Evil, or pretends 
not to know them; he removes himself from the realm of both and declines all responsibility 
for either one or the other. But beneath his apparent madness it is the Good which he seeks. 
…His acts impart a new vigour to life. …Divine juggler! We laugh at him, but he mocks us. 
For what happens to him happens to us. …if he causes laughter and is a source of liberation 
and criticism, he does not necessarily take part in the laughter and his attitude is frequently 
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one of disturbing sadness. For he is conscious of the responsibility of the role he plays which 
is a cause of social conflict. …there are only two means of overcoming the tragic: religion 
and irony. …laughter is a basically anti-religious manifestation. Clown, jester, joker, fool, 
trickster…bouffon, jongleur, arlequin…an entire repertory of titles, significant, suggestive 
and as varied as the costumes proper to the hundred manifestations of the same hero.218  
 
As dramaturgs of religion and irony, both Nietzsche and Kierkegaard invoke the mettle of 
this ancient anti-hero, their narrators and actors of repetition becoming just such sacred fools 
who create the truth: as Deleuze says, while Nietzsche’s Zarathustra will create a “thought 
beyond good and evil”, Kierkegaard’s knight performs an otherwise unthinkable “suspension 
of ethics”.219 As mime, acrobat and tight-rope walker, as trickster, fool and madman, these 
are the messengers of a new kind of truth-seeking who would shatter what Deleuze will call 
philosophy’s “false” theatre of representation,220 allowing him to advance his own cinema of 
restoration. 
 
Conclusion: From Humour to Faith 
Humour is the last stage of existential inwardness before faith. …Humour is not faith but 
comes before faith—it is not after faith or a development of faith. 
—Søren Kierkegaard221  
 
To contemplate a cinematic restoration of faith as deeply ironic in both the tragic and the 
comical sense…to discover a cinema that is “a Testament and a Theatre”…to grasp the 
infinite possibilities of the body as the gestural, jesting doer of truth rather than purely ascetic 
sayer of doctrine or spiritually-paralysed seer of despair…with so many turns through a 
Deleuzian cinema—of the body, of the spirit, of modes of existence, of sacred fools and 
madmen—does a spirituality of the cinematic body exist beyond a strictly serious asceticism, 
somewhere between the seriousness and the nonsense of the absurd, because of its 
pedagogical possibilities? 
 
The body which Deleuze prepares for thought through the time-images of neo-realism—a 
body bereft of belief yet simultaneously charged with the power to restore belief—is nothing 
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if not the serious incantation of absurdity’s tragic irony, its role given to bear witness to a life 
of banality and despair, a life which paradoxically takes the absurdity of its existence with the 
utmost seriousness.222 Yet Deleuze would also prepare for thought the movement-image 
bodies of surrealism, slapstick, and expressionism, all forms whose role it is to radically 
undermine the serious, the ascetic, the faithful, the ‘real’. Can Deleuze’s credo only be 
realised in the constant passage between movement-bodies of comical irony and time-bodies 
of tragic irony? Without the theatre of repetition, without Kierkegaard’s sacred fool who 
would joust with Nietzsche’s madman, without the affective forces of leaping and dancing, 
how are we to properly grasp the ironic nature of our own life beyond the tragic? Without the 
clown, how are we to practice the movements of faith, by virtue of the absurd? 
 
For Kierkegaard, it is humour that will move us into the possibility of faith and truth, and out 
from beneath the mask of the false knight, his most satirical castings reserved for his own 
ineptitude to leap: “Irony and humour reflect also upon themselves, and therefore belong 
within the sphere of infinite resignation…The last movement, the paradoxical movement of 
faith, I cannot make…in spite of the fact that I would do it more than gladly.”223 The irony of 
Kierkegaard’s own life—his infinite resignation to love God without leaping while desiring 
nonetheless to become the leaping spirit—ultimately invites an image of the tragic comic. 
This is not lost on Deleuze, who would see Kierkegaard’s self-conscious sacred fool of 
religious faith strung up amidst so much pathos: 
 
Kierkegaard… entrusted this supreme repetition, repetition as a category of the future, to 
faith. …However, there is an adventure of faith, according to which one is always the clown 
of one’s own faith, the comedian of one’s ideal. For faith has its own Cogito which in turns 
conditions the sentiment of grace, like an interior light. …the believer does not lead his life 
only as a tragic sinner in so far as he is deprived of the condition, but as a comedian and 
clown, a simulacrum of himself in so far as he is doubled in the condition. Two believers 
cannot observe each other without laughing. Grace excludes no less when it is given than 
when it is lacking. Indeed, Kierkegaard said he was a poet of the faith rather than a knight—in 
short, a ‘humorist’. …How could faith not be its own habit and its own reminiscence, and 
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how could…a repetition which, paradoxically, takes place once and for all—not be 
comical?224   
 
Thus, through the many turns we have made, it is not merely the credo of faith, nor the 
peculiar passion that creates Kierkegaard’s leap, that Deleuze would salvage and transform 
for his own philosophy of restoration in the cinema books, but the complexity of irony as it 
relates to faith and the body. In Cinema 2, the strange allusion to the figure of the sacred fool 
now takes on a wholly different meaning:  “We need an ethic or a faith, which makes fools 
laugh: it is not a need to believe in something else, but a need to believe in this world, of 
which fools are a part.”225 This, for me, is Deleuze’s most provocative spiritual landmine, one 
that presents the Kierkegaardian spirit in a properly absurd light. For Kierkegaard, the lack of 
a body is his great ironic pose. For Deleuze, it is precisely this lacuna that cinema not only 
bears witness to, but seeks to restore through its own theatre of repetition, through the body 
of burlesque, a body which is beyond representation, and the essence of the true artist that 
Deleuze reveres: “Metamorphosis of the true. What the artist is, is creator of truth, because 
truth is not to be achieved, formed, or reproduced; it has to be created. There is no other truth 
than the creation of the New…”.226 If we are indeed absent from ourselves, perhaps the 
remedy resides in Deleuze’s ensemble of orators of the body, which harbours, rather than 
exorcises, Kierkegaard’s spirit of immanence. The subtle way out invites us to live into a new 
spirituality for the future, through a body whose despair is the foundation for its creation, 
through faith, by virtue of the absurd. “Give me a body then…” 
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Conclusion: Spiritual Complexity  
 
In conclusion, we might ask, with Cobussen, “Where has this wandering, this groping and 
erring taken us?”1 Through musical meanings and cinematic human figures, have the liminal 
modes revealed a new significance for spirituality? Have they revealed new definitions, new 
modes of existence, for an age that is itself wandering, groping and erring amidst the 
unsettling displacements of our own post-secular, post-religious time? Have they provided an 
equally critical and poetic engagement with Deleuze’s call for a new kind of faith that he 
believes to be immanent to cinema, a faith that rethinks the transcendental, otherworldly kind 
that has tended to remain, throughout history, the province of music?  
 
From a musical perspective, we can say, with Cobussen, that “spirituality escapes any 
presentation within logocentrism”: like music, spirituality is “transcendent to this way of 
thinking, transcendent to presentation.”2  In this sense, music and spirituality defy the act of 
definition itself. Music is not a cipher for universal, divine messages, but a temporal conduit 
through which the spiritual emerges as “immanent, singular and not otherworldly”: 
 
…spirituality does not precede music; it is through music (and of course many other 
evocations) that we encounter the spiritual… . A spiritual existence is therefore always 
mediated and thus never immediate. Spirituality is thus no stable concept, an invariable (and 
with that a definable) idea; spirituality happens, it happens each time differently and is 
therefore in a constant process of becoming, of (trans)formation. Spirituality is a movement.3 
 
The core concepts of movement, transformation and mediation remain significant, for music 
exists as a force that requires the medium of the sensible—the body—for it to sound, to be 
heard and felt, while also being the catalyst for movements and transformations in thought 
itself: for music to “be” spiritual, it need not “belong” to the site of the eternal soul, to 
religion, to Christianity, or to other organisations or institutes that create ambiguous crossings 
between terms such as unity, oneness, order, belonging, universality, equality, homogeneity, 
sameness and conformity. Recognising the further irony of naming this movement that is 
paradoxically beyond language, Cobussen calls the musical encounter a para-spirituality, 
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with ‘para’ being “the dangerous prefix defying the rules of identity, stability, and 
centricity”.4 In a time defined arbitrarily as both post-religious and post-secular—thus a time 
moving ambivalently between a defiance to, and a reassertion of, the rules of identity, 
stability and centricity—Cobussen’s work offers a pathway that leaves the freedom and 
openness of music’s spirituality intact; spirituality “can never be defined for once and for 
all…this way is twisted and not very well specified…”5 In this sense, Cobussen’s thresholds 
allow us to reimagine our own participation with music’s aura of mystery beyond a 
moralising orthodoxy that has traditionally bound the territory of spirituality to 
anthropocentric, logocentric thought.  
 
Following Cobussen, we might further suggest that this process of mediation allows us to 
recognise that music’s complicated relation with identity, stability and centricity necessarily 
entails a confrontation with what it means to be human. Provocatively, the cinematic human 
figure, with its own processes of mediation, its own fluid metamorphoses of identity, and its 
own complicated relation with spirituality presents a rather peculiar reciprocity with music’s 
para nature, opening out the question of where the spiritual resides, and upon which planes of 
existence. Like musical meaning, the cinematic human figure is not only innately liminal, but 
liminal in a plural sense, its own aura of mystery, like music’s, summoning diverse theories 
of identity that move between such polarities as body and soul, thought and feeling, human 
and cosmos, time and eternity, life and death: Jankélévitch’s imprecise soul in the flux of 
becoming, Cholodenko’s anti-Platonic uncanny spectre, Bazin’s luminous spirit, Morin’s 
mythical double, Ficino’s musical-mystical subtle body (the body of light), Nietzsche’s 
Dionysian self-forgetting spirit of the earth and the night, Kierkegaard’s spirit of the absurd, 
Deleuze’s cinematic body of immanence. Correspondingly, each figure animates an affective, 
cosmological threshold intrinsic to its bond between human identity and faith, revealing a 
certain kinship between questions of belonging and solitude, the problem of time (of which 
death is foundational), the imagination’s powers of creation, and those actual and symbolic 
forces of the universe with which cosmic communion is realised: from the pre-Christian 
archaic darkness of Hades and the Christian luminous space between heaven and earth, to the 
silent abyss between the “modern” self and the world of humans, such thresholds compel us 
to think the plurality of ways in which the bounds of human ontology are challenged, and 
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how the simultaneous desire to merge with both nature and the divine necessarily entails a 
movement beyond the either/or predicament that continues to haunt the future of belief.   
 
This generative ensemble of para-spiritual figures and spaces has emerged from the language 
and methodology implicit to the concept of liminality itself: in this respect, I hope to have 
shown the ways in which the intersecting modes of the ineffable, the uncanny, utopian desire 
and absurd feeling, and their respective components of existential ambiguity, paradox and 
irony, offer an extraordinarily rich and complex foundation for revitalising those perennial, 
irresolvable problems of existence that art seeks communion with. In moving through these 
modes, such complexity has taken the relation between faith, musical meaning and the 
cinematic human figure into much stranger, and at times controversial, places than the 
discrete paradigms of musicology, film theory and film music studies have traditionally 
accommodated. Animating crossings between archaic, Platonic, Christian and atheistic 
beliefs, the modes themselves necessarily intervene with the false certitude that an either/or 
system imposes and preserves, creating new possibilities for thinking the bond between 
human identity and faith, possibilities that I believe respond dynamically and responsibly to 
the incertitude of our own post-religious and post-secular time.  
 
Ultimately, a thinking in thresholds allows us to approach the intersecting theories of 
musicology and film studies with a firm grasp of the stakes involved in forging a theory of 
spiritual complexity, a theory that pursues the significance of art in relation to thought and 
life: however counter-intuitive, alien or undesirable, spiritual complexity recognises 
otherwise unthinkable thresholds that move indeterminately between thought and feeling, 
between the Platonist and the Nietzschean, between the Christian and atheist, between logos 
and mythos, between a belief in time and a belief in eternity. Toward such complexity, the 
modes give us a language for engaging critically and creatively, even theatrically, as Deleuze 
suggests, with those ontological and ethical quandaries regarding our existence, with what we 
cannot know of death, and what may yet become possible in life, without reducing the act of 
theorising itself to a purely logical, “rigidly rationalistic” process.6 In Pure Immanence, 
Deleuze writes: 
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The philosopher of the future is the explorer of ancient worlds, of peaks and caves, who 
creates only inasmuch as he recalls something that has been essentially forgotten. That 
something, according to Nietzsche, is the unity of life and thought. It is a complex unity; one 
step for life, one step for thought. Modes of life inspire ways of thinking; modes of thinking 
create ways of living. Life activates thought, and thought in turn affirms life.7  
 
In directly pursuing how liminal philosophies of thought also connect to spiritual theories of 
musical meaning and the cinematic human figure, I have tried to emphasise the extent to 
which complexity involves not only a reckoning with the belief in eternity, but a recognition 
of spirituality immersed in the qualitative feeling of time, which remains beyond logical, 
quantitative knowledge. While a Bergsonian current flows through these ideas, so too does 
Morin’s notion of “true rationality”, where, like Deleuze’s own affirmations, the very concept 
of “thought” moves beyond the traditional category of reason. More collectively still, and 
however discrete their anthropological, philosophical, theological and/or artistic pursuits, 
from Kierkegaard to Nietzsche, Morin to Deleuze, Jankélévitch to Cobussen, one mode of 
existence—of thought—is consistently challenged, the one which refuses complexity through 
the privileging of rationalism—the pious, ascetic thinker, as Deleuze calls the philosopher, 
Kierkegaard’s false knight of infinite resignation, Tarkovsky’s spiritually impotent modern 
man of capitalist consumerism—while other more potent identities are offered as alternatives, 
all of which are equally available and possible to thought when one embraces not only the 
incertitude of existence through paradox and ambiguity, but the equally dynamic forces of 
joy, innocence, irony and the shifting plurality of metamorphosis. Among these are Morin’s 
thinker-feeler-madman-player-doer, Nietzsche’s hermit, Cobussen’s atopian wandering 
mystic, Kierkegaard’s true knight of faith, Deleuze’s artist-thinker who lives into a burlesque 
spirit of immanence: in the search for what Ramey calls “the future of belief”, these are 
figures who might certainly offer new possibilities for future modes of faith, particularly if 
faith is now entrusted not only to the composer and the filmmaker, but also to the dramaturge 
philosopher that captivates Deleuze.  
 
Ramey is “convinced that philosophy, within and beyond Deleuze, has an eschatological 
dimension in that it calls for new concrete syntheses of thought and life, in the midst of a 
continuing crisis over the nature and future of secular, modern, and post-Enlightenment 
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culture.”8 To this, I wonder if this eschatological dimension is already active when thought 
and life converge in the liminal modes of musical meaning and the cinematic human figure. 
Toward such spiritual complexity, I hope to have begun a dialogue which advocates a 
genuine sense of diversity amidst liminalist music and film theories, which affirms that such 
theories offer sophisticated negotiations with the “post-secular turn” that philosophy is 
currently immersed in, and which establishes the music-cinema encounter as an open 
threshold for creatively reimagining the future of belief itself.  
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